Sullivan v. George
| Decision Date | 14 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Cum-17-371 |
| Citation | 191 A.3d 1168 |
| Parties | Michelle L. (George) SULLIVAN v. William A. GEORGE |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Gene R. Libby, Esq., and Tyler J. Smith, Esq., Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellant Michelle L. (George) Sullivan
Theodore H. Irwin, Jr., Esq., and Jacqueline R. Moss, Esq., Irwin Tardy & Morris, Portland, for appellee William A. George
Panel: ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
[¶ 1] Michelle L. (George) Sullivan appeals from a divorce judgment entered by the District Court (Portland, J. French, J. ). She contends that the court abused its discretion by ordering, sua sponte, a downward deviation of William A. George's child support obligation from the amount prescribed by the guidelines, by ordering William to pay spousal support in an amount that Michelle asserts is insufficient in duration and amount, and by declining to award attorney fees beyond those provided through an interim order. We vacate the court's child support order and remand for entry of a child support order pursuant to the guidelines, but we affirm the judgment in all other respects.
[¶ 2] The following facts, which are supported by the record, are drawn from the divorce judgment. Harper v. Harper , 2017 ME 171, ¶ 2, 169 A.3d 385.
[¶ 3] Michelle and William were married in 1995 and have three children—at the time of the hearing, one was an adult and two were minors.1 In early 2016, Michelle commenced this divorce action. At the two-day final hearing held in May of 2017, the parties stipulated to some parenting issues and to the distribution of most of the real property and the valuation of some of the personal property and debt. The contested issues included the amount of the parties' incomes for purposes of determining child support, spousal support, and attorney fees.2
[¶ 4] In the divorce judgment issued in July of 2017, the court found that the parties had agreed that if they started a family, Michelle would stay at home with the children. Michelle is a physical therapist who has worked generally on a per diem basis, although her license has expired. She is also a certified Pilates instructor. Following the birth of the parties' first child in 1997, Michelle worked as a physical therapist intermittently, and when she did so, her employment was less than full-time. Her most recent employment, which was in 20163 and paid her roughly $45 per hour, ended after only two weeks because her training was not current.
[¶ 5] The court fixed Michelle's current annual imputed employment income at $14,040, based on an hourly wage of $9 for 30 hours per week. The court declined to attribute income to Michelle based on full-time employment because she will be required to intern or volunteer for at least 1,000 hours to qualify as an independent practitioner in a specialized field that will combine her vocational goals as a Pilates instructor and physical therapist. The court found that Michelle's annual living expenses are nearly $125,000.4
[¶ 6] William is a physician and is the founder and current one-third owner of a medical practice. He earns $335,000 annually and incurs annual living expenses totaling just over $100,000. William lives with a domestic partner who earns $37,000 per year and contributes toward the monthly household expenses.
[¶ 7] Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the court ordered that the children would live primarily with Michelle with rights of contact awarded to William. The court calculated the amount of weekly child support that William would be required to pay pursuant to the guidelines, see 19-A M.R.S. § 2006 (2016),5 which was $626 for two children and $444 for the youngest child after William's obligation to pay support for the middle child ends, see supra n.1. Then, even though neither party requested that the court depart from the child support guideline amounts, the court ordered a downward deviation from the guidelines on the basis that "the support guidelines would be inequitable or unjust in consideration of the interrelation of the total support obligation[,] ... the division of property[,] and an award of spousal support[,] as well as available income and financial contribution of [William's] domestic associate." For those stated reasons, the court reduced William's weekly support obligation for two children from $626 to $550, and from $444 to $400 for one child.
[¶ 8] The court's division of the marital estate resulted in a net distribution of assets and liabilities that was nearly equal.
[¶ 9] The court ordered William to pay general spousal support of $3,600 per month. In addition, the court awarded Michelle monthly transitional support of $3,600 for thirty months "to allow for Michelle's reentry in the workforce." See infra n.9. The court stated that the awards of general and transitional spousal support resulted from its consideration of the factors contained in 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5) (2017), including the length of the parties' marriage, Michelle's contributions as a homemaker, and the employment and income-producing history of each party. Finally, the court denied Michelle's request for attorney fees.
[¶ 10] Following entry of the judgment, Michelle filed a motion for further findings and conclusions on several issues, including the amount of child support, and a motion to amend the judgment. See M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59(e). The court made several corrections within the child support orders without altering the reduced amounts of child support that William was required to pay, but the court otherwise denied the motions, explaining that the judgment articulated the factual and legal bases for its determinations. Michelle filed a timely notice of appeal. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1) (2017) ; 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2017) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(c).
[¶ 11] Michelle contends that the court erred by awarding an insufficient amount of spousal support and by ordering a downward deviation of child support.6 Because we conclude that the court's reasoning for the downward deviation of child support is not supported by the record, we focus our discussion on that issue.
[¶ 12] We review a deviation from the statutorily presumptive child support guidelines "for an abuse of discretion, and, absent a violation of a positive rule of law, we will overturn the trial court's decision only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument." Dep't of Human Servs. v. Monty , 2000 ME 96, ¶ 10, 750 A.2d 1276 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 13] A determination of whether a court abused its discretion involves a three-part analysis: (1) whether factual findings are "supported by the record according to the clear error standard; (2) [whether] the court [understood] the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given all the facts and applying the appropriate law, was the court's weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds of reasonableness." Pettinelli v. Yost , 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11, 930 A.2d 1074. "A fact-finding is clearly erroneous only if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it." Wandishin v. Wandishin , 2009 ME 73, ¶ 14, 976 A.2d 949. Because Michelle filed a proper motion for further factual findings on the child support order, M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) —a motion that the court denied because it stated that it had already articulated the basis for its determination—our review is confined to the court's explicit findings. Ehret v. Ehret , 2016 ME 43, ¶ 12, 135 A.3d 101.
[¶ 14] The fundamental step in determining the amount of a parent's child support obligation is to calculate that amount pursuant to the support guidelines, which takes into account the number of children, the parents' incomes, child care costs, a child's extraordinary medical expenses, and the costs of private health insurance. 19-A M.R.S. § 2006. "There is a rebuttable presumption that the child support obligation derived from the child support guidelines is the amount to be ordered, absent special circumstances or a deviation from the guidelines ...." Sullivan v. Doe , 2014 ME 109, ¶ 25, 100 A.3d 171 ; see also 19-A M.R.S. § 2005 (2017). The court may deviate from that presumptive amount upon a finding that that amount is "inequitable or unjust" due to at least one of the considerations enumerated in the governing statute, 19-A M.R.S. § 2007(1), (3) (2017).
[¶ 15] Here, the presumptive child support amount, as calculated in the child support worksheets, was $626 for two children and $444 when William is obligated to pay for the benefit of only the youngest child. The court determined sua sponte7 that a downward deviation from the presumptive amount was justified, and the court accordingly reduced the amount to $550 per week for two children and $400 per week when only one child is eligible. The amount of the reduction from the presumptive obligation is therefore $76 per week for two children ($3,952 annually) and $44 per week when the support is for one child ($2,288 annually).
[¶ 16] The court explained that there were three reasons to warrant the downward deviation:
The court finds that a child support order based on the support guidelines would be inequitable or unjust in consideration of the interrelation of the total support obligation established under the support guidelines for child support, the division of property[,] and an award of spousal support as well as available income and financial contribution of [William's] domestic associate. And so the court believes that a downward deviation is appropriate.
These ostensible justifications for the downward deviation are derived from the factors that a court may use for that purpose:
To continue reading
Request your trial
- State v. J.R., Docket: Som-17-489
-
Sears v. Sears
...[¶2] "The following facts, which are supported by the record, are drawn from the divorce judgment." Sullivan v. George, 2018 ME 115, ¶ 2, 191 A.3d 1168. Torrey Bobby were married on August 16, 2000. In late 2018, Torrey told Bobby that he wanted a divorce, and they have been living separate......
-
Cashman v. Robertson, Docket: Wal-18-204
...The following facts, which are supported by the evidence, are drawn from the divorce judgment. See Sullivan v. George , 2018 ME 115, ¶ 2, 191 A.3d 1168.[¶6] Danielle and Jaison were married in Maine on September 13, 2003, and separated in July 2016. The parties' two minor daughters reside w......
-
Bahn v. Small
...19-A M.R.S. §§ 2007 -2008 (2018) ; see 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2005 -2006 (2018) ; see also Sullivan v. George , 2018 ME 115, ¶¶ 14-17 & n.7, 191 A.3d 1168. Even when the parties agree to the child support provision, such an agreement "must be reviewed by the court or hearing officer to determine if......