Chrisman v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 06 May 1987 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Leroy CHRISMAN et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT, etc., County of San Diego, Respondent; GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Real Party in Interest. D005948. |
Sachse, James, Croswell & Lopardo and Kevin J. Croswell, Fallbrook, for petitioners.
No appearance for respondent.
Newell & Balestreri, Thomas A. Balestreri, Jr., and David K. Silverberg, San Diego, for Real Party in Interest.
We grant Leroy and Joseph Chrisman's petition for a writ of prohibition and mandate to prohibit the superior court from requiring a de novo trial of their underinsured motorist claim and to direct the court to confirm an arbitration award obtained on the underinsured motorist claim against their insurer General Accident Insurance Company (General). We hold the State's statutory scheme guarantees insureds who incur damages from under insured motorists the same binding arbitration rights as those available to un insured motorists pursuant to INSURANCE CODE SECTION 11580.21 and issue the writ.
On February 10, 1985, Joseph Chrisman was involved in an auto collision while insured with General under a policy obtained by his father Leroy. Joseph settled with the other driver to the collision for the policy limits of $50,000. The Chrismans then filed a claim with General for the difference between the $50,000 received and the actual amount of damages, up to the $100,000 limit of their policy. This issue was arbitrated and the arbitrator found General owed $60,000. General then filed an action seeking a de novo hearing on the issue before the superior court or, at minimum, to have the award reduced to the $50,000 maximum recovery possible under its policy. The Chrismans moved to dismiss General's action and petitioned for confirmation of the arbitration award. The motion and the petition to confirm the arbitration award were heard simultaneously and denied.
The underlying dispute is whether a provision in General's policy making an underinsured arbitration award reviewable in court conflicts with section 11580.2 which regulates uninsured and underinsured insurance practices.
General's policy provides:
Based upon this policy provision, General sought judicial review (through declaratory relief) of the underinsured motorist claim because the award exceeded the state-required $15,000 minimum. The Chrismans argue the provision is void as inconsistent with section 11580.2, subdivision (f), which states in part:
"The policy or an endorsement added thereto shall provide that the determination as to whether the insured shall be legally entitled to recover damages, and if so entitled, the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured and the insurer or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration."
An arbitration decision is not reviewable de novo by a trial court. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1286.2.) As a result, General's policy conflicts with the statute if subdivision (f) applies to underinsured claims. 2 General, however, claims section 11580.2, subdivision (f), only applies to un insured motor vehicle coverage and in the absence of a specific arbitration agreement in the insurance contract, the Chrismans' only remedy for under insured coverage disputes would be in the judicial system.
General does not dispute that arbitration, pursuant to the statute, would be binding except for review permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 1286. In an adhesive portion of its insurance contract, General purports to make arbitration subject to a trial de novo if the award against it exceeds $15,000. Although General argues the de novo condition is mutually advantageous since it is available both to the insured and to General, the potential advantage to an insured who has obtained an arbitration award in excess of minimum insurance requirements appears remote compared to its utility to the insurer. Although we believe General's argument is unpersuasive, we do not address it further because we find the legislation here expressly requires binding arbitration of both uninsured and underinsured claims. Section 11580.2 makes no distinction between un insured awards (which General concedes are binding) and under insured awards. Further, the insurance policy provision denying finality only to underinsured awards which are greater than $15,000 thwarts the statutory benefits of finality and avoidance of costly time-consuming judicial involvement in attempting to recover benefits from one's own insurer.
Citing cases addressing different circumstances and issues and section 11580.2, subdivisions (b) and (p)(2), General argues "uninsured" and "underinsured" generally have different meanings. However, for our purposes, section 11580.2, subdivision (b) contextually states in part the Legislature's meaning of the terms:
"As used in this section, the term 'uninsured motor vehicle' means a motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is no bodily injury liability insurance or bond applicable at the time of the accident, ... or an 'underinsured motor vehicle' as defined in subdivision (p),...
Section 11580.2, subdivision (n) states in part: "For the purposes of this section, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage shall be offered as a single coverage. " (Italics added.) Section 11580.2, subdivision (p) relates specifically to underinsured motorist coverage, providing in part: "If the provisions of this subdivision conflict with subdivisions (a) through (o), the provisions of this subdivision shall prevail." Thus, where there is no conflict between subdivision (p) and subdivisions (a) through (o), the provisions of subdivisions (a) through (o) apply to both uninsured and underinsured motor vehicle coverage. Because the arbitration procedure expressed in subdivision (f) does not conflict with anything expressed in subdivision (p), subdivision (f) applies both to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.
General also claims section 11580.2 did not apply to...
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Mercury Ins. Group v. Superior Court
...(Goulart v. Crum & Forster Personal Ins. Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 527, 530, 271 Cal.Rptr. 627; Chrisman v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1465, 1469, 236 Cal.Rptr. 703; see Orpustan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 988, 992, 103 Cal.Rptr. 919, 500 P.2d 1119.) Its ben......
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Rizzo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2016–0592
...disputes by binding arbitration, and California courts have not enforced trial de novo provisions. See Chrisman v. Superior Court, 191 Cal.App.3d 1465, 236 Cal.Rptr. 703, 704–05 (1987) (holding that a trial de novo provision is unenforceable because Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(f) (2006) requir......
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O'Hanesian, v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
...novo following underinsured motorist arbitration was invalid and unenforceable by either party]; Chrisman v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1465, 1468-1469, 236 Cal.Rptr. 703 (Chrisman) [holding invalid as to the insurer a policy provision for trial de novo following an underinsured m......
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Gordon v. G.R.O.U.P., Inc.
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