Sampsell v. People of State of California
Decision Date | 18 September 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 12704.,12704. |
Citation | 191 F.2d 721 |
Parties | SAMPSELL v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
J. Oscar Goldstein, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., State of Cal., Clarence A. Linn, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before MATHEWS, STEPHENS and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
Sampsell was convicted in a California Superior Court of murder in the first degree, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to murder, and robbery in the first degree, and sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, People v. Sampsell, 1950, 34 Cal.2d 757, 214 P.2d 813, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Sampsell v. California, 1950, 339 U.S. 990, 70 S.Ct. 1016, 94 L.Ed. 1391. He is here appealing from a judgment of the United States District Court dismissing his petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The judgment followed the issuance of an order to show cause upon which issues were drawn in accordance with the usual practice.
Where a petitioner has exhausted his state remedies and his petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has been denied, a federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for federal habeas corpus. Darr v. Burford, 1950, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587, 94 L.Ed. 761; Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. In such a case, appellate jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253. The denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court carries no weight in the subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding. Darr v. Burford, supra, 339 U.S. at page 216, 70 S.Ct. at page 596.
Sampsell claims and has the burden of showing that the state so departed from constitutional requirements as to justify a federal court's intervention. Darr v. Burford, supra, 339 U.S. at page 218, 70 S.Ct. at page 597. The Great Writ does not extend to the prisoner in this type of proceeding unless he is in custody in violation of the constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(3).
The intervention of the United States District Court is justified by petitioner because, as he claims, the jury was not instructed to the effect that unanimous agreement of the jury members upon the penalty was necessary, should a verdict of guilty be returned. He relies upon Andres v. United States, 1948, 333 U.S. 740, 68 S.Ct. 880, 92 L.Ed. 1055, where a conviction in a federal district court was reversed for misdirection of the jury as to the unanimity required on the penalty issue. In the Andres case the Supreme Court was exercising its function of reviewing federal criminal proceedings, and was not dealing with the question of the deprivation of constitutional rights. Whether cognizance of this point by the district court was proper in this proceeding we do not stop to consider since the contention is without support factually. The instructions clearly covered the point. The jury were told that if a verdict of guilty of murder is found by the unanimous vote of the jurors the penalty of death or imprisonment for life was a matter of discretion for the jury. They were told that such discretion should be exercised in the following manner: If the jury should find that the punishment is to be life imprisonment, notation to that effect is to be added to the verdict of guilty, but that if the punishment should be death, nothing should be added to the verdict of guilty. The jury were also told that "If any individual juror, or the jury as a whole, entertains a reasonable doubt as to which one of two or more punishments should be imposed, it is your duty to impose the lesser of the two." It is not and could not well be contended that life imprisonment is not the lesser of the two. Jurors cannot be assumed to be below the level of common understanding. And it can hardly be argued that the common and plain meaning of these instructions is that the verdict of "guilty" without more meant and was under the California statute a verdict unanimously agreed to that the punishment should be that of death. Such was the decision of the Supreme Court of California. We hold that it was not error for the district court to dismiss the petition as to this point.
Petitioner also contends that alleged misconduct of the district attorney in his closing remarks to the jury deprived him of a fair trial, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. These remarks followed the defense attorney's argument to the jury in which he laid particular emphasis upon the complete responsibility of each individual juror for determining whether the death penalty should be inflicted.
During the course of the trial the petitioner voluntarily took the stand and admitted the robbery and the killing, and also related much as to his criminal record. Under state law, California Penal Code 1949, Section 189, any murder committed in the perpetration of robbery is murder in the first degree irrespective of intention. People v. King, 1939, 13 Cal.2d 521, 90 P.2d 291. California law further provides that every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion of the jury trying the same. California Penal Code 1949, Section 190.
Therefore, petitioner's own testimony subjected him to conviction of murder in the first degree. The only really contested issue before the jury was as to the penalty to be imposed. The district attorney addressed the jury on this issue as follows:
The California Supreme Court considered the remarks of the district attorney and dealt with them in its unanimous opinion. With reference to the statement of the district attorney that a life term in California is "less than seven years", that court said, People v. Sampsell, 1950, 34 Cal.2d 757, 764, 214 P.2d 813, 818: The court goes on to hold that this error was not prejudicial since the trial court admonished the jury generally during the defense attorney's argument that they were to disregard any statements of counsel other than "what you have heard from the witness stand". It could well have said also that the jury was instructed to take the law solely from the court and that the instruction of the court plainly stated the law as we have stated it under the first point herein treated.
The California Supreme Court then states 34 Cal.2d at page 765, 214 P.2d at page 818, of the...
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