State v. Candelaria

• Decision Date: 30 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 27,675.,27,675.
• Citation: 192 P.3d 792,2008 NMCA 120
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard CANDELARIA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

192 P.3d 792

2008 NMCA 120

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard CANDELARIA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 27,675.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

July 30, 2008.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, Linda Yen, Assistant Public Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

VIGIL, Judge.

{1} The metropolitan court dismissed the case against Defendant after two mistrials were caused by the State's witnesses and after a police officer, who was a key witness for both the State and Defendant, failed to appear for the third scheduled trial when the State failed to subpoena him after representing that it would do so. The State appealed to the district court, which reversed. Defendant then appealed to this Court. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the metropolitan court order of dismissal.

BACKGROUND

{2} Officer Picchione of the Albuquerque Police Department filed a complaint in the metropolitan court on June 23, 2005, charging Defendant with battery of a household member (his father-in-law) following an incident that occurred when Defendant, who was separated from his wife, was in the process of removing some property from the former marital home. Officer Picchione wrote a report and filed the complaint after speaking with Defendant's wife and father-in-law.

{3} A jury trial was set for November 1, 2005. The State filed a "Notice of Intent to Call Witnesses" stating it intended to call Defendant's wife, Defendant's father-in-law, and Officer Picchione as witnesses at the trial. The State was prepared to proceed with the trial, but Defendant moved for a continuance because a defense witness, who was not subpoenaed, was not present. The continuance was granted, and the trial was rescheduled.

{4} At the next trial setting on December 13, 2005, the State moved for a continuance because Officer Picchione was not present. Stating that he also required Officer Picchione's presence, Defendant did not oppose the State's motion. Upon inquiry from the metropolitan court as to whether the parties required subpoenas, Defendant said he would subpoena the defense witnesses and asked the prosecutor if he was going to have to subpoena Officer Picchione as well. The prosecutor stated, "We'll go ahead and subpoena the officer." The State never subpoenaed Officer Picchione.

{5} The first trial commenced on January 4, 2006. However, a mistrial was declared after the State's first witness (Defendant's father-in-law) violated a pretrial ruling on a motion in limine. The metropolitan court had cautioned the State to instruct its witnesses about its ruling and that a violation of the ruling would be grounds for a mistrial. The second trial commenced on January 25, 2006, and another mistrial was declared on the same basis when the State's first witness (this time Defendant's wife) violated the same pretrial ruling. Trial was re-set to commence on March 10, 2006, with the metropolitan court stating this would be the last such setting.

{6} On March 7, 2006, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy, prosecutorial misconduct, and speedy trial grounds. At the March 10, 2006 setting, the State requested a continuance, stating that Officer Picchione was not present due to a lung and throat infection and because it wanted additional time to respond to Defendant's motion to dismiss. The metropolitan court granted the State's request over Defendant's objection and set a motion hearing for March 29, 2006.

{7} During the motion hearing on March 29, 2006, the metropolitan court expressed concern about the protracted course of the proceedings. There was also discussion about Officer Picchione's illness that necessitated a continuance of the March 10, 2006 setting. The metropolitan court specifically asked, "Is he able to come to court now? Is this stale information?" In response, the prosecutor answered, "I believe that's stale information. He couldn't come to court on that day." The metropolitan court said, "Alright, so this whole business of Officer Picchione — Everybody's available for trial now?" The prosecutor represented, "Everyone's available for trial, your honor. I've kept in regular contact with them and let them know, kept them informed of what's going on." The metropolitan court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. However, the court also warned, "I'm going to reset the case for trial, and we'll get to try it once and for all. If the State has another problem with its witnesses testifying to things they are directed not to, then I'll dismiss it with prejudice and impose sanctions if necessary."

{8} The case was called for trial a third time on May 3, 2006. Officer Picchione was not present. Defense counsel asserted that Officer Picchione's absence was damaging to the defense and made an offer of proof that aspects of his report had exculpatory value and that his testimony was required to impeach the State's other witnesses. Defense counsel further stated that she had not subpoenaed Officer Picchione because the State had previously represented that it was going to insure his presence at the trial. Upon inquiry by the metropolitan court, the prosecutor acknowledged both the potential exculpatory value of Officer Picchione's testimony and his prior assurances that he would procure Officer Picchione's presence at the trial. The prosecutor then explained that he did not know until the morning of trial that Officer Picchione was at a doctor's appointment and that efforts to contact Officer Picchione had been unsuccessful. The State asserted, nevertheless, that it was prepared to proceed to trial without Officer Picchione's testimony.

{9} In light of Officer Picchione's absence, Defendant moved to either suppress all evidence that might have been impeached by Officer Picchione's testimony or to dismiss. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the metropolitan court granted Defendant's motion and dismissed. In its final judgment, the court stated that the two prior mistrials combined with Officer Picchione's failure to appear at the third scheduled trial, supplied the grounds for the dismissal of the proceedings.

{10} The State appealed the dismissal to the district court. See NMSA 1978, § 34-8A-6(C) (1993) (providing that in criminal actions involving "domestic violence" as defined, the metropolitan court is a court of record and that a party aggrieved by a judgment of the metropolitan court in such an action may appeal to the district court). Sitting as an appellate court, the district court concluded that the metropolitan court abused its discretion when it dismissed the State's case and reversed. The district court gave three reasons for its conclusion: (1) it was Defendant's duty to make sure Officer Picchione had been subpoenaed if his testimony was critical to his defense, (2) the proper remedy was to continue the trial to allow Defendant to subpoena Officer Picchione, and (3) Defendant would not have been prejudiced had the case proceeded to trial in Officer Picchione's absence.

{11} Defendant appeals from the order of the district court. See Rule 7-703(R) NMRA ("An aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment of the district court to the New Mexico Supreme Court or New Mexico Court of Appeals, as authorized by law, in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure."). The State argues that we should arrive at the same conclusion as the district court for the same three reasons expressed by that court. We decline to do so. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court and reinstate the final judgment of the metropolitan court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{12} The district court was sitting as an appellate court in this case. See State v. Foster, 2003-NMCA-099, ¶ 9, 134 N.M. 224, 75 P.3d 824 (stating that if an appeal from the magistrate court in the district court is on the record, the district court acts as a typical appellate court). The issue decided by the district court was whether the dismissal was properly ordered by the metropolitan court. A metropolitan court is vested with the inherent authority to sanction parties in furtherance of controlling its docket and the proceedings that come before it. See In re Jade G., 2001-NMCA-058, ¶¶ 27-28, 130 N.M. 687, 30 P.3d 376. An appellate court reviews dismissal of a criminal case based on this inherent power for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Esparza, 2003-NMCA-075, ¶ 41, 133 N.M. 772, 70 P.3d 762 (observing that dismissal pursuant to inherent authority is reviewed for abuse of discretion); State v. Lopez, 99 N.M. 385, 388, 658 P.2d 460, 463 (Ct.App.1983) ("We hold that the trial court exercised its inherent power to dismiss, and that its ruling was not against logic or effect of the State's representations at the time the motion to dismiss was granted."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831, 104 S.Ct. Ill, 78 L.Ed.2d 113 (1983). The district court's review of the metropolitan court's discretion does not turn on whether the district court would have arrived at the same result, see State v. Ferguson, 111 N.M. 191, 195, 803 P.2d 676, 680 (Ct.App.1990), and the district court could only conclude that the metropolitan court abused its discretion if it could characterize its ruling as "clearly untenable or not justified by reason." State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 41, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In performing its review, the district court is required to view the evidence, and its inferences, in the light most favorable to the metropolitan court's decision. See State v. Rael, 2008-NMCA-067, ¶ 6, 144 N.M. 170, 184 P.3d 1064.

{13} Our standard of review is identical-did the metropolitan court abuse its discretion in accordance with the foregoing standards when it ordered a dismissal of the criminal charge under its inherent authority to control the...