U.S. v. Hunte
Decision Date | 22 March 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 97-1987,97-1987 |
Citation | 193 F.3d 173 |
Parties | (3rd Cir. 1999) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. EARL PACKER HUNTE, a/k/a Earl Packer, a/k/a E, EARL PACKER HUNTE Appellant Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 96-cr-00539-9) District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, COWEN, Circuit Judge, and STAGG,* District Judge
Defendant Earl Packer Hunte was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846. The government's evidence against Hunte, the sufficiency of which he does not challenge on appeal, established that he was a member of a violent, large-scale narcotics trafficking organization led by Darryl Coleman and Terrence Gibbs. See generally United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188 (3rd Cir.1999) (filed concurrently herewith). Specifically, the evidence demonstrated that Hunte agreed to distribute cocaine supplied by Gibbs, and that he agreed to carry out acts of violence to protect the illegal enterprise.
Hunte's appeal raises a single issue. He contends that the government violated the so-called "anti-gratuity statute," 18 U.S.C. S 201(c)(2), by making promises of leniency to several cooperating witnesses in exchange for their truthful testimony against him.1 Relying exclusively on the Tenth Circuit's now vacated opinion in United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) (Singleton I), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (Singleton II), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999), Hunte argues that the District Court erred in not suppressing the testimony of these cooperating witnesses.
Because Hunte did not raise this issue in the District Court, we would ordinarily review it only for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Due to the frequency with which this argument has been raised in the courts of this Circuit since the issuance of Singleton I, however, we will take this opportunity to address the issue squarely. We hold that section 201(c)(2) does not prohibit the government from promising leniency to cooperating witnesses in exchange for truthful testimony. In so deciding, we align ourselves with the en banc decision of the Tenth Circuit, as well as every other circuit court that has considered the issue. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1298; accord United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 118-119 (2d Cir. June 30, 1999); United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 197 (1st Cir. June 30, 1999); United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 688-89 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Johnson, 169 F.3d 1092, 1097 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1122-24 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 418 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348 (1999); United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 366-68 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1795, 143 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1999). Our reasons for rejecting the holding of Singleton I are set forth briefly below; given the numerous federal appellate decisions addressing this issue over the last year, an extended discussion would be redundant.
The criminal statute in question, 18 U.S.C. S 201(c)(2), provides in pertinent part:
Whoever ... directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court ... authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. 18 U.S.C. S 201(c)(2). The Tenth Circuit panel in Singleton I concluded, inter alia, that the plain meaning of the term "whoever" includes the government, and that, accordingly, a government attorney's promise of leniency to a witness in exchange for that witness' testimony violates S 201(c)(2). 144 F.3d at 1345-48. We disagree.
In Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), the Supreme Court described a canon of statutory construction that provides that a statute does not apply to the government or affect governmental rights unless the text of the statute expressly includes the government. Id. at 383; see also The Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 227, 229 (1873) () The Nardone Court stated that the canon has been applied in two categories of cases. "The first is where an act, if not so limited, would deprive the sovereign of a recognized or established prerogative title or interest." Id. at 383. The second category is "where a reading which would include such [government] officers would work obvious absurdity." Id. at 384. We agree with the courts that have held that this type of case -- where the government has agreed to move for leniency in exchange for testimony -- falls within both categories described in Nardone. See Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 988-90; Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1300-01; Ware, 161 F.3d at 419.
First, construing section 201(c)(2) to preclude the government from offering leniency in exchange for truthful testimony would deprive the sovereign of an established and recognized prerogative. "The prosecutorial prerogative to recommend leniency in exchange for truthful testimony arises from English common law, see Ware, 161 F.3d at 419, and has been repeatedly approved by the United States Supreme Court . . .." Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 988 (citing The Whisky Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878)); see also United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (). We are not persuaded by the Singleton I panel's claim that section 201(c)(2) is removed from this category because the statute only limits the practices of the government's agents, not the sovereign itself. 144 F.3d at 1345-46.2 If section 201(c)(2) did indeed prohibit promises of leniency in exchange for testimony, it is surely the government's interests that would be affected, not those of its representatives. See Ware, 161 F.3d at 421 ().
Second, the application of section 201(c)(2) to the government in cases such as this would work an obvious absurdity. As many courts have observed, interpreting section 201(c)(2) to forbid promises of leniency in exchange for truthful testimony would "preclude enforcement or limit the efficacy of the terms of several more recent -- and more specific -- statutes [or Rules or Guidelines enacted purusant to statute], all of which presuppose the potential use of testimony in exchange for non-prosecution agreements, leniency recommendations, and/or other valuable promises." United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 197 (1st Cir. June 30, 1999); see also Ramsey 165 F.3d at 990; Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1305-06. Numerous statutes adopted after the anti-gratuity law, for example, authorize sentence reductions for defendants who have provided "substantial assistance" in the investigation or prosecution of others. 28 U.S.C. S 994(n) ( ); 18 U.S.C. S 3553(e) ( ); U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 ( ); Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) ( ). It is plain to us that the "substantial assistance" referred to in these statutes includes providing testimony against others. See U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1(a)(2) ( )(emphasis added). Accordingly, adopting the holding of Singleton I would create an "absurd conflict," Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 990, between section 201(c)(2) and the above-cited statutes.3
Finally, we reject the holding of Singleton I because it is completely implausible to us that Congress,...
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