Linden v. Hodges

• Citation: 193 F.3d 268
• Decision Date: 30 September 1999
• Docket Number: YOUNG-BRICKEL,R,COBB-HUNTE,CA-91-363,No. 98-2174,98-2174
• Parties: Page 268 193 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 1999) NEIL A. VANDER LINDEN; FORREST E. OTT; ANN Y. HART; PEGGY A. DUFEK; VINCENT JOHNSON; ALICE J. CICENIA; GWENDOLYN L. GROOMS; ROBERT H. WATERS; ANITA L. FRANKLIN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and BUFORT BLANTON, Plaintiff, v. JAMES H. HODGES, Governor, in his capacity as Governor of South Carolina; DAVID H. WILKINS, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives; DORCHESTER COUNTY LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION; GEORGE H. BAILEY, in his representative capacity as a member of the State House of Representatives; THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE; DEFENDANT CLASS; SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; JOHN DOE, Chair of the Dorchester County Legislative Delegation; BILL BRANTON, Senator; CONVERSE A. CHELLIS, III, Representative; ROBERT W. HARRELL, JR., Representative; GILDAepresentative; ANNETTEepresentative, Defendants-Appellees, and NICK THEODORE, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor and presiding officer of the South Carolina Senate; ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives; JAMES B. ELLISOR, in his offical capacity as Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Defendants. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Amicus Curiae. (
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Page 268

193 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 1999)

NEIL A. VANDER LINDEN; FORREST E. OTT; ANN Y. HART; PEGGY A. DUFEK; VINCENT JOHNSON; ALICE J. CICENIA; GWENDOLYN L. GROOMS; ROBERT H. WATERS; ANITA L. FRANKLIN, Plaintiffs-Appellants and BUFORT BLANTON, Plaintiff v JAMES H. HODGES, Governor, in his capacity as Governor of South Carolina; DAVID H. WILKINS, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives; DORCHESTER COUNTY LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION; GEORGE H. BAILEY, in his representative capacity as a member of the State House of Representatives; THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE; DEFENDANT CLASS; SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; JOHN DOE, Chair of the Dorchester County Legislative Delegation; BILL BRANTON, Senator; CONVERSE A. CHELLIS, III, Representative; ROBERT W. HARRELL, JR., Representative;

GILDA COBB-HUNTER, Representative; ANNETTE YOUNG-BRICKELL, Representative, Defendants-Appellees,

and

NICK THEODORE, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor and presiding officer of the South Carolina Senate; ROBERT J. SHEHEEN, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives; JAMES B. ELLISOR, in his offical capacity as Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Defendants. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Amicus Curiae.

No. 98-2174 (CA-91-3635-2-11)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

Argued: April 7, 1999.

Decided: September 30, 1999.

Filed: October 6, 1999.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.

COUNSEL ARGUED: Moffatt Laughlin McDonald, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, INC., Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellants. David Reece Williams, III, Columbia, South Carolina; James Emory Smith, Jr. Columbia, South Carolina; Thomas Stuart White, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Neil Bradley, Maha Zaki, Cristina Correia, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, INC., Atlanta, Georgia; Herbert E. Buhl, III, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. Paula Gail Benson, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee Senate; Charles Molony Condon, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees Wilkins and House; Samuel W. Howell, IV, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees Legislative Delegation and Doe; Charles F. Reid, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee Speaker; Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee Beasley.

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Michael joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

In this case we consider the legality of South Carolina's county legislative delegation system. The district court upheld this system in the face of constitutional and statutory challenges. Because county legislative delegations constitute elected governmental bodies to which the constitutionally mandated "one person, one vote" requirement applies, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Except as noted, the district court found or the parties stipulated to the following facts.

Persons residing and voting in various South Carolina counties (collectively, the voters) brought this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against the Governor of South Carolina, the South Carolina legislature, the Speaker of the House, and other state officials (collectively, the State). The voters assert that the State's legislative delegation system violates the United States Constitution, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 1994), and the Civil Rights Act of 1957, id. § 1971(a).

Legislative delegations have played a critical role in the governance of South Carolina counties for more than a century. As the district court noted, "for generations legislative delegations of the General Assembly controlled virtually every aspect of local government." Both parties' experts testified that the legislative delegation system took shape at the end of the 19th century, after a constitutional amendment in 1890 removed local government from the hands of locally elected officials. The experts agreed that the system of locally elected county government was rejected partly because it had resulted in the election of large numbers of African-American officials.

The voters' expert testified that the legislative delegation system, which developed in place of locally elected county government, was similarly created out of fear of African-American voting power. Even the State's expert conceded that fear of the demands of emancipated slaves was one factor that led to the creation of the legislative delegation system. Moreover, the experts agreed that the legislative delegation system arose against the backdrop of a white supremacist movement, led by Governor Ben Tillman, that sought to diminish African-American voting power. This effort, the experts further explained, led to the effective disfranchisement of the AfricanAmerican population through the adoption of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895.

By 1900, county government had come to be controlled by the General Assembly. Under this system, the residents of each county elected one senator and, depending on the county's population, one or more representatives to the General Assembly. The legislators thus elected from each county constituted the county's legislative delegation. In practice, local legislation was formulated by the legislative delegation for the relevant county and then enacted by the General Assembly at large with no scrutiny. See Duncan v. County of York, 228 S.E.2d 92, 95 (S.C. 1976). As the district court explained, "in addition to being state legislators, members of the Senate and House were effectively the county legislature and governing board."

The structure of county legislative delegations in South Carolina remained unchanged until legislative districts were redrawn following establishment of the one person, one vote rule in 1964. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). This redistricting produced legislative districts that sometimes crossed county lines. As a result, "the complexion of the legislative delegation changed," the district court noted, "such that there was no longer a county-oriented legislative delegation elected by the voters of an entire county and answerable to the people of that county."

Instead, redistricting created a situation in which South Carolina legislators are elected from districts that contain parts of more than one county. Upon election to the General Assembly, each legislator automatically becomes a member of the legislative delegation of every county containing territory that falls within the legislator's district. Generally, each member of a delegation has one vote in delegation decisions regardless of the number of constituents that he or she has in the county. The voters presented uncontroverted evidence that some legislators are members of the legislative delegation of a county in which they have relatively few constituents, and that some are even members of delegations for counties in which they have no constituents at all.

In 1973, South Carolina amended its Constitution in order to vest much of the power over county affairs in locally elected county officials. But county legislative delegations still retain statutory authority over certain aspects of local government. Indeed, the parties stipulated that "County Legislative Delegations perform numerous and various general county governmental functions prescribed by state law."¹ They further stipulated that these "numerous" and "general county and governmental functions" include:

(a) making and/or recommending appointments to boards and commissions;

(b) approving and/or recommending the expenditure of money allocated by the South Carolina General Assembly for highways, parks, recreation, tourism, and other matters;

(c) approving the budgets of local school districts;

(d) initiating referenda regarding the budgetary powers and the election of governing bodies for a special purpose in public service districts;

(e) approving the reimbursement of expenses for county planning commissioners;

(f) approving county planning commission contracts with architects, engineers, and other consultants;

(g) altering or dividing school districts of counties;

(h) reducing existing special school levies in counties and school districts;

(i) submitting grant applications for planning, development and renovating park and recreation facilities.

In 1991, the voters filed this action challenging the county legislative delegation system. The district court stayed the case to permit the General Assembly to fashion an appropriate alternative to the present system. When the General Assembly failed to come up with any alternative, the district court reactivated the case.

The voters maintain that because each member of a county legislative delegation has one vote regardless of how many of the member's constituents live in the county, the delegation system dilutes the voting power of county residents from more populous areas. The system, according to the voters, thus violates the one person, one vote requirement that the Supreme Court has held derives from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533; U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. The voters also argue that the delegation system discriminates against African-Americans in purpose and effect in contravention of the Constitution, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Civil Rights Act of 1957.

After a bench trial, the district court rejected both contentions. Because we conclude that the county legislative delegation system violates the constitutionally mandated one person, one vote requirement, we must reverse....