Lolos v. Solutia, Inc., Civ.A. 99-30222-KPN.

Citation193 F.Supp.2d 364
Decision Date26 March 2002
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 99-30222-KPN.,Civ.A. 99-30222-KPN.
PartiesSheree A. LOLOS, Plaintiff, v. SOLUTIA, INC., Defendant.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts

A.J. O'Donald, III, Holyoke, MA, for Plaintiff.

Jay M. Presser, Rosemary J. Nevins, Skoler, Abbott & Presser, Springfield, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WITH REGARD TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket No. 31)

NEIMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Sheree Lolos ("Plaintiff") alleges in this action that her firing by Solutia, Inc. ("Defendant") amounts to handicap discrimination in violation of § 4(16) of Mass.Gen.L. ch. 151B ("chapter 151B"). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this court, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and Defendant has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the court will allow Defendant's motion. In essence, the court concludes that chapter 151B—unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which Plaintiff has not invoked— does not accord Plaintiff the right to the accommodation she seeks, reassignment to a vacant position.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For purposes of Defendant's motion, the parties do not dispute the following facts, sketched in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the party opposing summary judgment. See Sullivan v. Raytheon Co., 262 F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 931, 151 L.Ed.2d 893 (2002). Defendant is an out-of state chemical corporation. In December of 1994, Plaintiff was hired at Defendant's Springfield facility as a Saflex Extrusion Operator ("SEO"), a physically demanding position which requires heavy lifting. Her last day of active work was May 8, 1995, when she suffered a work-related injury that resulted in carpel tunnel syndrome and tendinitis of the upper extremities ("CTS-tendinitis"). About one week later, Plaintiff was involved in a car accident.

In the Fall of 1995, Plaintiff received negative evaluations from a variety of physicians, including a neurologist. Consequently, on November 20, 1995, she filed a claim with the Massachusetts Department of Industrial Accidents ("DIA") seeking workers compensation benefits. On April 4, 1996, a medical examiner appointed by the DIA opined that, while Plaintiff was physically able to return to the plant, she could only perform "light" tasks in temperatures at least fifty-five degrees Fahrenheit and that she should not be assigned "the heavy work she used to do as an [SEO]." (Docket No. 36 ("Def.'s Exhibits, Vol. II"), Exhibit E-10 at 3.) At an October 9, 1996 hearing, evidence was presented to a DIA administrative judge that Plaintiff's SEO job involved "movement of materials using both arms, with regular lifting, pushing, pulling and reaching above the shoulder," which Plaintiff could not do. (Id., Exhibit E-11 at 3, 5.)

On December 5, 1996, the administrative judge determined that, not only was Plaintiff "totally disabled" from May 8, 1995, through September 1, 1995, she should "be excluded from her usual work as an [SEO]." (Id. at 5-6.) The administrative judge also found, however, that Plaintiff had skills that would allow her to obtain other gainful employment in the job market, earning as least as much as she was with Defendant as an SEO. On March 12, 1998, the DIA review board remanded the earnings finding.

In the meantime, Plaintiff filed a second workers compensation claim in which she alleged that her condition had worsened. In June of 1998, the DIA-appointed medical examiner re-evaluated Plaintiff and confirmed her "total" disability with respect to the type of "heavy lifting" she was doing as an SEO. (See id., Exhibit E-1 2 at 4.) At a September 25, 1998 hearing, Plaintiff testified that she was physically unable to return to work as an SEO. Soon thereafter, on December 7, 1998, the administrative judge issued an opinion in which he reiterated that Plaintiff could not return to her former job (although he felt she could do light work) and concluded that she was entitled to partial disability benefits from September 1, 1995 forward. (See id. at 1-7.) The next day, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment.

In the midst of these benchmarks, Plaintiff applied for Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits, which application was denied by the Social Security Administration ("SSA") on November 24, 1995. (The alleged reason Plaintiff sought SSDI benefits is addressed below.) An administrative hearing was held on September 16, 1996, at which a vocational expert testified that, given Plaintiff's restrictions, there were no jobs to which she could make a vocational adjustment. On September 27, 1996, an SSA administrative law judge found Plaintiff disabled for SSDI purposes.

Over two years later, in 1998, Plaintiff filed a report of continuing disability with the SSA in which she stated that she felt unable to return to work. Then, in January of 2001, Plaintiff testified at a reconsideration hearing that she was "disabled" and "unable to work." (See id., Exhibit E-19 at 4.) The hearing officer found Plaintiff credible and concluded that her SSDI benefits should continue.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September of 1999, Plaintiff filed this action, at the time consisting of three counts, in state court. Defendant removed the complaint to federal court and then sought dismissal, arguing that each count—the chapter 151B count and two counts based on the state workers compensation act—was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 et seq.

On October 20, 2000, Senior Judge Frank H. Freedman dismissed the workers compensation counts on the basis of preemption. He concluded, however, that section 301 did not preempt Plaintiff's chapter 151B count as that claim, while it "may require reference to the [parties' collective bargaining agreement (`CMA')] solely for factual information, ... [did] not require an interpretation of that agreement." (Docket No. 21 at 6.)

Following Judge Freedman's order, the parties consented to trial by this court and engaged in discovery. In due course, on November 30, 2001, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment with respect to the remaining chapter 151B claim.1 Plaintiff filed her opposition on January 2, 2002, and the court thereafter heard oral argument.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may grant summary judgment pursuant to FED.R.Civ.P. 56(c) if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Once the moving party has asserted that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden is on the opposing party to point to specific facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue. National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.1995). A "genuine" issue is one "that a reasonable jury could resolve ... in favor of the nonmoving party." McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995). Accord United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, Great Harbor Neck, New Shoreham, R.I., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992).

Not every genuine factual conflict, however, necessitates a trial. "`It is only when a disputed fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if found favorably to the nonmovant that the materiality hurdle is cleared.'" Parrilla-Burgos v. Hernandez-Rivera, 108 F.3d 445, 448 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 983-84 (1st Cir.1995)). At bottom, matters of law are for the court to decide at summary judgment. Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 721 (1st Cir.1996).

IV. DISCUSSION

As applicable here, chapter 151B makes it unlawful "[f]or any employer ... to dismiss from employment ... or otherwise discriminate against, because of [her] handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation." Mass.Gen.L. ch. 151B, § 4(16). A "qualified handicapped person" is defined as "a handicapped person who is capable of performing the essential functions of a particular job, or who would be capable of performing the essential functions of a particular job with reasonable accommodation to [her] handicap." Id., § 1(16). In essence, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not a "qualified handicapped person" for two reasons: (1) she is admittedly unable to return to her prior SEO job; and (2) chapter 151B does not require Defendant, as a "reasonable accommodation," to reassign Plaintiff to a less-strenuous, vacant position. The court will address each contention in turn.

A. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED ADMISSIONS WITH RESPECT TO HER SEO POSITION

Defendant's initial argument centers on Plaintiff's alleged "admissions" in both the SSDI and DIA proceedings that she was unable to continue working as an SEO. Those admissions, Defendant asserts, have not been sufficiently explained. Ergo, Defendant argues, Plaintiff is unable to show that she is a "qualified handicapped person" with respect to her former SEO position and, as a result, summary judgment should enter in Defendant's favor.

Defendant's argument revolves around Cleveland v. Policy Mgm't Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999). There, the Supreme Court held that—while the mere existence of an SSDI claim does not necessarily bar a subsequent discrimination action—a court, "[w]hen faced with a plaintiff's previous sworn statement asserting `total disability' or the like, ... should require an explanation of any apparent inconsistency with the necessary elements of [a handicap discrimination] claim." Id., 526 U.S. at 807, 119 S.Ct. 1597. "To defeat summary judgment," the Supreme Court added, the plaintiffs "explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's good faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless `perform the essential...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Gauthier v. Sunhealth Specialty Services, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • March 27, 2008
    ...or different position. Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 437 Mass. 443, 454, 772 N.E.2d 1054 (2002); see Lolos v. Solutia, Inc., 193 F.Supp.2d 364, 371-73 (D.Mass.2002); St. Laurent 416 F.Supp.2d at 223. Requiring the employer to transfer plaintiff to light duty would involve "writin......
  • Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co. Inc
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 16, 2010
    ...create an undue hardship for the Globe, the Globe would be required to apply that policy to the plaintiff. See Lolos v. Solutia, Inc., 193 F.Supp.2d 364, 371-372 (D.Mass.2002). Even if we view this claim as a claim for discrimination based on Globe policy, the plaintiff has not established ......
  • St. Laurent v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • January 4, 2006
    ...obligated to create a new position for the plaintiff. Russell, 437 Mass. at 454, 772 N.E.2d at 1063. See also Lobos v. Solutia, Inc., 193 F.Supp.2d 364, 373 (D.Mass.2002) (Mass. Gen. Laws 151B, § 4(16) does not require an employer to consider reassigning an employee to another position as a......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT