Renfro v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–372.,15–372.
• Citation: 193 So.3d 1192
• Parties: Thalia RENFRO v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, et al.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

193 So.3d 1192

Thalia RENFRO

v.BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, et al.

No. 15–372.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

May 11, 2016.

John F. Wilkes, III, Ray Lucus, III, Borne & Wilkes, LLC, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Town of Vinton.

Lawrence N. Curtis, Lawrence N. Curtis, Ltd., Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Thalia Renfro.

Adam L. Ortego, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Lake Charles, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development.

Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, JOHN D. SAUNDERS, JAMES T. GENOVESE, SHANNON J. GREMILLION, and DAVID KENT SAVOIE, Judges.

SAVOIE, J.

This suit arises out of an accident in which a train struck a vehicle attempting to cross the railroad tracks. The seventeen-year-old driver and sole occupant of the vehicle was killed in the crash. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the decedent's mother, Thalia Renfro (“Ms.Renfro”), and against the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”). Both DOTD and Ms. Renfro have appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 4, 2001, a tragic vehicle/train accident took place at the Eddy Street railroad crossing in Vinton, Louisiana. A train was headed eastbound, and seventeen-year-old Mallory Young (“Mallory”) was driving her mother's 2000 Mercury Mountaineer southbound on Eddy Street. The train collided with Mallory's vehicle as she attempted to cross over the railroad tracks, and Mallory did not survive the accident.

Eddy Street is a municipal street owned by the Town of Vinton (“The Town”). The Eddy Street crossing where the accident occurred is an off-system crossing in that it is not part of the state highway system.

Prior to 1996, the Eddy Street crossing was controlled by an active warning device¹ called a “wig wag,” which was a flashing light signal that warned motorists when a train was approaching the intersection. In 1996, the Eddy Street crossing was closed in connection with an upgrade to another nearby crossing. According to DOTD, the closing was the result of a miscommunication between DOTD and the Town wherein DOTD erroneously concluded that the Town had agreed to the closing. The crossing was subsequently reopened in 1997; however, only passive warning devices² were put into place, including an advanced warning sign, an X-shaped sign known as “crossbucks,” pavement markings, and a stop sign.

Mallory's mother, Ms. Renfro, filed suit against multiple defendants, including DOTD, the Town, Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Company/Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Railroad”), and Calcasieu Parish. At the time of trial, only DOTD and the Town remained as Defendants.

A trial on the merits was held on January 27, 2014. Primarily at issue was whether, and to what extent, DOTD and/or the Town were negligent in connection with the installation of passive, rather than active, warning signals when the crossing was reopened in 1997. The case against the DOTD was tried before a jury, and the case against the Town was simultaneously tried before the trial court judge based on evidence submitted in connection with the jury trial. Even though the trial judge was to determine the case against the Town, the parties agreed to conduct the jury trial as if liability of both the Town and DOTD were at issue.

The jury assessed fault as follows: Mallory (32%); the Railroad (31%); DOTD (29%); and the Town (8%). The jury also found that general damages in the following amounts would compensate Ms. Renfro: $1,320,000 for “grief and sorrow;” $1,320,000 for “mental anguish;” and $3,960,000 for “loss of love, affection, and companionship.” The jury also awarded Mallory's medical and funeral expenses, as well as Ms. Renfro's medical expenses.

In connection with the bench trial against the Town, the trial judge found no fault on the part of the Town and dismissed Ms. Renfro's claims against it. In its written reasons for ruling, the trial judge noted that it had previously granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Town, finding that the Town had discretionary immunity for asking that the crossing be reopened after it was closed by DOTD. The trial judge found that the Town “had no control over what signalization was placed at the Eddy Street crossing,” and that “the Town of Vinton's placement of the stop sign at the crossing was performed in accordance with guidelines and instructions from the DOTD.”

Ultimately, the trial judge rendered judgment in favor of Ms. Renfro and against DOTD, assessing DOTD with twenty-nine percent of the damages awarded, but reducing DOTD's liability for general damages to $500,000 pursuant to the statutory cap provided by La.R.S. 13:5106. The trial judge also assessed DOTD with all court costs in the amount of $46,6001. Both DOTD and Ms. Renfro appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, DOTD asserts the following as assignments of error:

1. The trial jury erred in apportioning twenty-nine percent (29%) fault to the DOTD and failing to apportion more fault to Ms. Mallory Young and the Railroad.

2. The trial judge erred in providing the jury with a verdict form which duplicated damages.

3. The trial jury erred in awarding $6,600,000 in general damages.

4. The trial judge erred in refusing to admit evidence of federal preemption and in not finding that federal preemption applied in this case.

5. The trial judge erred in failing to determine whether the DOTD assumed a duty in this case.

6. The trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury.

7. The trial judge erred in permitting the unlimited introduction of 23 U.S.C. Section 409 materials.

8. The trial judge erred in assessing all costs to DOTD.

In her answer to the appeal, Ms. Renfro asserts that the trial court erred in limiting the general damages awarded against the DOTD to one statutory cap, rather than allowing two separate $500,000 statutory caps—one for a wrongful death claim under La.Civ.Code. art. 2315.2, and one for a bystander claim under La.Civ.Code art. 2315.6.

ANALYSIS

Federal Preemption:

DOTD contends that the trial court erred in not finding that Ms. Renfro's negligence claims were preempted by federal law. In support of its argument, DOTD suggests that the testimony of William Shrewsberry, as well as two proffered affidavits not admitted into evidence by the trial court, established that federal funds were used in connection with reopening the Eddy Street crossing.

DOTD cites to CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993), “that states where ‘federal aid funds participated in the installation of the [warning] devices' at the crossing, federal law preempts state law[.]” Duncan, 773 So.2d at 678 (citation omitted). Mere demonstration that federal funds were used at a particular crossing is insufficient to establish federal preemption of state tort law. Ducote v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 08–1208 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/09), 4 So.3d 240, writ denied, 09–940 (La.6/5/09), 9 So.3d 877. “Rather, the railway company must present evidence that would lead to an ‘unequivocal conclusion that the signage’ at a particular crossing was installed or replaced with federal moneys.” Id. at 245 (citation omitted). The trial court's factual findings are subject to the manifest error standard of review. See Duncan v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 00–66 (La.10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670.

We first address the proffered affidavits, which the trial court refused to admit on the basis that they were inadmissible hearsay. As this court explained in Young v. Joy, 09–756, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/10), 30 So.3d 1116, 1119 (citation omitted), “[t]he district court is awarded vast discretion in its decisions on evidentiary rulings, and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion.”

“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” La.Code Evid. art. 801(C). Generally, hearsay is not admissible at trial. La.Code Evid. art. 802. However, several exceptions to this general rule exist, including an exception provided by La.Code Evid. art. 803(6), for:

Records of regularly conducted business activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, ... if made and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make and to keep the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation.... This exception is inapplicable unless the recorded information was furnished to the business either by a person who was routinely acting for the business in reporting the information or in circumstances under which the statement would not be excluded by the hearsay rule.

When questioned by the trial judge concerning the affidavits, counsel for DOTD stated that he “got [the affidavits] from the attorneys for the railroad [,]” and that “it was done for the purpose of this case[,] and they are the originals[,] and the witnesses say that they are in the business records of the railroad.” Therefore, the affidavits at issue were not “made and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity[,]” and it was not “the regular practice of that business activity to make and to keep” such affidavits. Instead, the affidavits were prepared specifically for trial. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to admit them into evidence.

DOTD also suggests that William Shrewsberry's testimony requires a finding that Ms. Renfro's claims are preempted. DOTD does not refer to any specific testimony in support of its argument, and it does not mention in its brief, or otherwise raise as an issue on appeal, that the trial judge “order[ed] that the answers given by ... [Shrewsberry] related to federal funding be...