Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. New York

Decision Date29 March 2002
Docket NumberNo. 74-CV-187.,74-CV-187.
Citation194 F.Supp.2d 104
PartiesThe ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK; the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin; and the Oneida of the Thames, Plaintiffs, and United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor, and The New York Brothertown Indian Nation, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. The State of NEW YORK; County of Madison, New York; and County of Oneida, New York, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

Thomas D. Barr, Rowan D. Wilson, Cravath, Swaine Law Firm, New York City, William W, Taylor, III, Caroline A. Judge, Zuckerman, Spaeder Law Firm, Washington, DC, John A. DeFrancisco, Harris, Beach Law Firm, Syracuse, NY, Thomas G. Rafferty, Cravath, Swain, New York City, Arlinda Locklear, nam, Office of Arlinda Locklear, Jefferson, MD, Daan Braveman, Ernest I. White Hall, Syracuse, NY, Carey R. Ramos, Robert S. Smith, Paul, Weiss Law Firm, New York City, William H. Pease, Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of the United States Attorney, Syracuse, NY, Charles Jakosa, nam, Asst. U.S. Atty., Steven Miskinis, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Indian Resources Section Environment and Natural Resources Division, Washington, DC, Charles E. O' Connell, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., U.S. Department of Justice Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington, DC, Michael G. Sterthous, Whiteman, Osterman Law Firm, Albany, NY, for Plaintiffs.

G. Robert Witmer, Jr., Nixon, Peabody Law Firm, Rochester, NY, David A. Reiser, phv, Zuckerman, Spaeder Law Firm, Washington, DC, David B. Roberts, Office of Attorney General State of New York, Albany, NY, Christopher W. Hall, Office of Attorney General State of New York, Albany, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

KAHN, District Judge.

BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background

This action is brought by three Indian nations, the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin and the Oneida of the Thames (collectively, the "Oneidas" or "Plaintiffs"), who claim to be descendants of the original Oneida Indian Nation that inhabited land in what is now central New York State "from time immemorial to shortly after the Revolution." County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 470 U.S. 226, 230, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985). The Oneidas bring this action in order to regain possession of approximately 250,000 acres of land in New York State that they claim was unlawfully taken from the Oneida Indian Nation by New York State.

The Oneidas' troubles with New York State, for purposes of this action, began in 1788 with the Treaty of Ft. Schuyler, in which the State purchased the majority of the Oneidas' aboriginal land and left the Oneidas with a reservation of approximately 300,000 acres in central New York State. In 1794, in the Treaty of Canandaigua, the United States recognized that the Oneida Indian Nation had been granted this reservation of land in New York State. In this action, the Oneidas allege that following the Treaties of Ft. Schuyler and Canandaigua, New York State proceeded to illegally purchase for itself the Oneida Indian Nation's reserved land. Specifically, the Oneidas challenge the validity of 30 land transactions entered into by the Oneida Indian Nation and New York State between 1795 and 1846. In these transactions, the original Oneida Indian Nation sold portions of the land reserved to it in the Treaties of Ft. Schuyler and Canandaigua to New York State. The Oneidas' current claim is based on their argument that these transactions are barred by the 1793 Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, that prohibits the conveyance of Indian land without the express approval of the federal government.

II. The "Test Case"

In 1970, the Oneidas filed suit in the Northern District of New York against Madison an Oneida Counties (the "Counties") challenging the validity of a 1795 land transaction in which the Oneida Indian Nation sold a large part of its original land reservation to New York State. In this action, titled Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida (the "test case"), the Oneidas sought the fair rental value for a two-year period of portions of the disputed land now occupied by the Counties. The test case was initially dismissed by the district court for lack of federal jurisdiction, and this decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit. See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 464 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.1972). However, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Oneidas' claim asserted a federal controversy because Indian possessory rights to tribal lands are governed by federal law. See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974) ("Oneida I").

The district court judge conducted a bench trial in the test case and found that the 1795 land transfer did violate the Nonintercourse Act. See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 434 F.Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y.1977) ("Oneida Test Case"). This ruling was affirmed by the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court. See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Oneida Test Case—Circuit"); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 470 U.S. 226, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985) ("Oneida II").

The test case involved facts and legal theories quite similar to those present in this action. In fact, many of the legal theories and defenses set forth by the parties in this action were discussed extensively by the courts issuing decisions in the test case. The fundamental difference between the two actions lies in their scope. While the test case dealt with only one transaction and a smaller area of land, this action concerns a series of transactions over several years and a much larger area of land. In addition, while the plaintiffs in the test case are identical to Plaintiffs in this action, New York State was not a defendant in the test case, and the United States and the New York Brothertown Indian Nation did not intervene in the test case.

Following Oneida II, the test case was remanded to the district court for further consideration of the Counties' claimed offset against damages. The test case is currently pending in the Northern District of New York before Judge McCurn.

III. Procedural History

This action was filed by Plaintiffs in 1974 against the Counties and essentially lay dormant for many years while the Plaintiffs actively pursued the test case and while the parties engaged in extensive settlement discussions. In 1998, the United States was permitted to intervene as a plaintiff. In September 2000, Judge McCurn permitted Plaintiffs and the United States to amend their Complaints to add New York State as a defendant and the Oneida of the Thames as a plaintiff. In that same decision, Judge McCurn denied Plaintiffs' motion to add private landowners as defendants. In May 2001, this Court permitted the Brothertown Indian Nation to intervene in this action. The Brothertown claim that the Oneidas granted them a portion of the land at issue in this action in a 1774 treaty between the two nations. They further claim that their right to this land was recognized in the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua. The Brothertown have intervened in this action in order to protect their rights to this parcel of land.

IV. Motions Before The Court

In November 2001, the parties presented oral argument on several motions to the Court. This decision addresses eight of those motions.1 In this decision the Court addresses (1) Defendants' motion to dismiss for nonjoinder of indispensable parties, (2) Plaintiffs' motion to strike Defendants' defenses, (3) the United States' motion to strike Defendants' defenses, (4) Brothertown's motion to strike Defendants' defenses, (5) Plaintiffs' motions to dismiss Defendants' counterclaims, and (6) the United States' motions to dismiss Defendants' counterclaims.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
I. Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) first requires the Court to determine whether an absent party is necessary to the action. An absent party is necessary and shall be joined in the action if:

(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties; or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 19(a).

Defendants contend that the New York Brothertown Indian Nation, the Brothertown Indian Nation of Wisconsin, the Marble Hill Oneida Indians, and the Iroquois Confederacy are all necessary parties to this action. Defendants urge the Court to either compel these parties to join in the action or dismiss the action under Rule 19 for failure to join indispensable parties.

The facts presented to the Court do not support a finding that any of the absent parties are necessary parties under Rule 19(a)(1). The absence of these parties will not result in a denial of complete relief to the parties currently present in this action. See Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir.1985) (stating that Rule 19(a)(1) does not contemplate relief that might be awarded to the absent party, but only whether the parties already present can be awarded full relief). There is no reason why the current parties cannot be awarded complete relief without the addition of the absent parties.

This leaves the Court to examine Defendants' claims under Rule 19(a)(2) and to determine whether the absent parties in fact claim an...

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