Koester v. Rochester Candy Works

Decision Date05 January 1909
Citation87 N.E. 77,194 N.Y. 92
PartiesKOESTER v. ROCHESTER CANDY WORKS.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Action by Charles W. Koester, an infant, against the Rochester Candy Works. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (122 App. Div. 894,106 N. Y. Supp. 1134), affirming a judgment on a verdict for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

P. M. French, for appellant.

George H. Harris, for respondent.

CULLEN, C. J.

The action is brought, servant against master, to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the defendant's negligence. The complaint charged the defendant, which conducted a candy factory, with employing the plaintiff, who at the time was an infant under the age of 14 years, in the operation of dangerous machinery, in violation of section 70 of the labor law (Laws 1897, p. 477, c. 415), and that the machinery was not protected by proper safeguards, as required by section 81 of that law. The answer put in issue the extent of the plaintiff's injuries, and the other allegations of the complaint, except plaintiff's employment and the character of the business carried on by the defendant. The plaintiff recovered a verdict at the Trial Term, which has been affirmed by the Appellate Division by a divided court. On the trial evidence was given by the plaintiff's parents as to the date of his birth, which established that at the time of the accident he was a few months less than 14 years of age. The defendant gave evidence to the effect that, when the plaintiff sought employment, he represented that he was more than 16 years old. In submitting the case to the jury the learned trial judge charged: ‘If you find that plaintiff did in fact make this statement as to his age, then you are further to inquire and determine whether defendant's agent, Colebrook, was justified in relying, as he says he did, upon that statement, or whether, in the exercise of reasonable prudence and caution before actually hiring the plaintiff, he should have made further inquiry and received further assurance and proof of the fact. If he was not justified in relying solely upon plaintiff's representation as to his age, aided by his observation of the personal appearance of the boy, if you find he made such representation, if there was in his appearance, or in any other fact coming then to the attention of this agent of defendant, which has been disclosed by the evidence, which would naturally have led him to suspect that plaintiff was not telling the truth about his age, and would have led an ordinarily prudent person to make further inquiry on that subject before actually hiring the plaintiff, then those facts are to be considered by you, and given their due weight in determining whether or not this agent actually believed, and was justified in believing, the statement plaintiff made as to his age.’ This was the whole of the court's instructions on the question. The defendant requested the court to charge, ‘If the plaintiff falsely stated his age to the officers of the defendant, and led them to believe that he was actually over 14 years of age at the time he was hired, and if they were justified in that belief, then they are not guilty of negligence in hiring him, and the jury must dismiss that provision of the labor law from further consideration.’ This the court refused. The defendant thereupon excepted, and that exception presents the first question for our consideration.

The labor law makes a violation of its provisions a misdemeanor, but does not give a civil remedy therefor to the party injured. Nevertheless it was held by this court, in Marino v. Lehmaier, 173 N. Y. 530, 534,66 N. E. 572, 573,61 L. R. A. 811, that a violation of the statute was, per se, evidence of negligence for which a jury might find the defendant liable. It was there said by Judge Haight: We think it is very evident that these reasons induced the Legislature to establish definitely an age limit under which children shall not be employed in factories; and, to our minds, the statute, in effect, declares that a child under the age specified presumably does not possess the judgment, discretion, care, and caution necessary for the engagement in such a dangerous avocation, and is therefore not, as a matter of law, chargeable with contributory negligence or with having assumed the risks of the employment in such occupation.’ Under this doctrine the gist of civil liability is the negligence of the master in employing a person of such tender years that the Legislature has forbidden his employment. Therefore, if the employer, in the exercise of proper vigilance and due caution, is led to believe that the employé is above the statutory age, he cannot well be charged with negligence in employing an infant, whether such belief would be available in a criminal prosecution or not. The representation of the employé as to his age. even if accompanied by a similar statement by his parents, is not conclusive on the question. No principle of estoppel is applicable to the case. The question always is whether the employer is justified in believing that the employé is of sufficient age to authorize his employment. For this purpose he may not rest alone on the representation of the plaintiff, but is required to exercise proper vigilance to discover the fact. What such vigilance would dictate differs in different cases. There can readily be imagined a case where the employé is of such mature appearance that the employer may naturally and properly accept his statement as to age. In other cases the appearance of the employé might be the exact reverse. No definite rule can be laid down to relieve the employer from liability in violating the statute. The jury must be satisfied that under the circumstances of the particular case the employer believed, and was justified in the belief, that the employé was of the prescribed age for work. In this respect the charge of the learned trial judge as to the circumstances under which the defendant...

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47 cases
  • Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering v. Adams
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • April 14, 1938
    ... ... statute or not. Morris v. Stanfield, 81 Ill.App ... 264; Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, 194 N.Y. 92, ... 87 N.E. 77, 19 L.R.A.,N.S., ... ...
  • Toobian v. Golzad
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • April 7, 2021
    ...Rosales v. Rivera, 176 A.D.3d 753, 755, 110 N.Y.S.3d 47 ; see Gangi v. Fradus, 227 N.Y. 452, 456, 125 N.E. 677 ; Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, 194 N.Y. 92, 93, 87 N.E. 77 ). While the defendant was entitled to proffer an explanation for his admissions in Joint Exhibit 59 (see Wachtel v.......
  • Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • July 24, 1911
    ... ... Newcastle & Gateshead ... [209 Mass. 494] ... Water Works Co., L. R. 2 Ex. Div. 441, and Johnston & Toronto Type Foundry Co., Ltd., ... go over them again here. See also Schlemmer v. Buffalo, ... Rochester & Pittsburg Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 1-12, 27 S.Ct ... 407, 51 L.Ed. 681; ... v ... Armentraut, 214 Ill. 509, 73 N.E. 766; Koester v ... Rochester Candy Works, 194 N.Y. 92, 87 N.E. 77, 19 L. R ... A ... ...
  • Amberg v. Kinley
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • April 13, 1915
    ...in an action by one injured through its violation, and in that respect the decision has since been followed. Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, 194 N. Y. 92, 87 N. E. 77,19 L. R. A. (N . S.) 783,16 Ann. Cas. 589. The Legislature intended by section 70 of the Labor Law to regulate, and in som......
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