State v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 14 March 1973
• Docket Number: No. 3,3
• Citation: 194 S.E.2d 800,283 N.C. 17
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Jerry Douglas WATKINS.

Page 800

194 S.E.2d 800

283 N.C. 17

STATE of North Carolina v. Jerry Douglas WATKINS.

No. 3.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 14, 1973.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Asst. Atty. Gen. Roy A. Giles, for the State.

Jerry Douglas Watkins, pro se.

SHARP, Justice:

Defendant's case on appeal and brief are signed 'Jerry Douglas Watkins, Defendant in propria persona.' His appeal, taken after a plea of guilty, presents for review only the question whether error appears on the face of the record. State v. Caldwell, 269 N.C. 521, 153 S.E.2d 34 (1967); State v. Newell, 268 N.C. 300, 150 S.E.2d 405 (1966).

Defendant's assignments which require discussion are that the trial court erred in accepting his plea of guilty to murder in the first degree, in accepting the verdict of the jury, and in imposing a life sentence upon him. He asserts (1) that under the law of this State a jury must determine whether murder is in the first or second degree, and a defendant will not be permitted to plead guilty to murder in the first degree; (2) that Judge Braswell's acceptance of his plea was a nullity 'totally without precedent' and a violation of defendant's rights under N.C.Const. art. I, § 19 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (3) that neither defendant's plea nor the jury's verdict will support a sentence.

At the outset, we note that defendant's plea was entered on 13 June 1972, sixteen days before the U.S. Supreme Court, on 29 June 1972, decided Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346. Furman invalidated any death sentence imposed under a statute which leaves to the discretion of either judge or jury whether a sentence shall be death or life imprisonment. Thus a death sentence imposed under G.S. § 14--17 as then constituted cannot be carried out. See State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973). Prior to Furman, the status of the death penalty under G.S. § 14--17 was uncertain. However, defendant knew that G.S. § 14--17 made either death or life imprisonment the penalty for first-degree murder, and he believed that if his plea was accepted his punishment would be one or the other.

The Attorney General concedes that on 13 June 1972 no statute or case law in this State specifically authorized the court to accept a plea of guilty to first-degree murder. He submits, however, that defendant has suffered no prejudice because (1) the State's evidence points unerringly to defendant's guilt of first-degree murder; (2) defendant does not challenge the fact that his plea was freely, understandingly, and voluntarily made; and (3) the jury's verdict imposed the minimum punishment of life imprisonment.

Undoubtedly, at common law, a defendant of competent understanding, duly enlightened, had the right to plead guilty to a capital crime instead of denying the charge. See Green v. Commonwealth, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 155 (1866); 31 N.C.L.Rev. 405 (1953). According to Blackstone, upon 'the prisoner's confession of the indictment . . . the court hath nothing to do but award judgment: but it is usually very backward in receiving and recording such confession, out of tenderness to life of the subject; and will generally advise the prisoner to retract it, and plead to the indictment.' 4 Blackstone, Commentaries

Page 324

In noting the reluctance of courts to accept a plea of guilty of a crime for which the penalty is death, Bishop said, 'Thus, where one tendered (this plea) in a capital case, the judges would not accept it till they had explained to him its serious nature, sent him back to his cell for reflection, brought him again into court, had the indictment read to him a second time, and examined witnesses as to his sanity, and whether or not promises of clemency had been made to him . . ., (a)nd in some of the states there are varying statutory and other devices to protect defendants from improvident pleas of guilty.' 2 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure § 795 (2d ed. 1913). See also 1 Greenleaf, Law of Evidence § 216 (16th ed. 1899).

In this country today it is generally held that every accused has the right to plead guilty and one may do so even in a capital case unless prohibited by statute. Annot., 6 A.L.R. 694 (1920); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 484 (1965); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 422(1), (4) (1961). See also Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, 18 U.S.C.A. Donnelly v. United States, 185 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1950); Territory v. Miller, 4 Dak. 173, 29 N.W. 7 (1886). However, 'one accused of a capital offense has no constitutional right to plead guilty.' 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 422(1) (1961). Accord, 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 484 (1965). See also People v. Ballentine, 39 Cal.2d 193, 246 P.2d 35 (1952); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 694, 695 (1920); Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 13 S.Ct. 105, 36 L.Ed. 986 (1892); 31 N.C.L.Rev. 405--06 (1953).

It is settled law in this State that a plea of guilty, freely, understandingly, and voluntarily entered, is equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged. State v. Shelly, 280 N.C. 300, 185 S.E.2d 702 (1972); State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 180 S.E.2d 135 (1970); State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 611, 157 S.E.2d 211 (1967); State v. Perry, 265 N.C. 517, 144 S.E.2d 591 (1965).

In State v. Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 63 S.E. 169 (1908), a case involving a prosecution for disturbing religious worship, in discussing the nature and effect of a plea of guilty, Justice Walker said: When a defendant 'directly, and in the face of the court, admits the truth of the accusation' in the indictment, '(t)his is called a 'plea of guilty' and is equivalent to a conviction. The court then has nothing to do but to award judgment as upon a verdict of guilty, but, of course, may hear evidence for the purpose of enabling it to determine the measure of punishment . . ..' Id. at 561, 63 S.E. at 170 (citations omitted). However, Justice Walker also said that 'a judge cannot compel a defendant against his will to plead not guilty and submit to a trial, for undoubtedly a prisoner of competent understanding, duly enlightened, has the right to plead guilty instead of denying the charge. Yet in proportion to the gravity of the offense, the court should exercise caution in receiving his plea and should see that he is properly advised as to the nature of his act, and its consequences. This is a matter which is left largely to the good judgment and discretion of the court, which should be exercised so as to protect a defendant from an improvident plea and to prevent injustice.' Id. at 563, 63 S.E. at 171.

Although North Carolina has had no statute specifically prohibiting a court from accepting a plea of guilty in a capital case, to our knowledge no judge had ever accepted a plea of guilty of crime for which the punishment could be (or was thought to be) death prior to Judge Braswell's acceptance of defendant's plea in this case. It has been the universal practice of the trial judges to require the entry of a plea of not guilty, and to have a jury determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Indeed, it has been generally understood by both bench and bar that the law required this procedure. However, the authority cited for it in our decisions hardly seems to sustain the proposition.

When Sections One and Two of Chapter 85, N.C.Sess.Laws (1893) (now G.S. § 14--17) divided murder into two degrees, Section Three (now G.S. § 15--172 (1965)) provided that the division required no alteration in the existing statutory form of indictment for murder, 'but the jury before whom the offender is tried shall determine in their verdict whether the crime is murder in the first or second degree.'

In State v. Blue, 219 N.C. 612, 14 S.E.2d 635 (1941), the defendant who was convicted of murder upon his plea of not guilty, was awarded a new trial for errors in the charge. Justice (later Chief Justice) Winborne, said: '(I)n this State a defendant will not be permitted to plead guilty to murder in the first degree. It is provided in (G.S. 15--172) that 'the jury before whom the offender is tried shall determine in their verdict whether the crime is murder in the first or second degree. '' Id. at 616, 14 S.E.2d at 637. The statute and the two cases cited in Blue immediately following the statement that a defendant will not be permitted to plead guilty to murder in the first degree do not support the proposition.

State v. Simmons, 236 N.C. 340, 72 S.E.2d 743 (1952), was also a case in which the defendant, convicted of murder after having pled not guilty, was awarded a new trial for errors in the charge. By way of dictum Justice Winborne again said, 'In this connection, this Court has held that in this State a defendant will not be permitted to plead guilty to murder in the first degree. State v. Blue 219 N.C. 612, 14 S.E.2d 635, and cases there cited.' Id. at 341, 72 S.E.2d at 744. For a statement of similar import in a factually similar case See State v. Murphy, 157 N.C. 614, 72 S.E. 1075 (1911).

The statutory form of an indictment for murder, prescribed by Chapter 58, N.C.Sess.Laws (1887) (now G.S. § 15--144), antedated the division of murder into two degrees (G.S. § 14--17). Although the form contained, Inter alia, an averment that the accused killed his alleged victim 'feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought,' it did not include specific averments of premeditation and deliberation, essential ingredients of murder in the first degree. This omission, however, became immaterial when legislative fiat made the existing form a sufficient indictment for murder in either the first or second degree. G.S. § 15--172; State v. Talbert, 282 N.C. 718, 194 S.E.2d 822 (1973); State v. Duncan, 282 N.C. 412, 193 S.E.2d 65 (1973); State v. Matthews, 142 N.C. 621, 55 S.E. 342 (1906). Clearly, therefore, the purpose of the requirement that the jury determine whether one charged under the statutory form is guilty of murder in the first or second degree, was merely to eliminate that uncertainty When the defendant's...