Austin v. Paramount Parks

Citation195 F.3d 715
Decision Date08 April 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-1897,CA-96-1966-PJM,No. 98-1850,No. 98-1424,98-1424,98-1850,98-1897
Parties(4th Cir. 1999) STEPHANIE P. AUSTIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PARAMOUNT PARKS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Kings Dominion, a/k/a Paramount Kings Dominion, Defendant-Appellant, OCTAVIA MARIE EATON, Movant. STEPHANIE P. AUSTIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PARAMOUNT PARKS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Kings Dominion, a/k/a Paramount Kings Dominion, Defendant-Appellant, OCTAVIA MARIE EATON, Movant. STEPHANIE P. AUSTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PARAMOUNT PARKS, INCORPORATED, d/b/a Kings Dominion, a/k/a Paramount Kings Dominion, Defendant-Appellee, OCTAVIA MARIE EATON, Movant. (). . Argued:
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Peter J. Messitte, District Judge.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] COUNSEL ARGUED: Steven Colin McCallum, MCGUIRE, WOODS, BATTLE & BOOTHE, L.L.P. Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Andrew J. Toland, SHAPIRO & OLANDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: F. Brawner Greer, Jonathan T. Blank, MCGUIRE, WOODS, BATTLE & BOOTHE, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Charles S. Fax, SHAPIRO & OLANDER, Baltimore, Maryland; Henry L. Marsh, III, HILL, TUCKER & MARSH, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WIDENER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in which Judge Widener and Senior Judge Butzner joined.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:

Paramount Parks, Inc. ("Paramount") operates an amusement park in Hanover County, Virginia known as "Paramount's Kings Dominion" ("Kings Dominion" or "the park"). While visiting Kings Dominion in May 1994, Stephanie P. Austin ("Austin") was positively identified by two of Kings Dominion's employees as a woman who had passed a bad check at the park less than one week earlier. After questioning Austin for several hours, a special police officer of the Kings Dominion Park Police Department caused a warrant to be issued for Austin's arrest on a charge of grand larceny. The same officer thereafter caused a second warrant to be issued, this time for Austin's arrest on charges of forgery and uttering a forged writing. The Commonwealth's Attorney's Office, with the assistance of the arresting officer, actively prepared the case against Austin over the next nine months. The charges were dismissed before trial, however, once the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office realized that one of the employees who had identified Austin as having passed the bad check in question had later identified another park guest in connection with the same offense.

Austin subsequently brought this civil action against Paramount, asserting a variety of claims arising from her arrests and prosecution on the preceding charges. At trial, the jury returned general verdicts for Austin on her claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1998) and on several claims under Virginia law, and awarded her compensatory and punitive damages. The district court ultimately entered judgment in favor of Austin, denied Paramount's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and awarded Austin attorney's fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1998) upon finding her to be a prevailing party on the § 1983 claim. This appeal followed.

We conclude that Paramount was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Austin's § 1983 claim because Austin failed to establish that any deprivation of her federal rights was caused by an official policy or custom of Paramount. We further conclude that Virginia law compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of Paramount on Austin's state-law claims because Virginia law shields a private employer from liability when a special police officer takes an action in compliance with a public duty to enforce the law. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Paramount's motion for judgment as a matter of law, vacate the judgment in favor of Austin, vacate the award of attorney's fees and expenses, and remand with instructions that judgment as a matter of law be entered in favor of Paramount.

I.

The Loss Prevention Department at Kings Dominion ("Loss Prevention") is responsible for providing safety to park guests and employees, preserving park assets, and enforcing Virginia law and park rules and regulations. The security operations group of Loss Prevention consists of special police officers associated with the Kings Dominion Park Police Department, and seasonal uniformed security officers. Unlike the uniformed security officers, the special police officers are sworn conservators of the peace who are authorized to carry firearms, make arrests, and perform the same functions that law enforcement officers in the Commonwealth of Virginia perform. The special police officers derive this authority from an appointment order issued annually, on Paramount's application, by the judges of the Circuit Court of Hanover County under Va. Code Ann.§ 19.2-13 (Michie Supp. 1999).1

The Sheriff of Hanover County had supervisory authority over the special police officers of the Park Police Department that was expressly acknowledged in both the Circuit Court's appointment order and the Park Police Department's Policy and Procedure Manual ("Manual") in force at the time of the events in question. Specifically, the appointment order provided that the special police officers "work only under the control and direction of the Sheriff of Hanover County." This directive was reiterated in the Manual, which provided that the Park Police Department "has direct affiliation with the Hanover County Sheriff's Department and is under the direction of the Sheriff of Hanover County." The Manual further provided: The Chain of Command and authority for all Kings Dominion Park Police shall be as follows involving official law enforcement:

a. Sheriff of Hanover County

b. Lieutenant of Kings Dominion Park Police

c. Kings Dominion Park Police Sergeant

d. Kings Dominion Park Police Corporal

e. Kings Dominion Park Police Officer

Although the Park Police Department fell under Loss Prevention in the organizational structure at Kings Dominion, the testimony at trial established that the special police officers performed their law enforcement duties without interference from park management. Chancellor L. Hester ("Hester"), who served as Manager of Loss Prevention at the time of the events in question, provided uncontradicted testimony that his role in matters of law enforcement was limited to ensuring that guests suspected of committing crimes at the park were treated courteously and professionally. As to decisions pertaining to law enforcement, however, Hester testified that he"let the police officers do the work," knowing that those officers received assistance and direction from the Hanover County Sheriff's Department and the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office. The annual training that the special police officers received reflected this division. Hester provided instruction on interpersonal skills, while the Sheriff's Department and the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office taught law enforcement classes on such topics as the laws of arrest, the conducting of interviews, self-defense, and searches and seizures.

The principal events giving rise to the present litigation occurred at Kings Dominion on May 15, 1994, when a guest arrived at the park's Season Pass office and submitted a check for $360 under the name of "Donita Morgan." Japata Taylor ("Taylor"), a park cashier, accepted the check and proceeded to retrieve $360 worth of Kings Dominion currency, known as "Scooby dollars," which guests use to purchase merchandise for sale within the park. Meanwhile, a guest at the next window submitted a check under the name of"Catherine May" to Joshua Stone ("Stone"), another park cashier. Because the Season Pass office did not have enough Scooby dollars to cash the two checks, Taylor and Stone contacted their supervisor, Deborah Samuel ("Samuel"). Samuel then had a chance to observe "Donita Morgan" and "Catherine May" after obtaining a sufficient amount of Scooby dollars from the park's Cash Control office.

Several days later, Loss Prevention learned that both the "Donita Morgan" check accepted by Taylor and the "Catherine May" check accepted by Stone were fraudulent. In fact, numerous fraudulent checks under these and other names had been passed at Kings Dominion during the May 14-15 weekend. Loss Prevention suspected that a group of individuals were operating an illegal check-cashing scheme at the park using fraudulent identification cards and fraudulent checks,2 and provided the park's cashiers with a memorandum listing various names under which bad checks had already been passed, including "Catherine May." The cashiers were directed to immediately inform Loss Prevention should a guest submit a check under a listed name.

Sergeant Cindy Gatewood ("Gatewood") of the Park Police Department supervised the investigation into the apparent check-cashing scheme. On the morning of Saturday, May 21, 1994, six days after Taylor and Stone had accepted the "Donita Morgan" check and the "Catherine May" check, respectively, Gatewood obtained verbal descriptions of the suspects from Samuel, Taylor, and Stone. According to Gatewood's testimony at trial, Samuel described "Donita Morgan" as a "middle-aged black woman with twisted hair." Taylor described that suspect as "a black female, five foot five, five foot six, average build, twisted hair braids, sunglasses." After obtaining verbal statements, Gatewood asked each of the three employees to prepare written statements. In her written statement, Taylor described "Donita Morgan" as a woman who had braided hair and wore Chanel sunglasses. Samuel, in her written statement, described her as "a middleaged black woman with glasses, long twisted braids, and a lot of children."

Austin, an...

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