Zimmerman v. Corbett, 1:13-cv-02788
| Decision Date | 15 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:13-cv-02788,1:13-cv-02788 |
| Citation | 195 F.Supp.3d 695 |
| Parties | John R. ZIMMERMAN, Plaintiff v. Thomas W. CORBETT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Devon M. Jacob, Jacob Litigation, Mechanicsburg, PA, for Plaintiff.
Amy Zapp, Lindsey A. Bedell, Timothy P. Keating, PA Office of the Attorney General, Special Litigation Section, Frank J. Lavery, Jr., Joshua M. Autry, Lavery Faherty, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.
Before the Court is Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. No. 47.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny Defendants' motion.
The above-captioned case stems from criminal charges filed against Plaintiff John R. Zimmerman and nine other Republican employees of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on November 12, 2009. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 32-34, 116, 120.) The charges followed an investigation of public corruption (see id. at ¶¶ 29-30), later characterized and reported as "Boxgate" and "Computergate" (id.¶ 34). Plaintiff maintains that he was charged in the "Boxgate" conspiracy, described as the movement of boxes that contained "three year old blank campaign letterhead" and envelopes. (Id.¶¶ 35-36.) Plaintiff alleges that then-Attorney General Thomas W. Corbett filed criminal charges against Zimmerman and the nine other Republicans in response to criticism that Corbett engaged in partisan politics in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. (Id.¶¶ 26, 28, 32-33, 39.) Plaintiff also alleges that the criminal charges were initiated without probable cause. The charges filed against Plaintiff were voluntarily dismissed on November 17, 2011. (Id.¶¶ 38, 164, 172.)
On November 14, 2013, Plaintiff Zimmerman filed a complaint in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants Thomas W. Corbett, Linda L. Kelly, Frank G. Fina, K. Kenneth Brown, II, Michael A Sprow, Anthony J. Fiore, and Gary E. Speaks maliciously prosecuted him in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Doc. No. 1.) In an amended complaint, filed on May 7, 2014, Plaintiff repleaded his malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and added a malicious prosecution claim under Pennsylvania law. (Doc. No. 20.)
On May 21, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 21.) On February 10, 2015, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 29, 30.) The Court dismissed Linda L. Kelly from the suit because Plaintiff failed to adequately allege her involvement. (Doc. Nos. 29 at 19; 30.) The Court also dismissed numerous allegations against the remaining Defendants as barred by absolute immunity. (Doc. No. 29 at 11-15, 17). However, the Court denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims – under either the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments or Pennsylvania law – to the extent that the claims are premised on allegations that:
(1) the Defendants manufactured witness testimony and intimidated witnesses prior to the grand jury proceedings, (2) the Defendants destroyed exculpatory evidence, and (3) that Defendant Fiore signed a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause that contained false and misleading statements.
(Doc. No. 30.) In the accompanying order, the Court stated that "Defendants may raise their immunity arguments at summary judgment, following development of the factual record in this case." (Id.)
On March 12, 2015, Defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint, and Plaintiff submitted an amended joint case management plan. (Doc. Nos. 32, 33.) Close of fact discovery was scheduled for December 22, 2015. (Doc. No. 36.) On November 30, 2015, Defendants filed the present motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. No. 47.) The motion for judgment on the pleadings urges the Court to grant Defendants qualified immunity on the remaining claims. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the pending motion on January 26, 2016 (Doc. No. 55), and Defendant filed a reply brief thereto on February 9, 2016 (Doc. No. 56). The present motion is now ripe for disposition.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed but within such time as to not delay the trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion is proper only "when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain." Inst. for Sci. Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1005 (3d Cir.1991) (internal citation omitted). "A court will grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings if the movant establishes that there are no issues of material fact, and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Squires, 667 F.3d 388, 390 (3d Cir.2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept all of the allegations in the pleadings of the party against whom the motion is addressed as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Id.
Defendants move the Court to grant the present motion on the basis of qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 47 ¶ 4.) Plaintiff opposes the motion on the grounds that material facts remain disputed and that the motion prematurely claims immunity. (See Doc. No. 55 at 2, 6-8.) The Court addresses the following in turn: (1) the doctrine of qualified immunity; (2) whether Plaintiff's allegations in the amended complaint make out a constitutional violation; (3) Defendants' efforts to frame the right at issue; and (4) whether Defendants Anthony J. Fiore and Gary E. Speaks are presumptively entitled to qualified immunity.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects "government officials performing discretionary functions" by "shield[ing them] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a district court undertakes the following two-pronged inquiry:
First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c) ) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right.... Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ).
The Court will begin its qualified immunity analysis with the first prong. The Court must decide whether the facts Plaintiff Zimmerman has alleged – accepting the allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor –make out a violation of a constitutional right. As explained below, Plaintiff has alleged a Fourth Amendments malicious prosecution claim. (Doc. No. 20 ¶ 183.) Accordingly, the Court will decide whether Plaintiff's allegations make out a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.
Defendants challenge whether Plaintiff Zimmerman has adequately pleaded his malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment. In particular, Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to adequately allege a Fourth Amendment seizure. (Doc. Nos. 47 ¶ 9; 49 at 24-25.)
"To prevail on a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in [the plaintiff's] favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding." Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 296–97 (3d Cir.2014) (quoting Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir.2007) ).
"Where the malicious prosecution claim sounds in the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff ‘must show some deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of ‘seizure.’ " Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 85 n. 14 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir.1998) ). In making this determination, courts consider whether a plaintiff was physically detained, faced travel restrictions, posted bail, or was subjected to "mandatory pretrial services check-ins." Perkins v. Staskiewicz, No. 08–1651, 2010 WL 2510191, at *4 (M.D.Pa. June 17, 2010) (collecting cases).
Here, the amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff was handcuffed and fingerprinted at the police station, subjected to a perp walk, surrendered his passport, was arraigned, was subject to a "$1,000 unsecured bail," and "suffered an ongoing deprivation of liberty ... as a consequence of being subject to bail conditions and having his passport confiscated." (Doc. No. 20 ¶¶ 126, 130-136, 181.) At this stage, accepting all of the allegations in the amended complaint as true, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff adequately alleges a Fourth Amendment seizure. See DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir.2005) (...
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