Quinn v. Heidman, 23526.

Decision Date16 November 1923
Docket NumberNo. 23526.,23526.
Citation195 N.W. 774,157 Minn. 129
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court
PartiesQUINN v. HEIDMAN.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; H. A. Dancer, Judge.

Action by H. G. Quinn against Paul Heidman. Verdict for plaintiff, and from an order denying his motion in the alternative for judgment or for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Although a pedestrian crossing a street may have looked and seen an automobile approaching, it is nevertheless the duty of the driver to sound the horn if the actions of the pedestrian indicate that he is unaware of the nearness of the automobile and is in danger of getting in its way.

The evidence failed to show conclusively that a pedestrian, struck by an automobile on a street crossing, was so heedless of his surroundings as to be chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of law. Burdick, Campbell & Bush, of Duluth, for appellant.

Geo. W. Atmore, Jr., of Duluth, for respondent.

LEES, C.

At about 7:30 a. m. on July 30, 1922, plaintiff was struck and seriously injured by a Ford truck driven by defendant. Charging defendant with negligence in the operation of the truck, he brought this action and recovered a verdict, and defendant has appealed from an order denying his motion in the alternative for judgment or a new trial.

At the time of the accident respondent was a night telegraph operator employed in the office of the News Tribune in the city of Duluth. He worked until about 1 a. m. on July 30th, then played cards until about 7 a. m., when he left the office to go home. He was walked in a westerly direction on the north side of Third street, which extends from the eastern to the western portion of Duluth and is intersected at right angles by Fourth Avenue East. When he reached the intersection and was three or four steps from the curb, he looked to the right up Fourth avenue and saw the truck approaching from the north. It was about 140 feet away, appeared to be moving at a speed of 12 or 15 miles an hour, and respondent believed he had ample time to cross Fourth avenue ahead of it. He was within 9 or 10 feet of the curb on the west side of the avenue when he was struck by the left front fender of the truck. He was knocked down, and the wheels passed over him, rolling his body forward 30 feet or more. The truck was not stopped until it had run around the corner and more than 50 feet west on Third street. Appellant bought the truck about 2 1/2 months before the accident. He had no previous experience as a driver. The grade of Fourth avenue descends from the north to the south and appellant had shifted to low gear, using the motor as an aid to the brakes. He testified that he first saw respondent when about 25 feet from him, sounded the horn, and thought respondent ‘had all time to cross, to get on the sidewalk,’ and that he ‘did not see him at all’ when he struck him. He also testified that it was his intention to round the corner and go west on Third street on his way to church. Respondent testified as follows:

‘I figured I had plenty of time to get across. * * * The first thing I know was, a horn sounded, and bang! That is * * * all I remember.’

A witness testified that when he was run down respondent was walking slowly, with his head down and his hands in his pockets, and that appellant put on speed as he turned the corner and just before he struck respondent.

The court instructed the jury that section 2632, subsec. 2 G. S. 1913, made it the duty of the appellant to give a timely signal and slow down as he approached respondent, and that, if he failed to do so, he was guilty of negligence, and the giving of this instruction is assigned as error.

Respondent admitted on cross-examination that after he first saw the truck he did not look again to see where it was or how fast it was coming. Appellant contends that his was an admission of negligence which contributed to cause the accident and for that reason his motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.

[1] 1. It is the duty of the driver of a motor vehicle to sound the horn in order that a pedestrian, unaware of the approach of the car, may have timely warning. If a pedestrian, crossing a street, sees and is aware of the on-coming car, no useful purpose would be served by sounding the horn; but it is a matter of common knowledge that pedestrians do cross streets oblivious for the moment of the nearness of a car and of the speed at which it is coming. Whenever a driver has cause to believe that a pedestrian is in danger of getting in the way, he should give a warning signal. He no longer has a right to proceed on the assumption that the pedestrian is conscious of the approach of a car merely because he looked and saw it when he started to cross the...

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