Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp.
| Citation | 195 S.E.2d 399,230 Ga. 58 |
| Decision Date | 04 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | 27289,27283,WOOD-MOSAIC,Nos. 27282,s. 27282 |
| Parties | COE & PAYNE COMPANY v.CORPORATION et al. ATLANTA FLOORING COMPANY v.CORPORATION et al. C.P. COMPANY v.CORPORATION et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Edward E. Dorsey, Stuart E. Eizenstat, Atlanta, for Coe & Payne Co.
Smith, Cohen, Ringel, Kohler, Martin & Lowe, Robert W. Beynart, Sam F. Lowe, Jr., atlanta, for Atlanta Flooring Co.
Neely, Freeman & Hawkins, Albert H. Parnell, Atlanta, for C.P.Co.
Carter, Ansley, Smith, McLendon & Quillian, Ben Kingree, N. Forrest Montet, Atlanta, for appellees.
Donald A. Weisman, Glenville Haldi, Atlanta, amicus curiae.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
There cases come here by writs of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. For a full statement of the facts giving rise to these appeals see Coe & Payne Company v. Wood-Mosaic Corporation et al., 125 Ga.App. 845, 189 S.E.2d 459 (1972).
The issues in these cases decided by the Court of Appeals and to be decided here involve the interpretation and application of the Georgia Long-Arm Statute (Code Ann. § 24-113.1). The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments of the trial court, those judgments essentially holding that the direct actions, third party complaints, and cross claims filed against Wood-Mosaic Corporation and Overall Paint Company, two foreign corporations, could not be maintained in the Georgia courts under the Georgia Long Arm Statute.
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence submitted by the two foreign corporations in support of their motions for summary judgment was adequate to show that they were not transacting 'any business within this State', and that jurisdiction of the two foreign corporations in the Georgia courts could not be predicated on subsection (a) of our Long Arm Statute.
The Court of Appeals also held that subsection (c) of our Long Arm Statute, enacted in 1970 and effective July 1, 1970, is not applicable in these cases, because the occurrence giving rise to these cause of action happened prior to the effective date of subsection (c). Subsection (c), which confers jurisdiction on a non-resident party who commits 'a tortious injury in this State caused by an act or omission outside this State, . . .', was obviously enacted to legislatively 'get around' the legal reasoning on which the decisions in O'Neal Steel v. Smith, 120 Ga.App. 106, 169 S.E.2d 827, and Castleberry v. Gold Agency, 124 Ga.App. 694, 185 S.E.2d 557, were based. Those two cases adopted the legal reasoning resulting in the New York Rule rather than that resulting in the Illinois Rule. Under the New York Rule subsection (b) of our Long Arm Statute does not confer jurisdiction in a situation where a nonresident party commits negligence outside the state with only the injurious consequences occurring within the state. The Illinois Rule, rejected by the Court of Appeals in those two decisions, sustains jurisdiction under subsection (b) of our Long Arm Statute, its reasoning being that the negligence occurring outside the state cannot be separated from the resulting injury occurring within the state. In other words, a 'tortious act' is a composite of both negligence and damage, and if damage occurred within the state then the tortious act occurred within the state within the meaning of subsection (b) of the Long Arm Statute. The Illinois Rule rejects the argument that the term 'tortious act' refers only to act or conduct, separate and apart from the consequences thereof. The Illinois Rule is also based on the premise that the Long Arm Statute contemplates that jurisdiction shall be exercised over non-resident parties to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process. Gray v. American Radiator Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 120 Ga.App. 106, 169 S.E.2d 827, supra, came to this court by writ of certiorari. Smith v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 225 Ga. 778, 171 S.E.2d 519. When the application for the writ was granted in that case it was felt that this court should pass upon the meaning of subsection (b) of our Long Arm Statute, either agreeing or disagreeing with the Court of Appeals in its rejection of the Illinois Rule because this court 'deemed the question to be of gravity and importance, and particularly so because it has been decided diversely in other jurisdictions but had not been ruled upon by this court.'
However, after the ruling of this court in the case of Bauer International Corp. v. Cagles, Inc., 225 Ga. 684, 171 S.E.2d 314 a majority of this court considered the question on which the application was granted to have become moot. One Justice of this court dissented because he felt that to remand the case because of Bauer, and not rule on the subsection (b) question would be misleading to the...
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