Voltz v. United States

• Citation: 196 F.2d 298
• Decision Date: 17 June 1952
• Docket Number: No. 13900.,13900.
• Parties: VOLTZ v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

196 F.2d 298 (1952)

VOLTZ v. UNITED STATES.

No. 13900.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 10, 1952.

Rehearing Denied June 17, 1952.

Louis A. Voltz, in Propria Persona, Springfield, Mo., for appellant.

John D. Hill, U. S. Atty., L. Drew Redden, Asst. U. S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., for appellee.

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and BORAH and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.

HUTCHESON, Chief Judge.

Appealing from an order denying, on the record¹ made of the trial, a motion made under Sec. 2255, Title 28, to vacate his sentence, movant is here seeking the reversal of that order.

The district judge in the district of sentence reviewed the prior proceedings in the court, including the reporter's transcript thereof, and found: that defendant appeared in open court with his counsel and, after being advised of the nature of the charge against him, entered his plea of guilty; that no complaint was made and no information furnished to the court before, during, or after, the trial until the filing of this motion, that any illegal or even irregular proceedings had occurred in connection with the case; and that it was not at that time claimed that he had been, or was being, coerced into making a plea of guilty. On these findings he denied the motion.

It is quite plain that his action in doing so was correct and that the appeal is wholly without merit. In each of the cases invoked by counsel below and in his brief, the defendant entered his plea of not guilty to a felony and proceeded to trial. The only instrument of his conviction in each case was an extra judicial confession. Each of these defendants at each step of the proceedings objected strenuously to the admission of these confessions into evidence on the ground that they had been executed on the threat of force, threats, duress, or coercion. In each case an examination was made into the circumstances surrounding the execution of the confession, and the Supreme Court found that the confessions were involuntary and inadmissible.

Here the defendant appeared in open court, waived indictment, was represented by competent and experienced counsel, and entered his plea of guilty. There followed a lengthy dialogue with the court concerning his extensive prior criminal record. He did not take advantage of his opportunity to inform the court of his claim that a confession, of which the court had no knowledge and which played no part in his confession or sentence, had been previously extorted from him by the police in St. Louis, Mo., outside of the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Instead he stated freely to the court that he was guilty and discussed his participation in the crime.

While it is established law that once an illegal confession infects a trial, the verdict of guilty must be set aside, no matter how free of taint the other evidence may be, Malinski v. People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029; Stroble v. State of California, U.S., 72 S.Ct. 599, it is equally clear that the burden is on the one claiming that a confession was illegally extorted from him to show that it infected the trial.

What was said in Stroble's case, 72 S.Ct. at page 607, while said there of a state court conviction, is, because no claim that a confession had been extorted was made when this case was tried, equally applicable here:

"* * * illegal acts of state officials prior to trial are relevant only as they bear on petitioner\'s contention that he has been deprived of a fair trial, either through the use of a coerced confession or otherwise." (Emphasis supplied.)

In Adams v. U. S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268, the court said:

"If the result of

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