Vargas v. Ruggiero
Decision Date | 06 December 1961 |
Parties | Angel VARGAS et al., Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants and Appellants, v. Domenique RUGGIERO, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent. Civ. 46. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
T. N. Petersen, Merced, for appellants.
Willard B. Treadwell, Merced, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order granting the motion of the defendant, Domenique Ruggiero, for a judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Clara Vargas, and from the judgment for said defendant entered pursuant thereto.
The complaint filed by plaintiffs, Angel Vargas and Clara Vargas, husband and wife, against the defendants, Domenique Ruggiero and his alleged agent, Virgil Mocci, is in two counts; the first, a cause of action by Clara Vargas, sounding in tort for a miscarriage; the second, a cause of action by the husband for an accounting and an injunction preventing threatened eviction from his home property contrary to his alleged contractual rights. The defendant, Ruggiero, cross-complained to quiet title to the plaintiffs' home place and for sums claimed to be due him, which claims were denied in the answer to the cross-complaint. During the trial by jury it was agreed by counsel that the second cause of action and the issues raised by the cross-complaint be separately litigated before the court at a later date, and the case then proceeded on the tort claim alone.
'* * * she was rendered generally sick, and suffered and sustained shock, nausea, and a miscarriage. * * *' The jury's verdict was as follows:
No objection was made by the court or by either counsel to the form of the verdict, and, in fact, the record indicates that it had been previously agreed upon by counsel. Obviously, the verdict as to 'actual and hospital expenses' is a nullity, because it completely disregards the jury's duty to fix damages. (Watson v. Damon, 54 Cal. 278, 280; 48 Cal.Jur.2d Trial, § 239, pp. 253-254; 89 C.J.S. Trial § 497, p. 160.) However, this observation does not compel a conclusion that the form of the rest of the verdict is not sound; it awards $8,000 in general damages to plaintiff against both defendants.
The defendant, Ruggiero, through his counsel, immediately moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the motion was granted; consequently, judgment was thereafter entered in his favor. The codefendant, Mocci's, similar motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied; but his later motion for a new trial was granted, although this latter fact is irrelevant so far as this appeal is concerned.
The sole question to be determined here is whether the trial court erred in granting Ruggiero's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The duty of the court in passing on such a motion is thus stated in Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal.2d 94, 99, 331 P.2d 48, 51:
'As noted, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and the only question to be determined on the appeal is whether there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the verdict on any of the theories relied upon.
'In conformity with the foregoing rules the main if not the only problem presented is whether (disregarding all conflicting evidence favorable to the defendants), there is sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict on any tenable theory of liability.' (See also Sparks v. Allen Northridge Market, 176 Cal.App.2d 694, 1 Cal.Rptr. 595; Gonzales v. Derrington, 10 Cal.Rptr. 700 1; Hozz v. Felder, 167 Cal.App.2d 197, 334 P.2d 159; Kirk v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 26 Cal.2d 833, 161 P.2d 673, 164 A.L.R. 1; Jones v. Hotchkiss, 147 Cal.App.2d 197, 305 P.2d 129.)
We deduce that the trial court based its ruling on the belief that there was inadequate proof of Mocci's agency, not only from the court's statement in the record, but because it contemporaneously denied Mocci's similar motion.
Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of agency? In reviewing the testimony the inquiry is necessarily limited to the question whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict which was overridden by the trial court. For this purpose we must accept as true all evidence favoring the plaintiff and all legitimate inferences based thereon. The court is not concerned with conflicts in the evidence, or with whether a verdict adopting a contrary conclusion would have been upheld on appeal, or with any question as to the credibility of witnesses, or the relative weight of conflicting evidence.
In Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal.2d 356, 372, 232 P.2d 241, 251, it is said:
As observed in Brokaw v. Black-Foxe Military Institute, 37 Cal.2d 274, 278, 231 P.2d 816, 818:
Agency is not dependent upon proof of compensation (Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622, 628, 248 P.2d 922; Rest., Agency, § 16, p. 85.) It may be shown by the conduct of the parties and by action or inaction on the part of the principal. (Buckley v. Silverberg, 113 Cal. 673, 45 P. 804; Ford v. Lou Kum Shu, 26 Cal.App. 203, 146 P. 199.)
In Ferroni v. Pacific Finance Corp., supra, 21 Cal.2d 773, 779, 135 P.2d 569, 572, the court says:
'An implied agency relationship may arise from the words and conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the particular case.'
In Ellis v. Crawford, 39 Cal. 523, 526, 527, a suit by plaintiff to recover money for work done on two schooners where agency was claimed, the court held:
'[T]he jury were required to take into consideration all the facts and circumstances attending the construction of the schooners. * * *
'It being the province of the jury to find the capacity in which the defendant acted in the building of the schooners, and the evidence on this point being very conflicting, we cannot disturb the verdict as being contrary to the evidence.'
In Bergtholdt v. Porter Bros. Co., 114 Cal. 681, 688, 46 P. 738, 739, the rules laid down in Ellis v. Crawford, supra, were followed:
The record shows that Domenique Ruggiero was a money lender who resided in San Francisco and that Virgil Mocci, who had lived in Merced County since 1920, was widely acquainted there. He was involved in the institution and enforcement of numerous loans made by Ruggiero in Merced County. His activities included interviews with prospective borrowers, both in and out of the presence of Ruggiero, and of at least one trip to San Francisco for the purpose.
Mocci claimed that he never received compensation from Ruggiero for these multifarious activities,...
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