People v. Morris
| Decision Date | 18 March 1964 |
| Docket Number | 36930,Nos. 36743,s. 36743 |
| Citation | 30 Ill.2d 406,197 N.E.2d 433 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Robert MORRIS et al., Plaintiffs in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Louis J. Prempas, Chicago, for Robert Morris.
Stewart S. Dixon, Chicago, for Allen McDaniel.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty. Chicago , for defendant in error.
After a jury trial in the criminal court of Cook County, Robert Morris, Allen McDaniel, Raymond White and Albert Sledge were found guilty of the armed robbery of Augustus Cosey and were sentenced to the penitentiary for terms of 5 to 10 years. We have heretofore reviewed and reversed the conviction of Sledge on the ground that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and we consider here consolidated writs of error prosecuted by Morris and McDaniel. It is the contention of these defendants that our reversal as to Sledge requires a reversal as to them; that the trial court erred in unduly limiting inquiry into the sobriety of the complaining and identifying witness; that they were denied certain rights inherent in constitutional guarantees of due process of law; and that remarks of the trial judge made at the time of imposing sentence constituted reversible error.
The salient facts as shown by the record may be found in our prior opinion (People v. Sledge, 25 Ill.2d 403, 185 N.E.2d 262) and we see no necessary purpose for repeating them here. Suffice it to say we held there that discrepancies in the testimony of the complaining witness at the trial and at a preliminary hearing left a reasonable doubt as to whether Sledge was in fact a participant in the robbery. Such finding as to Sledge, however, does not require a similar finding as to Morris and McDaniel as is here contended, inasmuch as the discrepancies in the testimony as to that which was essential to convict Sledge did not extend to the proof necessary to convict these defendants. The record shows that Cosey consistently and positively identified them as two of the men who had robbed him when called upon to do so immediately after the robbery, at the preliminary hearing and at the trial. Thus, the doubt of guilt which arose as to Sledge did not arise as to the present defendants and, under the circumstances of the case, we cannot say that the discrepancies in the testimony of the complaining witness as it related to Sledge operated to render the former an unreliable witness against these defendants.
At the same time, however, we find ourselves in accord with the defendants that the trial court abused its discretion and committed error by unduly limiting inquiry aimed at the capacity of the complaining witness to identify his assailants. As noted in our prior opinion, Cosey and Sledge, utter strangers, joined together in the skidrow district of Chicago early in the morning hours and set out in Cosey's car either to find a night club or a prostitute. About an hour later the robbery occurred in an unlighted alley. The time consumed by the crime was short and the situation was confused by the scuffle between Sledge and the robber wielding the knife. Under all of the circumstances the opportunity and ability of the complaining witness to identify the robbers assumed the utmost importance. When cross-examined, Cosey stated that he had nothing to drink on the night in question but, thereafter, the trial court refused to allow an apparent effort by the defense to impeach such testimony and stifled all further attempts to inquire into the matter. Again, when Sledge appeared as a defense witness, the court sustained the State's objections to a series of questions going to the matter of Cosey's sobriety.
Where the principal issue concerns the identification of an accused, defense counsel should be given wide latitude on cross-examination in order that the intelligence of the witness, his powers of discernment and his capacity to form a correct judgment may be submitted to the jury so it may have an opportunity for determining the value of his testimony. And while cross-examination must always be held within reasonable and proper limits, we have consistently held that an accused has the right to question identifying witnesses concerning any matter which goes to explain, modify or discredit what they stated on direct examination. (People v. Coli, 2 Ill.2d 186, 117 N.E.2d 777; People v. Pelletri, 323 Ill. 176, 153 N.E. 591; cf. People v. Andrews, 327 Ill. 162, 171, 158 N.E. 462.) Here, it is our opinion that the defense should fairly and properly have been permitted to fully cross-examine Cosey on the matter of his sobriety and, by the same token, that Sledge should have been permitted to testify regarding the same issue. On this ground defendants should be accorded a new trial.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary to consider the claim of error predicated upon the remarks of the trial court, as well as the further contention (revolving around the discrepancies as to Sledge,) that the People obtained the convictions of these defendants by the knowing use of 'perjured' testimony. However, since it may arise again, consideration must be given to defendants' contention that they were deprived of due process of law because they were not provided with counsel at the preliminary hearing nor furnished with a transcript of such hearing.
To sustain their claim that due process requires counsel to be furnished for indigent persons upon the occasion of the preliminary hearing before an examining magistrate, defendants rely chiefly upon Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, decided March 18, 1963. An analysis of that opinion, however, reveals their reliance to be both factually and legally misplaced. In Gideon there was a request for counsel and a denial of such request which...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States ex rel. Haywood v. Wolff
...charged had been committed and, if so, whether there was probable cause to believe they were committed by petitioner. People v. Morris, 30 Ill.2d 406, 197 N.E.2d 433 (1964); United States ex rel. Bonner v. Pate, 430 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915, 91 S.Ct. 890, 27 L.Ed.......
-
State v. Gervasio
...limited constitutional rules governing preliminary hearings. See, e.g., the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Morris, 30 Ill 2d 406, 197 NE2d 433. Moreover, a number of courts, including all of the federal courts of appeals had concluded that the preliminary hearing was no......
-
Adams v. Illinois 8212 5038
...counsel to represent him at the preliminary hearing. The motion was denied on May 3, 1967, on the authority of People v. Morris, 30 Ill.2d 406, 197 N.E.2d 433 (1964). In Morris the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois preliminary hearing was not a critical stage at which the accuse......
-
People v. Lyles
...or discredit what he said on direct examination (People v. Strother (1972), 53 Ill.2d 95, 99, 290 N.E.2d 201; People v. Morris (1964), 30 Ill.2d 406, 409, 197 N.E.2d 433), cross-examination which is designed to harass, annoy or humiliate a witness should not be tolerated (Smith v. Illinois ......