Democratic Nat'L Committee v. Watada

• Decision Date: 11 April 2002
• Docket Number: Civil 02-00085 SOM/KSC.
• Citation: 198 F.Supp.2d 1193
• Parties: DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al., Plaintiff, v. Robert Y. WATADA, et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

198 F.Supp.2d 1193

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al., Plaintiff, v. Robert Y. WATADA, et al., Defendant.

Civil 02-00085 SOM/KSC.

United States District Court, D. Hawai`i.

April 11, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William C. McCorriston, Christopher Cole, McCorriston Miller Mukai MacKinnon LLP, Honolulu, HI, for Democratic National Committee, Jeremy Harris.

Christopher I.L. Parsons, Im Hanifin Parsons LLLC, Honolulu, HI, for the Harris 2002 Campaign Committee.

Russell A. Suzuki, Gary K.H. Kam, Attorney General's Office, Honolulu, HI, for Robert Y. Watada, The Campaign Spending Commission of the State of Hawaii, A. Duane Black, Della L.W. Au Belatti, Mona K.O. Chock, Clifford S. Muraoka, Richard B.F. Choy.

ORDER DENYING STAY PENDING APPEAL

MOLLWAY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION.

This court began its last opinion in this case by noting that the case presented no live controversy. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but gave Plaintiffs until April 30, 2002, to file an amended complaint properly alleging federal jurisdiction, if subsequent events so warranted. In the short time since the court issued its original opinion (later amended in nonsubstantive ways), the parties have proven how many twists and turns there can be even without a real controversy. The matter is now before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay or Enjoin Action on the Subject Administrative Complaint and Other Enforcement Pending Appeal.

The court previously denied Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion given the dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiffs appealed that denial¹ and now seek a stay of this court's refusal to enjoin Defendants. In essence, the motion to stay is a retitled motion for preliminary injunction. The court is no more persuaded by the present motion than it was by the initial preliminary injunction motion. The motion to stay is DENIED.

Plaintiff Jeremy Harris ("Harris") is the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu. Mayor Harris and his campaign committee, Plaintiff The Harris 2002 Campaign Committee ("Harris Campaign Committee"), solicited and raised funds for Plaintiff Democratic National Committee (the "DNC"). Defendant Robert Y. Watada ("Watada"), the Executive Director of Defendant Campaign Spending Commission (the "CSC"), initiated an administrative complaint, alleging that Plaintiffs had violated state campaign spending laws in soliciting and raising funds for the DNC, as well as in spending campaign funds to travel to DNC meetings. No evidence was introduced indicating that any Commissioner of the CSC ever saw, reviewed, or approved the administrative complaint prior to its filing.

Before the CSC's Commissioners took action on Watada's administrative complaint, Plaintiffs ran into court seeking an injunction. The court found that, because Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a credible threat to their First Amendment rights, the court lacked jurisdiction. While Plaintiffs argued that the CSC might take action adverse to them, the court held that the matter was not ripe. The court noted that the Commissioners were scheduled to meet to discuss Watada's complaint on April 17, 2002, and that the Commissioners might dismiss the complaint at that time. Unlike Watada, who had allegedly been investigating the DNC contributions for some time, the Commissioners had yet to address the subject and may not have understood what Watada was alleging, given the lack of clarity in the administrative complaint.

In their motion to stay, Plaintiffs argue that the stay is needed because the Commissioners are "poised to fine Plaintiffs ... on April 17, 2002." Memorandum in Support of Motion at 1. There is no evidence in the record supporting this argument, either in connection with the preliminary injunction motion or in connection with the present motion to stay.

After Plaintiffs appealed the preliminary injunction motion and filed their motion to stay proceedings pending appeal, Watada withdrew his administrative complaint. Plaintiffs express no joy at this turn of events. Instead, Plaintiffs now redouble their efforts to identify a controversy. They say that they need a stay "to maintain the status quo." Memorandum in Support of Motion at 1. Even while seeking a stay by this court, Plaintiffs have demanded that the CSC proceed to address the administrative complaint at its meeting on April 17, 2002. Plaintiffs want a clear statement by the Commissioners as to whether the matters in the administrative complaint are going to resurface. Plaintiffs fear that Watada is engaging in gamesmanship, and that the charges will be refiled in the midst of the gubernatorial campaign. See Letter from William C. McCorriston, counsel for Mayor Harris and the DNC, to A. Duane Black, Chairman of the CSC (April 8, 2002). The CSC is apparently going to grant Plaintiffs' wish for the Commissioners to address the effect of Watada's withdrawal of the administrative complaint. The latest agenda for the meeting scheduled for April 17, 2002, indicates that, at that meeting, the Commissioners will take up the matter of Watada's withdrawal of the administrative complaint.

None of this activity, fast and furious as it is, has made a stay appropriate.

II. STANDARD.

Rule 62(c) states:

When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(c).

This court evaluates a motion for stay pending appeal using tests on a continuum like that used for injunctive relief. At one end of the continuum, the appellant "must show both a probability of success on the merits in his appeal and the possibility of irreparable injury. At the other end of the continuum, [the appellant] must demonstrate that serious legal questions are raised and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor." The public's interest is an additional factor. Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir.1986). Accord Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.1983) ("The standard for evaluating stays pending appeal is similar to that employed by district courts in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction"); Maui Land & Pineapple Co. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 24 F.Supp.2d 1083, 1084 (D.Haw.1998) ("The standard for evaluating a request for a stay pending appeal is similar to that for evaluating a request for preliminary injunction"); see also Dorothy W. Nelson et al., Federal Ninth Circuit Civil Appellate Practice §§ 6.267 to 6.268 (2001) (the standard on a motion for stay pending appeal is comparable to that used in evaluating a motion for preliminary injunction; the court balances the moving party's probability of success on appeal, the relative hardships to the parties, and the public's interest).

III. ANALYSIS.

Plaintiffs' motion for a stay seeks the very injunctive relief that this court denied. Just as they were not entitled to injunctive relief, they are not entitled to a stay.

A. As This Case Continues to Lack Ripeness, the Court Does Not Address the Issue of Mootness.

The court's earlier ruling turned on a lack of ripeness. Ripeness is clearly distinguishable from mootness, the doctrine on which Defendants now rely. Defendants argue that, with Watada's withdrawal of the administrative complaint, Plaintiffs' claims have been rendered moot, and that this motion should be denied on that ground. Plaintiffs argue that the matter is not moot as long as the situation is capable of repetition. Even if the record were sufficient to permit the court to determine the effect of the withdrawal, which it is not, the court would not reach the issue. If, in the first instance, a dispute is not ripe, the court need never address an allegation of mootness.²

In determining whether a dispute is ripe, the court looks to the situation as of the time suit was filed. See Malama Makua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1161 (D.Haw.2001) ("[r]ipeness is an element of jurisdiction and is measured at the time an action is instituted"); Bradley v. Work, 916 F.Supp. 1446, 1464 (S.D.Ind. 1996) ("ripeness is determined as of the date of filing the action"), aff'd 154 F.3d 704 (1998); cf. Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir.1990) (ripeness in takings case determined at time suit was filed). "The ripeness doctrine is designed to prevent premature judicial intervention in uncompleted agency proceedings and to insure that challenged agency decisions have a concrete impact on the parties involved." Friedman Bros. Inv. Co. v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir.1982) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977)). Ripeness is not affected by events occurring after a suit is filed.

By contrast, events occurring after suit is filed may render a dispute moot. See Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Maryland, 179 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1999) ("mootness is grounds to dismiss an action at any time"). "[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969)). A party claiming mootness has the heavy burden of establishing that it is not conveniently stopping the complained-of activity, only to resume once a suit is dismissed. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (the burden "lies with the party asserting mootness"). Clearly, dismissal in that context could expose a plaintiff to the...