198 So.3d 1278 (Miss.App. 2016), 2015-CA-00115-COA, Varnell v. Rogers
| Judge | Before IRVING, P.J., BARNES and ISHEE, JJ. LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. |
| Parties | June Rose Thompson VARNELL and Dexter Varnell, Appellants. v. Michael Frederick ROGERS, Judy Chisum Rogers, Laura Ratliff a/k/a Laura Ratliff Rogers, and Joseph Sadler, Appellees. |
| Docket Number | 2015-CA-00115-COA |
| Date | 19 April 2016 |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
| Citation | 198 So.3d 1278 |
Page 1278
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/28/2014.
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DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT HON. VICKI B. DANIELS.
Jerry Wesley Hisaw, Southaven, H.R. Garner, attorney for appellants.
Neal Howard Labovitz, Southaven, attorney for appellees.
Before IRVING, P.J., BARNES and ISHEE, JJ.
OPINION
IRVING, P.J.
[¶1] June Rose Thompson Varnell and Dexter Varnell (the Varnells, unless the context dictates otherwise) appeal from a judgment of the Chancery Court of DeSoto County, dismissing with prejudice their complaint for injunctive or other relief against Michael Frederick Rogers and Judy Chisum Rogers (the Rogerses, unless the context dictates otherwise), Laura Ratliff a.k.a. Laura Ratliff Rogers (Ratliff), and Joseph Sadler. 1 The chancery court also granted the Rogerses’ counterclaim for nuisance against the Varnells and ordered the Varnells to reimburse the Rogerses $1,000 for a fence that the Rogerses had erected on their property to place a barrier between the Rogerses’ and the Varnells’ properties. The chancery court also ordered the Varnells to pay the Rogerses $5,000 in attorney’s fees. The Varnells filed a motion for reconsideration and/or a new trial, which the chancery court denied. The Varnells appeal, arguing that the chancery court erred in (1) not issuing an injunction against the Rogerses, (2) ordering them to reimburse the Rogerses for the fence, and (3) awarding attorney’s fees to the Rogerses.
[¶2] Finding that the chancery court did not err in dismissing the Varnells’ complaint against the Rogerses and refusing to issue an injunction against the Rogerses, we affirm that portion of the judgment. However, we find that the chancery court erred in ordering the Varnells to pay attorney’s fees and to reimburse the Rogerses for the cost of the fence. Therefore, we reverse and render both awards.
FACTS
[¶3] On January 23, 2002, June Varnell purchased the Varnells’ home in Southaven, Mississippi. While the house was being constructed, June testified that she experienced, among other things, vandalism, theft of building materials, the workmen’s port-a-potty being overturned multiple times, and garbage being left on her property, all of which the Varnells allege
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was caused by their neighbors, the Rogerses. The Varnells moved into their home on October 23, 2004. Beginning in 2009 and continuing until 2014, a series of incidents occurred between the Varnells and the Rogerses, all of which the Varnells also allege was caused by the Rogerses, Ratliff, and Sadler. Some of the incidents required the assistance of both law enforcement and the chancery court. Those incidents included, but were not limited to: (1) fireworks landing on the Varnells’ property, (2) feces allegedly being placed on the Varnells’ porch, (3) alleged “ catcalls” by the Rogerses, Ratliff, and Sadler towards the Varnells, (4) leaves that had been raked off the Varnells’ property by Dexter appearing back on the Varnells’ property the next day, (5) friends of Ratliff allegedly coming and knocking on the Varnells’ door, and (6) the Varnells’ plants being destroyed.
[¶4] In July 2009, Dexter began constructing a fence on the property line between the Varnells’ and the Rogerses’ properties. However, he halted construction of the fence because he became ill and had to have surgery. Michael then hired a friend to construct a fence on his property, beginning at the point where the Rogerses’ partially constructed fence terminated and continuing to the end of the property line between the Varnells and the Rogerses.
[¶5] In January 2012, Dexter and Ratliff signed a mutual agreement in the Municipal Court of the City of Southaven whereby “ [Ratliff] agreed not to harass or come on the property of [Dexter], nor molest or interfere with [Dexter], or litter the yard of [Dexter].” On January 3, 2014, the Varnells filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the Rogerses, Ratliff, and Sadler. The Varnells sought injunctive relief to preclude the Rogerses, Ratliff, and Sadler from (1) causing a nuisance through the shooting of fireworks, (2) preventing the Varnells from enjoying their property, and (3) continuing to harass the Varnells. Sadler filed a pro se answer, wherein he denied all the allegations in the complaint. Subsequently, the Rogerses filed an answer, by and through counsel, wherein they also denied the allegations within the complaint and, in addition, filed a counterclaim against the Varnells for nuisance. On October 28, 2014, the case was tried before the chancery court, and a plethora of testimony was presented by both the Varnells and the Rogerses.
[¶6] Following the close of all the evidence, the chancellor issued a bench ruling in favor of the Rogerses. While issuing her ruling, the chancellor noted the Varnells’lack of actual evidence linking the Rogerses, Ratliff, and Sadler to the numerous acts that they had accused them of committing. The chancery court entered an order, on December 1, 2014, nunc pro tunc for October 28, 2014, that granted to the Rogerses the relief discussed earlier in this opinion. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
[¶7] A chancellor’s factual findings will not be disturbed “ when supported by substantial evidence unless [we] can say with reasonable certainty that the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous[,] or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Biglane v. Under the Hill Corp., 949 So.2d 9, 13-14 (¶ 17) (Miss. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “ Additionally, where the chancellor has made no specific findings, we will proceed on the assumption that the chancellor resolved all such fact issues in favor of the appellee.” City of Picayune v. S. Reg’l Corp., 916 So.2d 510, 519 (¶ 22) (Miss. 2005) (citing Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So.2d 511, 514 (Miss. 1990)). We review questions of law de novo. Biglane, 949 So.2d at 14 (¶ 17) (internal citation omitted).
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I. Injunction
[¶8] Here, the Varnells argue that the chancellor erred in failing to issue an injunction against the Rogerses, Ratliff, and Sadler. We review a chancellor’s denial of an injunction for abuse of discretion. Ruff v. Estate of Ruff, 989 So.2d 366, 369 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2008) (internal citation omitted). The Mississippi Supreme Court has explained: Rather than implying bad faith or an intentional wrong on the part of the trial judge, an abuse of discretion is viewed as a strict legal term that is clearly against logic and effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing.
White v. State, 742 So.2d 1126, 1136 (¶ 42) (Miss. 1999) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
[¶9] In support of their argument, the Varnells contend that the injunction against them is “ vague and overly...
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