Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Hammond Elevator Company

• Citation: 25 S.Ct. 740,49 L.Ed. 1111,198 U.S. 424
• Decision Date: 29 May 1905
• Docket Number: No. 215,215
• Parties: BOARD OF TRADE OF CITY OF CHICAGO, Appt. , v. HAMMOND ELEVATOR COMPANY and Western Union Telegraph Company
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

198 U.S. 424

25 S.Ct. 740

49 L.Ed. 1111

BOARD OF TRADE OF CITY OF CHICAGO, Appt.,

v HAMMOND ELEVATOR COMPANY and Western Union Telegraph Company.

No. 215.

Argued April 13, 1905.

Decided May 29, 1905.

This is an appeal directly to this court from a decree of the circuit court dismissing, for want of jurisdiction, a bill filed by the board of trade of the city of Chicago, an Illinois corporation, against the Hammond Elevator Company, a Delaware corporation, and a citizen of that state.

The basis of the bill was that the appellant had a property right in the quotation of prices in transactions made within its exchange; that the defendant had entered into a conspiracy with others to steal and was using such quotations, and prayed an injunction. A subpoena was issued in the usual form, requiring the Hammond Elevator Company to appear and answer the bill, and was afterwards returned by the marshal as served within the northern district of Illinois by delivering a copy of the same 'to Albert M. Babb, agent for the Hammond Elevator Company at Peoria,' and also 'by reading the same to and within the presence and hearing of John L. Dickes, a member of the firm of Battle & Dickes, agents of said company,' as well as upon Battle. On the day following the service the elevator company entered a special appearance, and moved the court to set aside the service of the subpoena by the marshal, on the ground that the return was untrue in fact and insufficient in law, and prayed judgment of the court whether it should be compelled to appear or plead to the bill of complaint, because it had not been served with process, and because the defendant was not, at the date of filing the bill, or at any other time, within the state of Illinois; that it is not a resident of such state, but is a Delaware corporation, and its principal place of business is outside the state of Illinois.

This motion of the elevator company was referred to a master to take testimony, and report the same with his conclusions of law. The master filed his report in the circuit court, recommending that the motion of the defendant to quash the service of process be sustained; whereupon counsel for plaintiff stated in open court that he was unable to make any other or different service upon the defendant, and it was ordered that the bill be dismissed as to the Hammond Elevator Company. The bill was also dismissed as to the Western Union Telegraph Company, which had been made a party by an amendment to the original bill. Thereupon appellant appealed to this court upon the same question of jurisdiction, praying that the appeal be allowed and said question be certified, which was done.

Mr. Henry S. Robbings for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 425-429 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Lloyd Charles Whitman, Jacob J. Kern, and John A. Brown for appellee.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 429-432 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court dismissed this appeal upon the ground that it had never acquired jurisdiction over the Hammond Elevator Company by the service of process upon Albert M. Babb and the members of the firm of Battle & Dickes, because they were not officers of the elevator company which was a Delaware corporation, and had its principal place of business in the state of Indiana.

1. There is, however, a preliminary question in this court; that is, whether we can lawfully entertain this appeal under § 5 of the act of March 3, 1891, which provides that an appeal shall lie directly to this court 'in any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue; in such cases the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the Supreme Court from the court below for decision.' [26 Stat. at L. 827, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 549.]

The proper constuction of this section has been the subject of frequent consideration in this court, and it has been definitely settled that it must be limited to cases where the jurisdiction of the Federal court, as a Federal court, is put in issue, and that questions of jurisdiction applicable to the state courts, as well as to the Federal courts, are not within its scope.

The earliest reported case on this subject is that of the World's Columbian Exposition v. United States, 6 C. C. A. 58, 18 U. S. App. 42, 56 Fed. 654, in which the circuit court, sitting in equity, granted an injunction to prevent the opening of the Exposition grounds on Sunday. On appeal to the circuit court of appeals the chief justice held that as the power of the circuit court to hear the cause was not denied, the appellant contending only that the United States had not made a case cognizable in a court of equity, the jurisdiction of the circuit court was not in issue within the intent and meaning of the act. In Smith v. McKay, 161 U. S. 355, 40 L. ed. 731, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490, it was held, following the prior case, that the question whether the remedy was at law or in equity did not involve the jurisdiction of the Federal court as such, and the case was dismissed. A similar ruling was made in Blythe v. Hinckley, 173 U. S. 501, 43 L. ed. 783, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 497.

The cases were fully reviewed in Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 191 U. S. 225, 48 L. ed. 159, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119, in which the question involved was the respective rights of a receiver appointed by the state court and one appointed by the circuit court of the United States. It was held that the question was not one of jurisdiction within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1891, the court observing: 'The question of jurisdiction which the statute permits to be certified to this court directly must be one involving the jurisdiction of the circuit court as a Federal court, and not simply its general authority as a judicial tribunal to proceed in harmony with established rules of practice governing courts of concurrent jurisdiction as between each other.'

In Bache v. Hunt, 193 U. S. 523, 48 L. ed. 774, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 547, Hunt, as receiver, filed an intervening petition for the reimbursement of certain amounts paid by him as receiver in the extinguishment of prior claims, which certain railroad bonds and stocks had been deposited to secure. A decree was made in his favor, and an appeal was taken to this court. It was said that 'the jurisdiction of the circuit court was only questioned in respect to its general authority as a judicial tribunal, and not in respect to its power as a court of the United States. The established rules of practice as to bringing in parties to anciallary or pro interesse suo proceedings, and those governing courts of concurrent jurisdiction as between themselves, was alone involved.' The appeal was dismissed.

In Courtney v. Pradt. 196 U. S. 89, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208, 49 L. ed. 398, a citizen of Wisconsin duly qualified as an executor in that state, was sued as such in Kentucky. Pradt demurred on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, and the circuit court of the United States, to which the case had been removed, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the suit. It was said that the court had power to so adjudicate, and that the question decided was not one of the jurisdiction of the circuit court as a court of the United States, but one with respect to the law of Kentucky. The case was dismissed.

There is a distinction, however, between these cases which turn upon questions arising after a valid service of process upon the defendant with respect to the mode of procedure, or the conflicting claims of the state and Federal courts, and certain other authorities which turn upon the validity of the service of process itself upon the defendants; in other words, which involve the jurisdiction of the court in any form over the defendant. The leading case is that of Shepard v. Adams, 168 U. S. 618, 42 L. ed. 602, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214. This case turned upon the validity of the service of the summons whereby the defendant was required to appear within ten days after such service, when, by the law of the state, he was allowed thirty days. The question was whether Rev. Stat. § 914, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 684, assimilating the practice, pleadings, forms, and modes of proceedings in civil causes in the Federal courts to those obtaining in the state courts, applied to the time within which the defendant was required to appear in obedience to a summons. It was held that, as the rule in the Federal court was adopted in conformity with the rules then in force in the state courts, it was not bound to alter its rules every time the state courts saw fit to alter their rules, and that the Federal courts were at liberty to continue their rules without subservience to such changes. The point was made that the question involved was not the jurisdiction of the Federal court as such, and in reply to that suggestion Mr. Justice Shiras observed: 'The present case differs from Smith v. McKay in the essential feature that the contention is that the court below never acquired jurisdiction at all over the defendant by a valid service of process. In such a case there would be an entire want of jurisdiction, and a judgment rendered without jurisdiction can be reviewed on a writ of error directly sued out to this court.'

That paragraph is doubtless broader than the exigency of the case required, as the question involved was the validity of the service of process in the Federal court as distinguished from the state court; but in the recent case of Remington v. Central P. R. Co. 198 U. S. 95, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 577, 49 L. ed. ——, it was accepted as applicable to the case of the validity of a summons from a state court, served upon a director of a railroad company in a state other than that in which the company was incorporated. The court denied a motion to set the service aside, whereupon the case was removed into the circuit court of the United States, and the defendant renewed its motion to set aside the...