U.S.A v. Marland Lamont Hill, 99-2122

Decision Date21 December 1999
Docket NumberNo. 99-2122,99-2122
Citation199 F.3d 1143
Parties(10th Cir. 1999) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MARLAND LAMONT HILL, Defendant - Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO. D.C. NO. CR-98-425-BB

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Alonzo J. Padilla, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellant.

David N. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney (John J. Kelly, United States Attorney and James D. Tierney, Assistant United States Attorney, on thebrief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellee.

Before ANDERSON, PORFILIO, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.

Marland Lamont Hill entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute ten grams or more of phencyclidine ("PCP"), in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and (b)(1)(B). He brought this appeal challenging the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his luggage while on a bus in Gallup, New Mexico. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

During April and May of 1998, McKinley County, New Mexico, deputy sheriff George Justice routinely conducted narcotics searches of carry-on luggage on buses stopped at the Gallup, New Mexico, port of entry from Arizona. All buses entering New Mexico from Arizona stopped at the port of entry to permit inspection of the buses and license verification. Bus driver Vernon Wittner testified that passengers always stayed on the bus while Deputy Justice conducted his searches. The searches lasted anywhere from twenty minutes to an hour.

At approximately 12:40 p.m. on May 28, 1998, Deputy Justice asked and was granted permission by Greyhound bus driver Steve Beach to question the passengers on his bus while it was stopped at the port of entry. Deputy Justice boarded the bus, dressed in plain clothes but with his badge visible on his belt and a gun in its holster on his right hip. He stood at the front of the bus, beside the only exit, and announced, "My name is George Justice. I'm from McKinley County Sheriff's Department, Narcotics Interdiction Unit. I'm going to start at the rear of the bus, work my way forward. If you would please identify your carry-on luggage." Vol. III Tr. at 12. He proceeded to the back of the bus and began asking each passenger about his or her travel itinerary. He also asked each passenger to identify his or her carry-on luggage. He testified that he asked every fourth passenger if he could search his or her carry-on luggage. See id. at 9, 48. He further testified that when he asked permission to search, he "always told them that they did not have to let [him] search their luggage." Id. at 10. When he questioned passengers, he stood in the aisle to the rear of their seat, so that "at times [he] would have to lean in." Id. at 50. He further testified that he estimated the width of the bus aisle to be three and one half feet. See id. at 49. Deputy Justice is six feet one inch tall and weighs 185 pounds.

Mr. Hill was seated in the window seat approximately mid-way towards the rear of the bus. He was twenty-one years old at that time. Another passenger sat in the aisle seat next to him. Deputy Justice testified that, when he reached Mr. Hill's seat, he asked him if he had any carry-on luggage. Id. at 15. When Mr. Hill answered affirmatively, Deputy Justice asked him to identify it, which Mr. Hill did, indicating that it was a blue bag in the overhead compartment towards the front of the bus. Deputy Justice then inquired about Mr. Hill's travel itinerary. He testified that Mr. Hill indicated he had attended a funeral in California and was returning home to Tulsa, Oklahoma. See id. at 17. Deputy Justice then asked Mr. Hill if he could search his blue carry-on bag. The deputy stated that he specifically told Mr. Hill that he did not have to permit the deputy to search the bag. Deputy Justice testified that Mr. Hill gave him permission to search the bag. See id. The deputy further testified that, at that time, Mr. Hill "was sitting with his hands near his lap, and he was visibly shaking." Id.

Deputy Justice continued questioning passengers, working his way toward the front of the bus and toward Mr. Hill's bag. When he reached the bag, he "pulled the bag out." Id. at 18. He testified that he "turned to Mr. Hill and said, 'Is this your bag?' And he advised yes." Id. at 18-19. Deputy Justice stated he asked, "'Are you sure I can look in your bag?'" and that Mr. Hill responded "yes." Id. at 19. When the deputy opened the bag, he "smelled a very strong chemical odor" which he testified he "believed to be PCP, phencyclidine." Id.1 Deputy Justice then "advised [Mr. Hill] to come off the bus with [him.]" Id. at 20. They both exited the bus.

Once outside the bus, the deputy asked Mr. Hill if everything in the bag was his, to which Mr. Hill answered affirmatively. Inside a pair of pants in the bag Deputy Justice found a sock containing nine small brown bottles. When he opened one of the bottles, he "smelled a very strong chemical odor . . . an overwhelming odor that PCP emits." Id. at 24. Deputy Justice testified that, when he stated that the bottle appeared to contain PCP, Mr. Hill replied that the liquid was ginseng purchased for him by his uncle in California. Id. at 25.

Deputy Justice then asked Mr. Hill for identification, and Mr. Hill gave him an Oklahoma identification card with his correct name on it. The deputy ran a computer check on the card which apparently revealed nothing unusual. Deputy Justice then returned the card to Mr. Hill. Deputy Justice also asked his dispatch center to check with a health food store on the smell and appearance of ginseng, and was told that "ginseng had little to no odor." Id. at 26. At that point, Deputy Justice "advised Mr. Hill that [he] believed the substance to be phencyclidine or PCP, and advised him that [he] was going to seize it, but he [Mr. Hill] was free to leave." Id. at 27. Mr. Hill got back on the bus with his bag, and Deputy Justice retained the sock and nine bottles.

Deputy Justice then contacted Albuquerque DEA agent Kevin Small and advised him of the seizure of Mr. Hill's bottles and told Agent Small that he believed they contained PCP. Agent Small indicated he would attempt to identify Mr. Hill when the bus arrived in Albuquerque. Deputy Justice subsequently conducted a field test on the substance in the bottles, which tested positive for PCP. Agent Small contacted Mr. Hill when the bus arrived in Albuquerque, and Mr. Hill initially denied any contact with Deputy Justice. Deputy Justice then met Agent Small at the Albuquerque bus station and handed him the bottles seized from Mr. Hill. The two officers subsequently arrested Mr. Hill.

Mr. Hill filed a motion to suppress the bottles found in the blue bag, along with any statements he made, arguing that the encounter with Deputy Justice was a non-consensual seizure for which Deputy Justice lacked reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion to suppress, holding as follows:

Well, I would indeed grant the request and quash the evidence, but for the fact that Agent Justice specifically told the defendant he was not required to give consent to the search. I think that is the one distinguishing factor . . . . I think the circumstances are otherwise coercive, and the defendant's objective consent to search, after being told after being told he was not required to consent, I think negates those other coercive factors.

Id. at 117-18. Mr. Hill conditionally pled guilty, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

"When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we accept its factual findings unless clearly erroneous and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government." United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 1997). However, the ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a question of law which we review de novo. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1998). As this court has repeatedly recognized, there are:

three categories of police-citizen encounters: (1) consensual encounters which do not implicate the Fourth Amendment[;] (2) investigative detentions which are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration and must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity[;] and (3) arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures and reasonable only if supported by probable cause.

United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted). In determining whether a police-citizen encounter is consensual, "the crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'" Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)); see also United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc). No per se or absolute rules govern this inquiry. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Little, 18 F.3d at 1503-04. "Rather, every case turns on the totality of the circumstances presented." Little, 18 F.3d at 1503.

We have identified various factors relevant to whether a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter with police:

the threatening presence of several officers; the brandishing of a weapon by an officer; some physical touching by an officer; use of aggressive language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with an officer's request is compulsory; prolonged retention of a person's personal effects such as identification and plane or bus tickets; a request to accompany the officer to the station; interaction in a nonpublic place or a small, enclosed place; and absence of other...

To continue reading

Request your trial
73 cases
  • United States v. Easley, Crim. No. 16–1089–MV
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • January 10, 2018
    ...station; interaction in a nonpublic place or a small, enclosed place; and absence of other members of the public. United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 1999).In Drayton, the Supreme Court applied the Bostick framework to the facts of the case before it and determined that......
  • State v. Thompson
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • September 7, 2007
    ...indicating coercion are much the same as those applied to determine if an encounter is consensual. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1148-50 (10th Cir.1999); Anderson, 114 F.3d at 1064. Again, none of those factors suggest that the consent was involuntary in this The judgment......
  • State v. JAVIER M.
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • September 26, 2001
    ...one of three categories. State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 34, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (Baca, J., dissenting); United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir.1999). At one end of the spectrum are consensual encounters which do not generally implicate any constitutional protections.......
  • Ramos v. Carbajal
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
    • March 31, 2007
    ...place; 8) and absence of other members of the public. Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir.2005)(quoting United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (10th Cir.1999)). The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that none of these factors is dispositive and that the list is not exhaustive. Se......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Using Legislative History as a Tool of Statutory Construction in Kansas
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 71-5, May 2002
    • Invalid date
    ...has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."). 50. United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that particular personal traits or subjective state of mind of driver-defendant are irrelevant); Williams, 271 F.......
  • Miles of Asphalt and the Evolving Rule of Law: Are We There Yet?
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 71-5, May 2002
    • Invalid date
    ...has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."). 50. United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that particular personal traits or subjective state of mind of driver-defendant are irrelevant); Williams, 271 F.......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT