1998 -NMCA- 30, Valdez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. 18120,WAL-MART,18120
• Citation: 1998 NMCA 30,954 P.2d 87,124 N.M. 655
• Parties: , 1998 -NMCA- 30 Wynelle VALDEZ, Worker-Appellant, v.STORES, INC., and National Union Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 87

954 P.2d 87

124 N.M. 655, 1998 -NMCA- 30

Wynelle VALDEZ, Worker-Appellant,

v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., and National Union Insurance Company,

Employer/Insurer-Appellees.

No. 18120.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Nov. 14, 1997.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 16, 1998.

[124 N.M. 656] Victor A. Titus, Titus & Murphy, Farmington, for Worker-Appellant.

Robert A. Martin, Bradley & McCulloch, P.A., Albuquerque, for Employer/Insurer-Appellees.

OPINION

APODACA, Judge.

¶1 Wynelle Valdez (Worker) appeals her workers' compensation award of scheduled injury benefits. She challenges the constitutionality of the permanent total disability statute and the failure of the workers' compensation judge (judge) to award total or partial disability benefits.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Worker worked at Wal-Mart as a janitor, waiter, cashier, stocker and food preparer. On April 10, 1993, two connected booths fell on and injured Worker's right foot. In October 1993, Worker quit her job because she could not tolerate the pain. She has had two surgeries on her foot. Physicians have diagnosed Worker with chronic pain and gait derangement. As a result, the physicians recommended various restrictions concerning standing, walking, lifting, and working in high places and on uneven surfaces.

¶3 Worker filed her first claim for workers' compensation in March 1994, seeking temporary total disability or permanent partial disability. The Workers' Compensation Administration (Administration) recommended that Worker receive temporary total benefits until a change in circumstances. Worker filed the claim that is the subject of this appeal in May 1996. The Administration recommended that Worker receive scheduled injury compensation benefits, payment of medical bills, and future-related medical benefits. Worker rejected the recommended resolution, however, asserting that she was totally, not partially, disabled. Later, the Administration scheduled a hearing before the judge. The judge found that:

23). .... Worker, although very limited to walking and standing for any extended period of time, has not sustained permanent and total loss of use of both hands or both arms or both feet or both legs or both eyes or any two of them as required in § 52-1-25 for permanent total disability benefits at one hundred percent.

...

30). Although Worker has significant limitations and cannot return to the job she has previously held because of the walking and standing involved, ... Worker is physically capable of sedentary work.

The judge's conclusions of law included:

8). .... Worker has a fifty three percent (53%) physical impairment of her right lower extremity and is entitled to two hundred (200) weeks of scheduled injury disability payments from [the] date of [her] maximum medical improvement, June 7, 1995.

...

11). There is no medical evidence that ... Worker has disabling depression, back pain, or any other condition to remove her from the scheduled injury portion of the Workers' Compensation Act, § 52-1-43.

12). .... Worker is not totally disabled vocationally to remove her from the scheduled injury portion of the Workers' Compensation Act, § 52-2-43 [sic].

13). .... Worker is not totally disabled as defined by § 52-1-25 (effective January 1, 1991).

On appeal, Worker raises three specific issues: (1) the constitutionality of the permanent total disability benefit statute, (2) the judge's failure to award total disability benefits, and (3) the judge's method of determining the permanent partial disability award.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Permanent Total Disability Benefit Statute and Equal Protection

¶4 The judge held that Worker was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits under NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-25 (1991). Section 52-1-25(A) provides: "As used in the Workers' Compensation Act [this article], 'permanent total disability' means the permanent and total loss or loss of use of both hands or both arms or both feet or both legs or both eyes or any two of them."

¶5 Worker argues that Section 52-1-25 violates equal protection because the statute arbitrarily denies total disability to workers who are unable to work and grants total disability to those who can work. Although Employer-Insurer address a due process challenge in their answer brief, we do not discuss this issue because Worker does not raise it in her briefs.

¶6 The federal and state constitutions provide for equal protection of the laws. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws." We have interpreted the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions "as providing the same protections." Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996 NMCA 095, p 16, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518.

¶7 There are three standards of review that have been traditionally applied to equal protection challenges of statutes: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the rational basis test. Id. p 24; see also Corn v. New Mexico Educators Fed. Credit Union, 119 N.M. 199, 203, 889 P.2d 234, 238 (Ct.App.1994) (recognizing "heightened rational-basis" as an additional standard of review). The applicable standard of review is determined "by the nature and importance of the individual interests asserted and the relationship between the [statutory] classification and the importance of the governmental interest involved." Mieras, 1996 NMCA 095, p 24, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518. The analyses of "equal protection challenges are generally the same under ... New Mexico and federal law." Id.

¶8 Strict scrutiny applies when legislation infringes fundamental constitutional rights or creates suspect classifications. Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 693, 763 P.2d 1153, 1158 (1988). Under strict scrutiny (the highest level of scrutiny), differential treatment must be necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest. Mieras, 1996 NMCA 095, p 25, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518.

¶9 Intermediate scrutiny applies to legislation "infringing important but not fundamental rights, and involving sensitive but not suspect classes." Richardson, 107 N.M. at 693, 763 P.2d at 1158. Under intermediate scrutiny, the classification must be substantially related to an important government interest. Id. at 693-94, 763 P.2d at 1158-59.

¶10 The rational basis test applies when the statute does not affect fundamental or important rights and does not create suspect or sensitive classifications. See id.; Mieras, 1996 NMCA 095, p 27, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518. Under the rational basis test, the classification must be rationally related to a legitimate state goal. Mieras, 1996 NMCA 095, p 30, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518.

¶11 The threshold inquiry of the equal protection analysis is whether Section 52-1-25 results in dissimilar treatment of similarly-situated individuals. Madrid v. Saint Joseph Hosp., 1996 NMSC 064, 1 35, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250. Worker argues that the statute creates two sensitive or suspect classifications. The statute grants total disability to workers who have suffered loss or loss of use of both hands, arms, feet, legs, eyes, or any two of them. These workers may have little or no vocational loss. However, Section 52-1-25 denies total disability to workers with complex vocational disabilities. We believe, however, that this unfortunate effect of the statute does not result in dissimilar treatment of similarly-situated individuals.

¶12 Section 52-1-25 does not create separate classes of workers subject to differential treatment. The statute evaluates all workers equally in its requirements for permanent total disability. See Montez v. J & B Radiator, Inc., 108 N.M. 752, 755, 779 P.2d 129, 132 (Ct.App.1989) (holding that interim partial disability statute did not raise an equal protection claim because "[a]ll workers injured during the effective period ... were subject to the same [requirements for] partial disability"); Madrid, 1996 NMSC 064, pp 32-37, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250 (holding that different criterion for impairment evaluation did not result in dissimilar treatment of similarly-situated individuals). Even assuming that Section 52-1-25 does result in dissimilar treatment of similarly-situated individuals, we believe the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. See Mieras, 1996 NMCA 095, p 30, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518.

¶13 We hold that the rational basis test is the appropriate constitutional standard in this appeal. "[L]egislative acts are presumptively valid and normally are subjected to the rational basis test." Richardson, 107 N.M. at 693, 763 P.2d at 1158. Section 52-1-25 neither creates suspect or sensitive classifications nor infringes fundamental or important rights. See Richardson, 107 N.M. at 693-94, 696, 763 P.2d at 1158-59, 1161; Madrid, 1996 NMSC 064, pp 32-37, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250 (holding that different criterion for impairment evaluation was rationally related to statute's purpose of providing workers' compensation benefits based on current medical advances).

¶14 Worker relies on Richardson, 107 N.M. at 698, 763 P.2d at 1163, and Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 119 N.M. 602, 893 P.2d 1006 (1995), to support application of the intermediate standard of review. These cases are distinguishable because they concern recovery in tort actions. In tort claims, the individual has an important interest in full compensation for his or her injuries,...