Chandler v. City of Dallas

• Decision Date: 20 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-1849,92-1849
• Citation: 2 F.3d 1385
• Parties: 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,584, 27 Fed.R.Serv.3d 819, 2 A.D. Cases 1326, 2 ADD 952, 4 NDLR P 161 Lyle S. CHANDLER and Adolphus A. Maddox, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The CITY OF DALLAS, et al., Defendants, The City of Dallas, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1385

2 F.3d 1385

62 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,584, 27 Fed.R.Serv.3d 819,

2 A.D. Cases 1326, 2 ADD 952, 4 NDLR P 161

Lyle S. CHANDLER and Adolphus A. Maddox, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The CITY OF DALLAS, et al., Defendants, The City of Dallas, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 92-1849.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 20, 1993.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 2, 1993.

Frank J. Garza, Asst. City Atty., Sam A. Lindsay, City Atty., Dallas, TX, for defendant-appellant.

Genice A.G. Rabe, Irving, TX, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before SMITH, DUHE, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

I

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1978, the City of Dallas, Texas (Dallas or the City) adopted a Driver Safety Program (the Program) to reduce the risk of vehicular collisions. The Program established certain physical standards for city employees who drive on public roads as an intrinsic part of their job duties. Employees of this type are referred to as Primary Drivers. The physical standards required by the Program were patterned on safety regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Transportation. If an employee did not meet these standards, he could not be certified as a primary driver and thus was ineligible for Primary Driver jobs. ¹

Two of the medical standards for Primary Drivers are of particular importance to the instant appeal. A Primary Driver: (1) cannot have an established medical history of diabetes mellitus severe enough to require insulin for control; and (2) must have 20/40 vision (corrected) and a field of vision of at least 70 degrees in the horizontal meridian in each eye. Plaintiff Lyle Chandler has diabetes mellitus that requires insulin for control. Plaintiff Adolphus Maddox has impaired vision in his left eye that cannot be corrected Chandler has required insulin for control of his diabetes since 1977 and has been an employee of Dallas since 1981. In 1985, the Chandler failed his initial driver's physical because of his diabetes. At that time he was employed as an Electrical Repairer T-9, a Primary Driver position. Chandler was allowed to retain that position on the condition that he be driven by another co-worker when he had to go to another work site.

                to meet minimum standards.  Both of these plaintiffs held positions with the City that were classified as Primary Driver jobs. 2  Only 138 of the City's job classifications were considered Primary Driver jobs
                

Chandler has had at least two major on-the-job hypoglycemic episodes that required emergency medical treatment. He also admits that he has had numerous other minor hypoglycemic incidents, during which he was confused. Chandler has also had a series of safety and misconduct incidents on the job. In 1986, he caused a serious electrical accident that resulted in injuries to himself and two co-workers. That same year, after a subsequent safety violation and violation of personnel rules, Chandler was demoted to Electrical Repairer T-7.

Maddox was hired by the City in 1982 and was promoted to Plant Mechanic T-7 in 1983. Maddox failed his initial driver's physical in 1985 because of poor vision in his left eye. Among other problems, his vision in his left eye cannot be corrected to better than 20/60 and his horizontal field of vision in that eye is less than 70 degrees. As with Chandler, Maddox was allowed to retain his then current position (which was also classified as a Primary Driver position) on the condition that a co-worker drive him when he needed to work at other facilities.

In December 1985, Chandler and Maddox filed suit against the City, alleging that the Program discriminated against them in violation of the Rehabilitation Act ³ (the Act), the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. They also sought to represent a class of persons adversely affected by the Program. The complaint was subsequently amended to include claims under the Revenue Sharing Act ⁴ and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. ⁵

The district court certified two classes of plaintiffs (those with substandard vision and those with insulin dependent diabetes) for purposes of injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, but failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The City appealed, and we vacated the judgment and remanded the case "for detailed findings of fact and concomitant conclusions of law." ⁶ On remand, the district court reinstated its judgment and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. The City has again timely appealed.

II

ANALYSIS

A. The Rehabilitation Act

The Act prohibits discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals with handicaps in programs that receive federal financial assistance. ⁷ The Act is intended to ensure that handicapped individuals receive the same treatment as those without handicaps. ⁸

                8]  To qualify for relief under this statute, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he was an "individual with handicaps";  (2) he was "otherwise qualified";  (3) he worked for a "program or activity" that received federal financial assistance;  and (4) he was adversely treated solely because of his handicap. 9  The burden of proof for each of these elements lies with the plaintiff. 10
                

1. Individual with Handicaps

The relevant definition of the term "handicap" is critical to determining when a person can recover under the Act. For employment purposes, the Act defines an "individual with handicaps" as a person "who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." ¹¹ The plaintiffs argue both that they are handicapped under subsection (i) and that the City treated them as being handicapped under subsection (iii). Predictably, the City takes the opposite position on both of these claims.

Although the Act contains a definition of "handicap," it does not define the terms used in that definition. We are not without guidance, however, for the Supreme Court directs us to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations intended to implement the Act. ¹² Those regulations define a physical impairment as

any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfiguration, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal, special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine. ¹³

"Major life activities" are defined as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." ¹⁴

According to these same regulations, a person is regarded as having an impairment that would constitute a handicap if he

(A) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by [an employer] as constituting such a limitation;

(B) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or

(C) has none of the [above described impairments] but is treated by [an employer] as having such an impairment. ¹⁵

a. Impaired Vision as a Handicap

This court has previously held that a person is not handicapped if his vision can be corrected to 20/200. ¹⁶ Clearly, if vision that can be corrected only to 20/200 does not constitute a handicap, neither does vision that can be corrected to 20/60. Further, Maddox himself testified at length that his impaired vision did not substantially limit any of his major life activities. As Maddox failed to establish that his impaired vision substantially limits one or more of his major life activities, he is not handicapped under the first prong of the statutory definition of an individual with handicaps. ¹⁷

b. Insulin Dependent Diabetes as a Handicap

The City contends that Chandler is not handicapped because he failed to establish that his insulin dependent diabetes substantially limits any of his major life activities.

Indeed Chandler himself testified that he did not consider his diabetes to be a substantial limitation on his major life activities. Given this testimony and the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we hold that Chandler failed to establish that he was handicapped by his insulin dependent diabetes.

Chandler advances an alternative argument that insulin dependent diabetes should be considered a handicap per se. Neither this nor any other circuit court has addressed whether insulin dependent diabetes constitutes a handicap per se. No explicit guidance is available from the Act itself or the DHHS regulations as neither expressly discusses diabetes. Chandler therefore bases his argument on language contained in the commentary to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations promulgated to implement the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA).

The ADA defines a disability in substantially the same terms as the Act defines an individual with handicaps (now an individual with a disability). ¹⁸ Stressing the similarities between the Act and the ADA, Chandler urges us to look to the ADA and the regulations promulgated under that act for additional guidance as to what constitutes a handicap under the Act.

The EEOC's implementing regulations for the ADA became effective on July 26, 1992. ¹⁹ In them, the EEOC uses the same definitions for key terms as does the DHHS in its regulations implementing the Act. ²⁰

The EEOC also included an appendix to 29 C.F.R. part 1630 entitled "Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act." In the Interpretive Guidance, the EEOC notes that the ADA term ...