U.S. v. Fountain
| Decision Date | 09 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | 92-1866,Nos. 92-1507,s. 92-1507 |
| Citation | 2 F.3d 656 |
| Parties | 39 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 460 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joe W. FOUNTAIN (92-1507); Carlton B. McEaddy (92-1866); Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Kathleen Moro Nesi, Asst. U.S. Atty., Detroit, MI (argued and briefed), for plaintiff-appellee.
William Luther Glenn, Detroit, MI (argued and briefed), for defendant-appellant, in No. 92-1507.
Paul Borman (argued and briefed), Andrew Patton, Federal Public Defenders Office, Detroit, MI, for defendant-appellant in No. 92-1866.
Before: MILBURN and RYAN, Circuit Judges; and COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. *
In this appeal from the joint prosecution of defendants Joe W. Fountain and Carlton B. McEaddy, we examine a total of five assignments of error; two advanced by McEaddy, and three by Fountain.
Carlton B. McEaddy pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1). He appeals the district court's order denying his motion to suppress statements on the basis that they were obtained as a result of an illegal seizure. The issues in McEaddy's appeal are:
1) Whether the district court properly concluded that McEaddy's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when he was detained during the search of a friend's home; and
2) Whether the district court properly concluded that the continued detention of McEaddy after the search was completed was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Because we find that McEaddy's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, we shall affirm the district court's order denying the motion to suppress.
Joe W. Fountain appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence for: 1) possession with intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 860; 2) use of a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c); and 3) destruction of property to prevent seizure, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2232(a). Fountain's issues on appeal are 3) Whether the district court erred when it received in evidence testimony regarding Fountain's prior drug-related activities;
4) Whether the district court erred when it received in evidence alleged hearsay testimony; and
5) Whether the district court properly departed from the recommended guideline range.
Although the district court's evidentiary rulings in 3) and 4) above were in error, we believe the errors were harmless. Furthermore, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it departed from the recommended guideline range in determining Fountain's sentence. Therefore, we also shall affirm Fountain's conviction and sentence.
On May 8, 1991, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms executed a search warrant at Fountain's residence in Detroit, Michigan. Upon entering Fountain's home, ATF Agent Roger Guthrie observed Fountain run from the bedroom to the bathroom, remove caps from two pill bottles, dump the contents in the toilet, flush the toilet, and throw the bottles into the bathtub. Agents searched the bathroom and found two empty pill vials, two caps, and a single cocaine rock in the bathtub. They also seized several semi-automatic weapons from the bedroom. Fountain admitted to the agents that he lived in the residence and that he owned the guns discovered in the bedroom.
One month later, on June 4, ATF agents executed a second search warrant at Fountain's home. The agents discovered four individuals in the house--Fountain, McEaddy, Selma Hill, and Gregory Jackson. The agents detained all four persons while they conducted a search of the premises. They discovered four rocks of cocaine in Fountain's pocket and three firearms in the hall closet. In response to a question by one of the agents, McEaddy, a convicted felon, admitted that he had "handled" the firearms found in the house.
In due course, a grand jury indicted Fountain and McEaddy for narcotics and gun violations. McEaddy moved to sever his case from Fountain's and to suppress statements he had given to the agents. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, McEaddy argued that his statement regarding the firearms was coerced and that it was the result of an illegal arrest. The district court granted McEaddy's motion to sever but denied his motion to suppress. McEaddy pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, but reserved the right to appeal the district court's decision denying his motion to suppress. He was sentenced to a 16-month prison term.
Fountain was convicted by a jury on January 29, 1992. The jury found Fountain guilty on four counts of drug and firearms violations. The presentence report determined that the applicable sentence range was 33-41 months for three counts of drug violations. The report recommended an upward departure from this range because Fountain's criminal history category did not accurately reflect his criminal history. The district court agreed and sentenced Fountain to 46 months imprisonment. The court also imposed a consecutive mandatory sentence of 60 months for the conviction on the firearms charge.
At the hearing on McEaddy's motion to suppress, two ATF agents, Roger Guthrie and Michael Yott, testified consistently about the search warrant executed at Fountain's home on June 4. According to the agents, the warrant authorized them to search for firearms, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. Upon entering the house, the agents conducted a protective sweep and assembled Fountain, McEaddy, Hill, and Jackson in the living room. The agents handcuffed all four persons and forced them to lie face down on the floor. Agent Anthony Primak read them their Miranda 1 rights, pausing to allow each of the four an opportunity to express his or her understanding. The agents detained the At the conclusion of the search, the agents took each of the four detainees, one at a time, into the adjoining dining room area for a brief interview. 2 Guthrie and Yott testified that the purpose of the dining room interviews was investigative; that is, to determine whether anyone should be detained further. According to the agents, when McEaddy was interviewed in the dining room, he identified himself by his alias, Frank Davis, and admitted that he was a paroled felon. He told the agents that although the weapons that had been found in Fountain's home did not belong to him, McEaddy had "handled" them. The agents immediately terminated the interview and led McEaddy to a second floor bedroom to question him more thoroughly.
occupants in the living room while the search was conducted. The agents discovered narcotics in Fountain's pocket and three firearms in the hall closet.
Upstairs, Agent Yott once again read McEaddy his Miranda rights. According to the agents, McEaddy's handcuffs were removed for the duration of the upstairs interview. McEaddy did not indicate during either interview that he did not wish to answer questions or that he wanted an attorney present. Agent Yott recorded McEaddy's oral statement on a waiver of rights form, which McEaddy signed using the alias Frank Davis. McEaddy stated that he had been staying at Fountain's home for approximately two months and that he had handled or loaded the three weapons seized by the agents.
McEaddy also testified at the hearing, but his testimony contradicted the statement recorded by Yott. According to McEaddy, he was not staying at Fountain's house but had been asked to come over on June 4 to cut the grass and clean the basement. He testified that the agents apprehended him in the kitchen, handcuffed him, and forced him to lie on the floor. Five minutes later, he was moved to the dining room and again told to lie face down on the floor. The agents read his Miranda rights and asked if he understood them. According to McEaddy, only one interview took place and that was in the upstairs bedroom; the agents had not conducted an "initial" interview in the dining room. McEaddy testified that in the upstairs bedroom, Agent Yott transcribed McEaddy's answers on the waiver form, and when McEaddy refused to sign the statement, the agents punched and kicked him. Both agents denied doing so.
Jackson, who was also detained during the June 4th search, testified for McEaddy at the suppression hearing. According to Jackson, the agents kept him on the floor for approximately 30 to 60 minutes before they escorted him upstairs for 20 minutes of questioning. Jackson denied that any interviews took place in the dining room.
McEaddy asked the district court to suppress his statements for two reasons: 1) his written statement and waiver were coerced; and 2) his oral and written statements were the product of an unreasonably prolonged detention and illegal arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion to suppress, specifically finding that McEaddy's testimony was not credible. United States v. McEaddy, 780 F.Supp. 464, 467-68 (E.D.Mich.1991). On appeal, McEaddy abandons the argument that his confession was coerced by the agents. He maintains, however, that his statements resulted from an unlawful arrest.
In his first assignment of error, McEaddy argues that the ATF agents violated his right to be free from an unreasonable seizure when they detained him while they executed the search warrant. According to McEaddy, the rule of Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981)--that law enforcement agents have limited authority to detain "occupants" present on the premises during the execution of a valid As a threshold matter, all parties agree that McEaddy's detention in Fountain's home constituted a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A seizure of a person occurs "when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the...
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