People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 01 January 1851
• Citation: 2 Mich. 250
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: The People v. Taylor

2 Mich. 250

The People v. Taylor

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 1, 1851

Error to Oakland Circuit.

New trial denied.

Drake for the People.

Stevens for defendant.

OPINION

By the Court, Wing, J.

The indictment in this case is founded upon section three of chapter 154, and section one of chapter 161, title 30 of the revised statutes. The first named section provides that "every person who shall willfully and maliciously burn in the night time, any barn, stable, shop, or office, of another, within the curtilage of any dwelling house," &c.

There are but two questions of any importance presented by the record for the judgment of the Court. The first is whether the Circuit Court gave the jury the correct definition of the term "curtilage;" the second is whether the Court stated to the jury the true rule of law by which they should be governed, in deciding whether the defendant hired Grey to burn the barn. If the Court was correct in its views as expressed on these points, it will not be necessary to spend any time upon the other.

The proof shows the relative position of the house, barn, and enclosures on the farm of Mr. Johns. The barn is alleged in the indictment to have been within the curtilage of the house. Does the proof support this allegation? This will depend upon the true meaning of the word curtilage. It is perhaps unfortunate that this term, which is found in the English statutes, and which is descriptive of the common arrangement of dwellings, and the yards surrounding them, in England, should have been perpetuated in our statutes. It is not strictly applicable to the common disposition of enclosures and buildings constituting the homestead of the inhabitants of this country, and particularly of farmers. In England, the dwellings and out-houses of all kinds, are usually surrounded by a fence or stone wall, enclosing a small piece of land embracing the yards and out-buildings near the house, constituting what is called the court. This wall is so constructed as to add greatly to the security of the property within it; but as such precautionary arrangements have not been considered necessary in this country, they have not been adopted. Hence, the difficulty in this case of giving a correct interpretation to the statute and of judging whether the barn as described by the witness, was within what was understood by the Legislature as the curtilage of the house.

Jacobs in his Law Dictionary says: "Curtilage is a courtyard, back-side, or piece of ground lying near and belonging to a dwelling-house, and though it is said to be a yard or garden belonging to a house, it seems to differ from a garden, for we find cum quando gardino et curtilagio." The definition given in Shepherd's Touchstone, page 84, Cunningham's Law Directory, and Webster's, Johnson's and Walker's Dictionaries, is substantially the same. Mr. Bouviere in his Law Dictionary, defines it to be "a space of ground within a common enclosure, belonging to a dwelling-house." Mr. Chitty in his General Practice, 175, speaks of its having been defined as is stated by Jacobs. In the case of Regina v. Gilbert, 1 Covington & Kirwan 84, the barn was situated in an enclosure which was surrounded by a general fence, but the yard in which the barn stood was separated from the yard immediately about the house by a stone wall; it was held the barn was within the curtilage. Mr. Chitty, in remarking upon the various definitions that have been given to this word says: "In its most comprehensive and proper legal signification it includes all that space of ground and buildings thereon, which is usually enclosed within the general fence, immediately surrounding a principal messuage, out-buildings and yard, closely adjoining to a dwelling-house, but it may be large enough for cattle to be levant and couchant therein." The definitions of Bouviere and Chitty do not strictly agree with the other authors named, yet it may be gathered from them all, that a curtilage is not necessarily one enclosure, but that it may include more than one yard near the dwelling-house. The definition of neither of the authors cited indicate that it is necessarily a yard which embraces the out-buildings, and yet it may be so; and in England it commonly is so, and the space about the house is spoken of as a court. In this case the barn stood eighty feet from the dwelling-house and nearly in range with it, east and west; it stood in a yard or lane with which there was a communication from the house by a pair of bars. The space of ground occupied by both buildings, and the buildings were such as are usually included in one enclosure in England. It is quite manifest from the statute that it was the intention of the Legislature to protect dwelling-houses from the hazards of fire which might be set to a barn, office, stable or shop, standing near to the house, as well as to protect these other...