The State v. Anderson
Decision Date | 26 September 1885 |
Docket Number | 12,365 |
Citation | 2 N.E. 332,103 Ind. 170 |
Parties | The State v. Anderson |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Knox Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
F. T Hord, Attorney General, W. A. Cullop, Prosecuting Attorney G. W. Shaw and C. B. Kessinger, for the State.
The following indictment was returned against appellee, to wit:
Here follows specific negations of every fact so sworn to in the affidavit. Following these negations the indictment is as follows:
On motion of appellee the indictment was quashed. The State has appealed.
There is no brief for appellee. We are informed by the prosecuting attorney in his brief, that the indictment was quashed upon the grounds: First. That it does not charge the offence in the language of the statute defining the offence of perjury; and, Second. That the action pending before the justice of the peace, in which the affidavit was filed, is not sufficiently described.
The statute provides that an indictment is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom: R. S. 1881, section 1755. It is further provided that no indictment shall be deemed invalid, nor shall the same be set aside or quashed, for any of the following causes: R. S. 1881, section 1756. It will be seen that these statutes provide for liberal rules to be applied in passing upon the sufficiency of indictments.
There are two sections of the statute providing penalties for perjury, in each of which the words "wilfully, corruptly and falsely" are used in connection with the swearing. It is charged in the indictment before us, that appellee made a false affidavit to procure a continuance in a cause in which he was defendant. The charge is in the words of the statute except that the word falsely is omitted, and in its stead the word "feloniously" is used. It is charged that the affidavit was false, and that appellee well knew that the affidavit and all stated therein were wholly false, and that he wilfully, knowingly and voluntarily committed wilful and corrupt perjury. These several charges, in connection with the word feloniously, we think, ought to be regarded as the equivalent of the word "falsely." Under our statute and the decisions of this court, the indictment need not be in the exact words of the statute, but other words conveying the same meaning may be used. R. S. 1881, section 1737; Malone v. State, 14 Ind. 219; State v. Gilbert, 21 Ind. 474; State v. Walls, 54 Ind. 561; Shinn v. State, 68 Ind. 423. In the last case, it was held that the word "feloniously" is the equivalent of the word "unlawfully," used in the statute.
The case of State v. Dark, 8 Blackf. 526, was based upon a statute which enacted that every person who should "falsely make, deface, destroy, etc., any record, etc., shall be deemed guilty of forgery."
It was not charged in the indictment, that the offence was falsely committed, and for this reason there was a motion to quash it. For the word falsely in the statute, the words unlawfully and feloniously were used in the indictment. It was held that these words are more than equivalent to the word falsely, and that hence the indictment should not have been quashed. This case seems to be directly in point here, and sustains the indictment.
Mr. Bishop, in his work on Criminal Procedure, at section 922, vol. 2, says: "'Falsely' can not be essential, because the assignment of the perjury avers the swearing to be false."
We think that, taking the several charges in the indictment together, and keeping in view the liberal rules fixed by the statutes, they show and charge that the affidavit was falsely made, and that the omission of the word "falsely" is not a sufficient ground for quashing the indictment.
In claiming that the cause pending before the justice of the peace, and in which the perjury is charged to have been committed, is sufficiently described in the indictment, counsel for the State make the mistake of assuming that the prosecution is based upon section 2007, R. S. 1881, and not upon section 2006.
The perjury is charged to have been...
To continue reading
Request your trial