Adams County v. The B. & M. R. R. Co.

Decision Date10 December 1880
Citation2 N.W. 1054,55 Iowa 94
PartiesADAMS COUNTY v. THE B. & M. R. R. CO. ET AL
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Adams District Court.

ACTION in equity to establish and quiet title to certain land claimed by the plaintiff as swamp land. The defendant claims to have derived title to the same under the act of Congress of May 15, 1856, granting lands in this State to aid in the construction of railroads. The action was commenced in 1869 and the present is the third appeal taken in the case. Upon the first trial a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. Upon appeal the judgment was reversed. 39, Iowa 507. The reversal was placed upon the ground that it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff was not the owner of the land. Afterwards, upon rehearing, a supplemental opinion was filed and the reversal was placed upon the ground that it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff had assessed the land and collected taxes thereon from the defendant, and was thereby estopped from asserting title thereto. The case having been remanded the plaintiff asked leave to file an amended replication, averring that the assessment and collection of taxes were made by inadvertence and mistake. The application was accompanied by affidavits tending to show that the fact of the mistake did not, until after the submission of the case, come to the plaintiff's knowledge, and could not have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence. The court refused to receive the affidavits, and refused to allow the amendment, and rendered judgment for the defendant, which, upon appeal was reversed. 44 Iowa 335. The case having been remanded the amendment was allowed and the parties took additional evidence, not only upon the new issue made in regard to the alleged mistake, but upon all the issues in the case, including those which had been disposed of. Upon a trial judgment was rendered for the defendant, the court holding that it did not appear that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to discover that the assessment and collection of taxes were made by mistake. The plaintiff appeals.

AFFIRMED.

F. M Davis, for appellant.

Stuart Bros., for appellee.

ADAMS J., ROTHROCK, J.

OPINION

ADAMS, J.

It appears to us that the ground upon which the judgment of the court below is based is not tenable. The question of diligence. was determined upon the affidavits which accompanied the plaintiff's application for an order allowing it to amend and tender a new issue. It was not to be determined again, we think, upon the trial. It is true such affidavits are taken ex parte, and do not constitute as satisfactory evidence as might be elicited upon an examination and cross-examination of witnesses. But they constitute the sole evidence of diligence in an application for a new trial in an action at law, where the question of diligence is involved, and we think that they are sufficient in an action in equity.

But notwithstanding the court may have erred in the ground of its decision, the judgment must be allowed to stand if the plaintiff has failed to prove its averment that the assessment and collection of taxes were made by mistake, unless, as the plaintiff claims, the whole case is subject to review, and upon such review the decision appears to be wrong.

The first question which presents itself is as to whether the plaintiff was limited to the trial of the new issue presented in the amended replication. In our opinion it was. We have come to this conclusion with much caution, because it is strenuously insisted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that it should not be held to be estopped by the assessment and collection of taxes, even if the assessment and collection were not made by mistake. It is said in the first place that the court was misled in regard to the facts upon which the estoppel was grounded, as appears from the evidence produced at the last trial; and in the second place that as a matter of law the assessment and collection of taxes by a county do not estop it from claiming title to the property taxed.

Some of the members of the court have come to entertain considerable doubt as to the correctness of the ruling, holding that there was an estoppel in this case. But we think that we cannot go into that question. The case was not remanded for a new trial, but for judgment in accordance with the opinion. The court below could have done nothing but render judgment if there had been no application for an order allowing the filing of an amended replication and the tender of a new issue upon the ground of a newly discovered fact material to the determination of the case. If without such application the plaintiff had claimed in the court below a right to a retrial upon, and redetermination of, the question of estoppel, the impropriety would have been manifest at once. The case might, to be sure, have been opened below, upon a proper showing, for the purpose of letting in new evidence upon old issues; but that would not have involved the retrial of issues to which the new evidence was not applicable. Where a case in equity, triable upon written evidence, involves independent issues, and it is opened for the purpose of letting in newly discovered evidence upon one of the issues, there is no more reason for letting in evidence not newly discovered upon the other issues than there would be in opening the case in the first place for evidence not newly discovered. The facts, then, in regard to this estoppel were to be taken as before determined, subject merely to the showing, if the plaintiff could make it, that the collection and assessment of taxes were made by mistake. We think, too, that we are equally precluded from a re-examination of the legal question.

An appellate court may, and should, overrule its decisions where they are wrong, and where adhering to them would work more mischief than overruling them. As between persons not parties to a decision it has only the force of an authority. If erroneous, they should not be affected by the error because they are in no way responsible for it. As between the parties to a decision it becomes an adjudication. It is urged however, that it should not be so considered so long as the case is pending. Whatever force there might be in this position in an action at law, where the right to introduce new evidence after verdict involves the retrial of the whole case, we think it cannot be maintained in a case like this. Indeed, the authorities seem to go to the extent of holding that the decision of an appellate court becomes conclusively the law of the case, to be followed in all subsequent proceedings, whether the action be at law or in equity. Of course if the facts change, the rule of law as announced may become inapplicable. In such a case it may become necessary to apply a different rule. Dodge v. Gaylord, 53 Ind. 365. But the facts remaining the same, the rule of law as once held must remain the rule for the case. In Dewey v. Gray, 2 Cal. 374, it was admitted that a former decision in the case was made in abrogation of one of the plainest principles of law. HAYDENFELDT, J., said: "If this case were a new one I would not hesitate to overrule it. But legal rules deprive us of the power to do so. The decision having been made in the case, it has become the law of the case, and it is not now the subject of revision." In Stacy v. Vermont Cen. R. Co., 32 Vt. 551, the court said: "The rule has been long established in this State, often declared from the bench, and we believe uniformly adhered to, that in the same case this court will not reverse or revise their former decisions. Whatever views the different...

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6 cases
  • Sleeper v. Killion
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 24 de setembro de 1917
    ...arise where amendment is permissible is well settled. For example, see Hogle v. Smith, 136 Iowa, 35, 113 N. W. 556;Adams Co. v. Railway Co., 55 Iowa, 94, 2 N. W. 1054, 7 N. W. 471; Code, § 3600; Dinsmoor v. Rouse, 211 Ill. 317, 71 N. E. 1003;Chickering v. Failes, 29 Ill. 294;Sowerwine v. Di......
  • Sleeper v. Killion
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 24 de setembro de 1917
    ... ... is permissible, is well settled. For example, see Hogle ... v. Smith, 136 Iowa 32, 35, 113 N.W. 556; Adams ... County v. The B. & M. R. R. Co., 55 Iowa 94, 2 N.W ... 1054; Code Section 3600; Dinsmoor v. Rowse, 211 Ill ... 317, 71 N.E. 1003; Chickering ... ...
  • City of Fairfield v. Dashiell
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 20 de junho de 1933
    ...30 Iowa, 498;Painter v. Hogue, 48 Iowa, 426;Stodghill v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 53 Iowa, 341, 5 N. W. 495;Adams County v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 55 Iowa, 94, 2 N. W. 1054, 7 N. W. 471;Wolfinger v. Betz, 66 Iowa, 594, 24 N. W. 228;Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Montague & Smith, 65 Iowa, 67, 21 N. W......
  • City of Fairfield v. Dashiell
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 20 de junho de 1933
    ... ...          On ... November 21, 1932, plaintiff filed in the office of the clerk ... of the district court of Jefferson county, Iowa, in the ... equity case of Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, a motion for ... the issuance of a writ of injunction, and for an order ... Schmidt v ... Zahensdorf, 30 Iowa 498; Painter v. Hogue, 48 ... Iowa 426; Stodghill v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 53 Iowa ... 341, 5 N.W. 495; Adams County v. B. & M. R. R. Co., ... 55 Iowa 94, 2 N.W. 1054, 7 N.W. 471; Wolfinger v ... Betz, 66 Iowa 594, 24 N.W. 228; Minnesota Linseed ... Oil ... ...
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