2 OF TOWNSHIP OF RUBICON, Farrell v. School Dist. No. 2 of Rubicon Tp.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1893
• Citation: 2 OF TOWNSHIP OF RUBICON, Farrell v. School Dist. No. 2 of Rubicon Tp., 56 N.W. 1053, 98 Mich. 43 (Mich. 1893)
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: FARRELL v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 OF TOWNSHIP OF RUBICON.

56 N.W. 1053

98 Mich. 43

FARRELL v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 OF TOWNSHIP OF RUBICON.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 4, 1893

Error to circuit court, Huron county; Watson Beach, Judge.

Action by Elizabeth R. Farrell against school district No. 2 of the township of Rubicon. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Charles L. Hall, for appellant.

Horace G. Snover, (Elbridge F. Bacon, of counsel,) for appellee.

GRANT J.

The defendant is a graded school district, with five trustees. Plaintiff had been employed as a teacher in the school during the latter part of the school year 1891. It is claimed that she was employed under a written contract dated June 27th made pursuant to a resolution of the school board on June 20th, for the ensuing school year, commencing in September. She presented herself in the schoolroom on the morning of the opening of school, to perform her contract, but was informed by the director that another teacher had been employed. She also appeared on the second and third mornings for a like purpose, but on the third morning was denied permission to enter the schoolhouse. She claims that she made proper efforts to obtain like employment in other schools but failed. At the close of the year she brought this suit for breach of the contract, to recover as damages the salary of $400, mentioned in it. The court directed a verdict in her favor. The facts will be stated in connection with each point raised by the defense.

1. June 20th a meeting of the school board was held, at which all the members were present. A resolution was adopted, by a vote of three to two, to employ plaintiff as principal for the ensuing school year at a salary of $40 per month. June 27th the contract was made, signed by three members of the board, the moderator, assessor, and one trustee, and by the plaintiff. It is insisted that the contract is void because not signed by the director, under How. St. � 5134, subd. 4, which makes it the duty of the board to employ qualified teachers, and to require the director and moderator to make contracts with them on behalf of the district. This point is ruled against the defendant in Crane v. School Dist., 61 Mich 299. It is not in the power of the director and moderator to defeat the action of the board by refusing to sign a contract authorized by it.

2. The contract was valid, though made prior to the annual school meeting. The old board had the right to employ teachers for the ensuing year. Tappan v. School Dist., 44 Mich. 500, 7 N.W. 73; Cleveland v. Amy, 88 Mich. 374, 50 N.W. 293. The reasons for the rule are fully stated in Tappan v. School Dist. The statute providing that the annual meeting may be changed from September to July does not affect the rule.

3. After the annual election in July, at which two new trustees were elected, and on July 18th, the board met, and by resolution rescinded the action of the old school board in hiring teachers for the ensuing year. July 20th notice of this action was mailed to the plaintiff, and she admits having received it. For this action no reason was given. It was not in the power of the subsequent board to rescind a contract which was legally made by the old board, without some valid reason therefor. These school contracts are governed by the same rules as other contracts, and, when once legally made, are equally binding upon both parties thereto. Neither can violate them without compensating the other for the damages sustained.

4. Plaintiff introduced in evidence two certificates, one a third and the other a first grade. The first-grade certificate showed that she was qualified to teach in any school district in this state for four years. These were objected to as incompetent. The objection now made is that there was no proof that they had been issued and signed by the secretary and chairman of the board that issued them. If the defendant then claimed that there was a defect in the certification, it was its duty to point it out upon the trial. Technical objections of this character cannot be taken advantage of under a general objection of incompetency and immateriality. Krolik v. Graham, 64 Mich. 226, 31 N.W. 307; Wood v. Weimar, 104 U.S. 786.

5. No evidence was introduced on the part of the defendant as to any efforts made by plaintiff to secure the like employment elsewhere, nor as to her opportunities for doing so, except that which was elicited from the plaintiff's cross-examination. Upon receipt of the letter notifying her of the resolution of the board attempting to rescind the contract, she at once replied that she should insist upon keeping the contract, and that she would be present at the beginning of the school year for that purpose. She testified that between the time of the receipt of this letter and the opening of school she inquired of some personal friends in Livingston county, where she lived, if they knew of any vacancies in the graded schools of that county. She made no application, because she knew of no vacancy. Most graded schools employ their teachers before the close of the school...