State v. Bryant
| Decision Date | 31 January 1887 |
| Citation | 2 S.W. 836,90 Mo. 534 |
| Parties | The State, Appellant, v. Bryant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Webster Circuit Court. -- Hon. Ben. V. Alton, Judge.
Affirmed.
B. G Boone, Attorney General, for the state.
The indictment employs the substantial language of the statute and is sufficient. R. S. 1879, sec. 1548; State v Flack, 24 Mo. 378; State v. Charles, 24 Mo 379; State v. Sutton, 24 Mo. 380. The rulings of this court in the cases above cited were under the statute of 1845, in which the section, making betting on games a misdemeanor, is identical with the law now in force on this subject. Compare section 1548, Revised Statutes, 1879, with section 16, article 8, chapter 47, Revised Statutes, 1845. It is not necessary that an indictment should follow the exact words of the statute. State v. Kirk, 6 Mo. 470; State v. Melton, 38 Mo. 369; State v. Wilcoxen, 38 Mo. 371; State v. Scott, 39 Mo. 426. Under our statute, it is indictable to bet money or property upon any gambling device whatever. Eubanks v. State, 5 Mo. 450; State v. Bates, 10 Mo. 166; Glasscock v. State, 10 Mo. 509. The object of the law is to suppress gaming, and courts will not discriminate between games of chance and skill. State v. Jackson, 39 Mo. 420. This court has held the following, where wagers are made upon them for money or property, to be gambling devices within the meaning of the statute: Faro banks, State v. Ames, 1 Mo. 524; State v. Fulton, 19 Mo. 680; State v. Andrews, 43 Mo. 470. Cards. State v. Purdom, 3 Mo. 114; State v. Skaggs, 33 Mo. 93. The game called "loto," or shuffle boards. Lowry v. State, 1 Mo. 722; State v. Foster, 2 Mo. 210. Roulette tables. State v. Simonds, 3 Mo. 414. Pool tables. State v. Jackson, supra. Betting upon a game of chance with and by means of half dollars and cracks in the floor of a house. State v. Flack, 24 Mo. 378. It has also been held sufficient under the statute to charge the offence generally as a "gambling device," without describing the nature of it. State v. Nelson, 19 Mo. 393.
No brief for respondent.
The trial court, on motion of the defendant, quashed an indictment, which, omitting formal parts, is as follows:
"That Harvey Bryant * * * did then and there unlawfully and wilfully bet a sum of money, to-wit: one dollar, at and upon a game of chance played with and by means of a target gun and target; which said target gun and target were then and there a gambling device, adapted to the purpose of playing a game of chance for money and property, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state."
This indictment is based on section 1548, Revised Statutes:
The preceding section, section 1547, reads in this way:
I. It is very evident to my mind that the words "or other gambling device," employed in section 1548, were only designed to apply to such gambling devices as are of a kindred nature and similar kind to those mentioned in section 1547. This view accords with that good rule of construction which requires that, "where a particular class is spoken of, and general words follow, the class first mentioned is to be taken as the most comprehensive, and the general words treated as referring to matters ejusdem generis with such class." Broom's Leg. Max. [6 Am. Ed.] s. p. 625. Thus, if in a statute, after the enumeration of classes of persons and things, there should be added "and all others," such general words will be limited in their meaning and restricted in their operation to objects of like kind with those specified. A familiar example of this "celebrated rule" is found in the case of Reg. v. Whitnash, 7 B. and C. 596. Statute 29, 2 Car., chapter 7, section 1, provided "that no tradesman, artificer, workman, laborer, or other person whatsoever," should exercise his ordinary calling on the Lord's day. And, thereupon, it...
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