Tolchester Beach Imp. Co. v. Steinmeier
| Decision Date | 18 June 1890 |
| Parties | TOLCHESTER BEACH IMP. CO. v. STEINMEIER. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from circuit court, Talbot county.
This is a suit for assault and false imprisonment. The appellant is a corporation known as the "Tolchester Beach Improvement Company of Kent County," and carries on an excursion business, by steamboats, bringing passengers from Baltimore and elsewhere to Tolchester beach, in Kent county, where the company has a wharf, hotel, baths, small boats for hire, etc. The plaintiff carried on a business on the shore in hiring small boats and fishing tackle, and got his customers mainly from persons who were appellant's excursionists; and out of this rivalry in trade grew ill feeling and controversy which culminated in the quarrel which gave rise to this suit. A public county road ran through the appellant's grounds to the water, where there was a public landing adjoining the appellant's premises and wharf, and on this public landing this controversy had its origin. Upon application to the governor of the state, the appellant had secured the appointment of Thomas J. Fletcher as a policeman "for the protection of the property of the corporation, and for the preservation of peace and good order on their premises." This officer was appointed on the nomination of the appellant, and was duly commissioned as a state officer under the seal of the state, under the act of 1880 c. 460, which gives sections 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, and 293 to the present Code, art. 23. Oliver H. Paxton was appellant's superintendent at the beach, and he was, on the occasion of this disturbance, engaged in booming and securing certain drift logs which had come down the bay, and floated around the appellant's wharf and the public landing. He was upon the public landing, and securing them there. The plaintiff (appellee here) and his partner came with their boat, and found their access to the landing obstructed. The appellee came ashore by stepping on the logs obtained a rope to throw to his partner in the boat, in order to draw the boat around the logs, and make it fast. His contention is that he stepped on a log upon which Paxton was standing, and, in throwing the line, the log turned in the water, and cast him and Paxton both into the water, whereupon the appellee contends and testified that Paxton at once ordered Fletcher to arrest him, saying, "Didn't you see him strike me?" Paxton's contention is that appellee willfully took hold of him and pushed him into the water. It makes no difference which is right in that particular, so far as the questions for our decision are concerned. Fletcher approached to arrest the appellee, but appellee drew his pistol, and prevented the arrest then and there being consummated, boarded his boat, and went around to his own premises, which he held under lease from the owners. Fletcher, without warrant, pursued him to his own premises and, having arrested him, handcuffed him, and took him to jail, where appellee remained until, after trial for alleged assault, he was acquitted and discharged.
Said section 288 provides that "corporations owning or using any railroad, steam-boat, canal, furnace, colliery, or rolling-mill in this state may, jointly or severally, apply to the governor to commission such persons as the said corporation or corporations may designate, to act as policemen for the protection of the property of said corporation or corporations, and for the preservation of peace and good order on their respective premises, railroad trains, or steam-boats." Section 289 provides that the governor may, if he thinks best, appoint such persons to be policemen, shall issue commissions to them, and may at pleasure revoke the same; and section 290 requires that the persons commissioned shall take the oath prescribed by article 1, § 4, of the constitution, and shall thereafter possess, in the counties and cities where the property of such corporations are situated, "all the authority and powers held and exercised by constables at common law, and under the statutes of this state, and also all the authority and powers conferred by law on policemen in the city of Baltimore."
Argued before ALVEY, C.J., and MILLER, BRYAN, MCSHERRY, FOWLER, BRISCOE, and IRVING, JJ.
H. H. Barroll, H. V. D. Johns, Albert Constable, Charles H. Gibson, and C. S. Carrington, for appellant.
H. W. Vickers and James A. Pearce, for appellee.
IRVING J., (after stating the facts as above.)
The appellant depends upon the contention that it is not responsible for this arrest and imprisonment because Fletcher was not acting as their employe, and that, if he was acting because of an order from Paxton, he had no authority to order an arrest. The circuit court ruled that Fletcher and Paxton were both officers of the company, and held the company answerable, and hence this appeal. Paxton was, without doubt an officer of the company; but because he was such officer it does not follow that he had authority to order an arrest, and bind the company for the consequences of it. He was superintendent of the company at the beach. That office is not mentioned and described in the charter, and what the duties and authority of such superintendent were the appellee offered no proof, while the appellant offered evidence that it was of a restricted character, and did not embrace any authority to order an arrest. If the company was to be bound by Paxton's act in directing the arrest, it must be because the term "superintendent," of itself and of necessity, imported such authority; for, to make the company answerable for his acts, the acts must appear to have been done within the scope and limits of his authority. It would be a most unwarrantable inference from the simple fact that he bore that name that the alleged act was authorized by the company. It was the criminal law of the state which was put in operation; and before the...
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