Jesse v. The State
Decision Date | 30 June 1856 |
Docket Number | No.33.,33. |
Parties | Jesse (a slave), plaintiff in error. vs. The State,defendant. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Indictment for rape, in Decatur. Tried before Judge Allen, June Term, 1856.
Jesse (a slave) was arraigned for trial at said term, upon an indictment containing two counts: one for rape, and the other for an assault with intent to commit a rape. The parties then being ready, and proceeding to form a Jury to try the case, the first Juror on the panel, John Smith, was called and put directly upon the prisoner, who objected to the mode of putting the Juror on him, insisting that before the Juror could be put on him, the prisoner, it was necessary to present the Juror to the accused, so that objections might be made, as to his competency as a Juror, if any existed; and that if then no objections should be made, the Sol. General should ask the Juror the questions prescribed by the Act in relation thereto, approved February 28, 1856; that the Jury should be selected according to the provisions of that Act.
The Court overruled the objection, and held that the Act did not apply to offences committed before its passage, &c.; to which ruling, prisoner's Counsel excepted. Prisoner's Counsel then asked the Court to try the Juror's competency. The Court ordered the questions prescribed by Statutes, existing previous to the Act of 1856, to be propounded to the Juror, which he answered affirmatively. The Court being requested to test the Juror's competency further, the Juror was tested by "triors, " according to the law as it existed previous to said Act of 1856. Two Jurors were thus selected.
A Juror having been sent before the triors, he answered, in response to questions addressed him by prisoner's Counsel, that he had formed and expressed an opinion from what he had heard in relation to the guilt or innocence of the accused; and from what he had heard, he had a bias or prejudice resting on his mind, for or against the accused. Counsel for prisoner insisted that the Juror should be set downfor cause, without waiting for the report of the triors. The Court refused the motion, and prisoner excepted.
One John M. Potter was then called as a Juror, and put on the prisoner; having affirmatively answered the statutory questions, he was put on triors, and answered before them, that he had heard a portion of the testimony of Mrs. Patterson before the committing Magistrates, and but little of it; and that he had formed and expressed no opinion from what he did hear; but that the same had made an impression on his mind against the prisoner; he was challenged for cause. The Court refused to allow the challenge for cause, and ordered the triors to examine and report on his competency; he was reported incompetent.
A. S. Curry was then called, and having answered the formal questions negatively, was sent before the triors, and answered, that from what he had heard, he had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, which was still resting on his mind, though it might be removed by the evidence; he would not say that it would, but thought it could be. Prisoner asked that he be set down for cause at once. The Court refused, and ordered the triors to examine and report on his competency; which was also excepted to. Being reported competent, prisoner's Counsel insisted that notwithstanding the report, the Juror had shown himself incompetent in the presence of the Court, and ought to be adjudged incompetent. The Court overruled the objection, and prisoner excepted.
James Lasseter being called, and having answered he had conscientious scruples in regard to capital punishment, the Solicitor-General replied aloud, and in the hearing of the panel yet to pass before the accused, "that they then had no use for him, as this was a hanging case."
George L. Earnest, one of the panel, being called up, stated to the Court that he was a little hard of hearing; that if taken as a Juror, he could not well hear the evidence. The Court discharged him, and no objection was made thereto.
The Jury being made up, Counsel for the State then pro-ceeded to open the case and submit the evidence on behalf of the State.
Mrs. Caroline E. Patterson, the main witness sworn on the part of the State, examined and cross-examined, recalled on the part of the State, and again cross-examined. Counsel for prisoner proposed to ask the witness some questions not strictly in rebuttal, stating to the Court that by inadvertence, they had neglected to have her answers to (?) similar examination taken down when she was under their cross-examination the night before; and that they desired to ask the questions now in order to have answers thereto taken down. The Court refused, and prisoner excepted.
The evidence having closed, the Solicitor-General, whilst addressing the Jury in conclusion, asserted, in the course of argument, that prisoner was of bad and infamous character. Counsel for prisoner requested the Court to stop the Counsel and correct the statement. The Court interrupted the Solicitor, who insisted that such was the proof, and continued to discuss his bad character, without being checked by the Court, although again appealed to by prisoner's Counsel.
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The like objection was made with the like result, when the Solicitor, commenting on the evidence of Mrs. Patterson, said: "her little girl, eleven years old, was awake and up while the prisoner was in Mrs. Patterson's room, and knew and called out that it was prisoner." Counsel for prisoner denying that such was the proof, and the Solicitor still insisting upon the fact as proven, as a fact identifying the pris-oner as the person making the assault on the person of Mrs. Caroline E. Patterson.
It is also charged as error, that "the Solicitor made frequent and repeated diversions from the evidence, in his statements and comments to the Jury, unsupported by the evidence, either directly or inferentially"; to which prisoner objected, without being supported by the Court; and that among other things the Solicitor remarked, that "I call on you, gentlemen of the Jury, this night to make a mark on the slave population, that will curb them in the commission of this dastardly crime that is taking the whole." Again: "that it was necessary for them to make an example of this wretch (meaning the prisoner), to protect and defend the honor, and integrity, and character of the County of Deca-tur, to protect their wives, sisters, and mothers, and daughters from such outrages."
The argument having closed, Counsel for prisoner requested the Court to charge the Jury-
1st. "That if the witness, Caroline E. Patterson, has contradicted herself or sworn falsely, in any material point, that she is not to be believed by them in any particular." This the Court declined to do as requested, but having read the same (said) yes, this is law; but the contradiction must be plain and palpable, and without explanation; and you must be satisfied that witness contradicted herself knowingly and wilfully; and then, if unexplained, the rule would exist, and not till then.
2d. "That if this witness has by so doing (contradicting herself in a material point), or otherwise (as by her manner of testifying), placed herself in a position not to be believed by them, then they can not find the prisoner guilty, as there is no evidence to sustain the charge." The Court also refused this charge in the words requested, but read them over and said—yes, gentlemen, this is also true, but you must take it with the same qualifications and instructions as to first point.
3d. "That if the fact that the prisoner did not try to get out of the way; that he remained there for some time, then went home where he was found by the persons in search of him, are circumstances to be considered by the Jury as evidences of his innocence." This the Court refused to charge as requested, but charged the Jury, that these facts, if there were no others; that if they were disconnected from all other circumstances, would be circumstances of his innocence; but as it was, they were to take them as mere badges that might...
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...the laws, the State does not ask their conviction but upon a calm and dispassionate investigation of the charges against them." Jesse v. State, 20 Ga. 156, 169. "While a solicitor is necessarily a partisan, yet it is his paramount duty `to subserve public justice' (Hicks v. Brantley, 102 Ga......
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Jackson v. State, 24974.
...as some evidence of innocence, was properly refused since it was not a correct statement of law. See in this connection, Jesse v. State, 20 Ga. 156 (6). (c) The other two requests, relating to public opinion and the appellant's color, dealt with matters which were not in issue. For this rea......
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Grayhouse v. State, 29065.
...the laws, the State does not ask their conviction but upon a calm and dispassionate investigation of the charges against them." Jesse v. State, 20 Ga. 156, 169. To this end the duty rests primarily upon the trial judge to prevent the injection into the trial of extrinsic and prejudicial mat......
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Grayhouse v. State
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