Guild v. Hull

Decision Date03 April 1889
Citation20 N.E. 665,127 Ill. 523
PartiesGUILD et al. v. HULL et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from circuit court, Dupage county; C. W. UPTON, Judge.

Bill by Thomas M. Hull, conservator, etc., of John Warne, against George W. Guild and Abbie Guild to set aside a conveyance of land made by said Warne to John W. Guild, the ancestor of defendants. Pending the suit Warne died, and his heirs were substituted as complainants. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal.Charles Wheaton

, for appellants.

Elbert H. Gary, for appellees.

SHOPE, J.

This was originally a bill by Thomas M. Hull, conservator of John Warne, to set aside a deed, bill of sale, and a lease, made by said Warne to John W. Guild, who was a grandson of said Warne. Subsequently to the filing of the bill Warne died, and thereafter the suit was prosecuted by his children and heirs at law, appropriate amendments having been made in the pleading for that purpose. On the 6th day of June, 1882, John Warne and wife executed and delivered to John W. Guild a deed for 108 acres of land, in consideration of past services rendered, and of natural love and affection. On the 10th day of August following, said Warne also made and delivered to Guild, his grandson, a lease of his home farm, during the life of the lessor, and that of his wife, and for six months after the death of the survivor of them, and also a bill of sale of all his personal property. Both of the last named were upon the condition that Guild should comfortably keep, maintain, and support Warne and his wife during their several lives, and properly care for and clothe them, and pay all taxes assessed upon the property. John W. Guild entered into the possession of the property, and, it is conceded, faithfully performed these duties until December 28, 1886, when he died intestate, leaving George W. Guild and Abbie Guild, his father and mother, his only heirs at law. George W. Guild was appointed administrator of his estate, and duly qualified as such. The wife of John Warne died about a month after the death of the grandson, and said Warne died in the spring of 1888. This bill was filed in 1887 against the administrator and heirs of said John W. Guild, deceased, seeking to set aside said deed, lease, and bill of sale, on the ground of the mental incapacity of John Warne to make a valid disposition of his property at the times when the same were severally made, and on the further ground of undue influence over him by John W. Guild in procuring the same. Answers were filed denying the material allegations of the bill. The circuit court directed the following issue to be submitted to a jury: (1) Was said John Warne, at the time of the execution and delivery of the deed dated June 6, 1882, and the lease and bill of sale, dated August 10, 1882, to John W. Guild, of sound mind and memory, and mentally capable of making such conveyances? (2) Were said deed, lease, and bill of sale obtained by undue influence of John W. Guild? The jury, after hearing the evidence, arguments of counsel, and the instruction of the court, returned a verdict that Warne was not of sound mind and memory at the time of the execution of the deed, lease, and bill of sale, and was not mentally capable of making the same; and that their execution was obtained through the undue influence of the said John W. Guild. The court overruled a motion for a new trial, and entered a final decree, which, after reciting the submission of the issue and the verdict of the jury, proceeds as follows: ‘And, being fully advised in the premises, and having overruled the motion to set aside said verdict, and for a new trial as aforesaid, doth order and decree that a pro forma decree, and pro forma only, be entered in said cause in pursuance of said findings of the said jury, and not otherwise,’ etc. The defendants bring the case to this court by appeal.

In chancery cases, except in cases where the submission to a jury is required by law or the rules of chancery practice, the chancellor is the judge of the weight of the evidence and of the ultimate facts established by it. If he submits controverted questions of fact to a jury, as he may do, the verdict or finding of the jury is advisory merely. He may adopt the verdict, or set the same aside, and resubmit the question to a jury, or he may disregard it, and enter such a decree as in his judgment equity demands. He may enter his decree after setting the verdict aside, or without setting it aside. Sibert v. McAvoy, 15 Ill. 108;Williams v. Bishop, Id. 553; Milk v. Moore, 39 Ill. 588;Sharkey v. Miller, 69 Ill. 560;Meeker v. Meeker, 75 Ill. 260;Smith v. Newton, 84 Ill. 14;Calvert v. Carpenter, 96 Ill. 63;Russell v. Fanning, 2 Ill. App. 632. It appears that the chancellor in this case made no independent finding, but rendered his decree in pursuance of the finding of the jury, ‘and not otherwise.’ The decree is pro forma, and pro forma only. This precludes the idea or presumption that the court acted upon its own judgment as to the truth of the allegation upon which the deed and bill of sale were set aside. Parties litigant are entitled to the judgment of the chancellor, and his consideration of the evidence, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. As the decree is based on the verdict of the jury alone, and not upon any independent judgment of the circuit court, it must follow that, if the finding of the jury was the result of, or was influenced by the admission of, improper evidence, or by improper instructions given by the court, the decree should be reversed. The condition is somewhat anomalous, but the effect must necessarily be the same as though the decree was based upon improper evidence or a misconception of the law applicable. In such case there can be no presumption that the chancellor acted upon proper evidence only, and rejected that which was incompetent. It therefore becomes necessary to examine whether the court below erred in the admission of evidence or in its rulings. Nor is this position rendered untenable by the fact that this court may pass upon the evidence submitted under the issues presented by the pleadings and determine the fact at issue, and enter such decree, or direct the entry thereof by the circuit court, as it shall find from the evidence pertains to equity and good conscience.

The evidence is here voluminous and conflicting. In Myatt v. Walker, 44 Ill. 485, we said, in speaking of evidence of this character, turning upon a controverted question of fact, and where the evidence is voluminous and contradictory: ‘In all such cases it is eminently proper that an issue should be formed and tried by a jury. Such a practice has always been fully sanctioned, and we think it more satisfactory and better calculated to promote justice, and the practice should be adopted by the court below in all cases involving questions of insanity.’ Numerous other cases may be found holding the same view. In addition, the parties litigant and this court have a right to the benefit of the judgment of the chancellor as to the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses whom he saw, and thus had the means, which we have not, of determining the degree of credit to which they were entitled. Upon the trial before the jury the court allowed complainant to prove the declarations of John Warne that John W. Guild and Mrs. Warne, his (John Warne's) wife, were trying to force him to deed his property to Guild. This was error. The declarations of a grantor, made either before or after the execution of his deed, are not admissible for the purpose of invalidating the same. Dickie v. Carter, 42 Ill. 377;Massey v. Huntington, 118 Ill. 80, 7 N. E. Rep. 269; Comstock v. Hadlyme, 8 Conn. 263;Jackson v. Kniffen, 2 Johns. 31.

Again, this proceeding was against the administrator and heirs of the grantee in the instruments named, and as John Warne,...

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