USA v. Whitehead, 99-50200
Decision Date | 11 January 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 99-50200,99-50200 |
Parties | (9th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TIMOTHY JAMES WHITEHEAD, Defendant-Appellant |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Joseph J. Burghardt, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, California, for the defendant-appellant.
John H. Gomez, Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, California, for the plaintiff-appellee. OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California; Thomas J. Whelan, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-98-02091-TJW
Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Barry G. Silverman, and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.
Timothy James Whitehead ("Whitehead") seeks reversal of his jury conviction for importation of marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. SS 952, 960 (1994), and importation of marijuana with intent to distribute, see id. S 841(a)(1), on the ground that the government infringed upon his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. In particular, Whitehead contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his post-arrest, preMiranda silence during the government's case-in-chief, and that it further erred when it permitted the prosecutor to comment on this silence during closing argument. Whitehead also argues that the district court erred in failing to grant use immunity to his brother, proposed defense witness Jason Whitehead, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the 28 U.S.C. S 546(d) appointment of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. II, S 2, cl. 2. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we affirm.
On June 8, 1998, at approximately 11:45 p.m., Whitehead attempted to enter the United States from Mexico at the Calexico, California Port of Entry. He drove a red 1988 Hyundai Excel to the border, and his 17-year-old brother Jason was his only passenger. Whitehead responded to questions from government officials at primary inspection and again at secondary inspection; however, after he was placed in custody, and before he received warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Whitehead remained silent.
As Whitehead drove up to primary inspection, INS Inspector Sean Hildenbrand noticed that When Whitehead complied with a request that he open the car's trunk, Inspector Hildenbrand discovered that it too was empty. Inspector Hildenbrand found it unusual that both the interior and trunk of Whitehead's vehicle were empty. Moreover, Whitehead appeared nervous, and when asked, Whitehead stated that he did not know who owned the Hyundai. Based on these factors, Inspector Hildenbrand referred Whitehead to the secondary inspection lot.
At secondary inspection, a narcotics-detector dog screened Whitehead's car and alerted to the rear of the vehicle. United States Customs Service Inspector Robert Garcia and another official then escorted Whitehead and his brother to the secondary office, placing the two in custody for the purposes of Miranda1. Once inside the office, Inspector Garcia frisked Whitehead and searched his wallet and shoes, but he did not find anything unusual. During this time, Whitehead did not speak.
Inspector Garcia next searched the Hyundai. Underneath the rear bumper, he found several brick-shaped packages wrapped in cellophane, and inside these packages, he discovered a green, leafy substance that field-tested positive for marijuana. Inspector Garcia immediately returned to the secondary office, had Whitehead and his brother remove their shoes and belts, and placed the two men in separate holding cells. Whitehead continued to remain silent.
Inspector Garcia then completed his search of Whitehead's vehicle, finding fifteen cellophane-wrapped packages concealed in the front and rear bumpers and rear doors. These packages contained 54.85 pounds of marijuana.
On July 8, 1988, the United States filed a two-count indictment against Whitehead in the Southern District of California. Count One charged importation of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 952, 960. Count Two charged possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1).
During trial, Whitehead subpoenaed his brother Jason to testify. After Jason first invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, Whitehead requested that the district court order the government to grant use immunity to Jason. The district court refused, and the government declined to provide immunity voluntarily. The following day, Jason Whitehead changed his mind and indicated to the district court that he was willing to testify. After taking the witness stand and answering several questions, however, Jason again invoked the Fifth Amendment. On the government's motion, the district court struck Jason Whitehead's entire testimony from the record.
A jury found Whitehead guilty on both counts of the indictment, and the district court sentenced him to thirteen months in custody, ordered him to serve three years of supervised release, and required him to pay a $200.00 penalty assessment. This appeal followed.
As noted above, it is undisputed that after he was taken into custody for the purposes of Miranda, but before he was read the Miranda warnings, Whitehead exercised his right to remain silent. Whitehead argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence of that silence during the government's case-in-chief. The prosecutor solicited the following testimony from Inspector Garcia:
Q. Now, during that time that you physically escorted the defendant to the holding cell and frisked him down, searched his wallet, took off his shoes and searched them, did the defendant ever ask you what was going on?
A. No.
Q. Did the defendant ever ask you what was the matter?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever ask you what you found in the car?
A. No. . . . .
Q. So you go in, take off their shoes, take off their belts, and put them both in holding cell[s]?
A. Yes.
Q. At that point, did they ask you what's going on?
A. No.
Q. Did they ask you what you found in the car?
A. No.
Q. Did they ask you why they were being arrested?
A. No.
During closing, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Whitehead remained silent because he knew he was guilty:
And then what do they do? Inspector Garcia leads him in there, pats him down -you know, T.V.- takes off his shoes and his belt and puts him in a cell.
What do you do at that point? What do I do? What would anyone of us do? What is going on here? What the heck is going on? Why I am being treated like this? Why am I being arrested? But you don't say that, if you know; and the defendant didn't say a word because he knew. He knew there were drugs in the car.
We must review Whitehead's claim that this use of his silence was in error under the plain-error standard, because he did not properly object in the district court. See United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.), amended by 161 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376 (1999); United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Evid. 103(d); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Nor did Whitehead preserve this objection through his pretrial motion in limine to suppress statements, because that motion challenged only "his statements given to Customs Inspector Garcia in the secondary inspection area," (emphasis added), and not the evidence at issue in this appeal: his silence while being escorted to the secondary office and being placed in a holding cell.
Under the plain-error standard,
[T]here must be (1) "error," (2) that is "plain," and (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights." If all three con ditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integ rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."
Plunk, 153 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted))) (alterations in original). Although we find that the district court committed "error" that is "plain," we cannot conclude that the error affected Whitehead's substantial rights.
In Douglas v. Cupp, 578 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1978), we held that "the fact of silence in the face of arrest" without reference to Miranda warnings could not be used as substantive evidence of guilt, because that would "act[ ] as an impermissible penalty on the exercise of the . . . right to remain silent." Id. at 267. Although it was not clear in Douglas whether the silence that was erroneously admitted into evidence was preor post-Miranda, Douglas's import was plain: regardless whether the Miranda warnings were actually given, comment on the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent was unconstitutional. See id.; accord United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 384-89 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ( ); United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 322-24 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); see also Mitchell v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 1319 n.2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ( ); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966) (...
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