Dionne v. Simmons

Citation200 F.3d 738
Decision Date11 January 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98-6136,98-6136
Parties(11th Cir. 2000) In Re Ruby Mae SIMMONS, Debtor. Donald L. Dionne, as the Trustee, of the Bankrupt Estate of Ruby Mae Simmons, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ruby Mae Simmons, a.k.a. Ruby Mae Simmons Rashid, and Abdul R. Rashid, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.(No. 98-MC-0331-W), U.W. Clemon, Judge.

Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and OWENS*, Senior District Judge.

OWENS, Senior District Judge:

This case requires that we review a district court order that without the benefit of reviewing the record or holding a hearing on the merits, withdrew the reference to the bankruptcy court. The district court order also reversed the bankruptcy court's order denying the debtor's motion to dismiss, and refused the bankruptcy court's recommendation that the debtor be held in contempt. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

I.Background

This case arises from Ruby Mae Simmons' (the "Debtor") sixth filing for bankruptcy dating back to March 1988. Before us is her most recent Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 701-766, which was preceded by five separate voluntary filings under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 11 U.S.C. 1301-1330 (1994).

The Debtor owned a home mortgaged to S. Lee Pake. The Debtor defaulted on her mortgage and Pake began proceedings in Alabama state court to dispossess her and obtain damages due to the default. On July 16, 1997, a hearing was held in the state court action. The following day that court entered an order divesting the Debtor of the property, and vesting title and possession of the home in Pake. The court set a hearing for damages to be held on July 29, 1997.

The day before the hearing was to be held, Debtor filed a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. This automatically stayed the proceedings in state court. The case was assigned to Judge Bennett in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama.2 In her petition for relief the Debtor identified her only creditor as Pake. The following day Pake filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case, but this motion was denied. The bankruptcy court appointed Donald L. Dionne as trustee (the "Trustee"), and because the Debtor had listed no assets for distribution, a Bankruptcy Rule 2002(e) notice was sent to creditors.3

On August 28, 1997, Pake moved for relief from the automatic stay. This motion was granted on September 11, 1997, and as a result the Debtor was evicted from her home. Pake then obtained a judgment of $19,892.64 for damages in the state court proceeding.

On September 24, 1997, at a 341 meeting, the Debtor admitted that she owed monies to at least four other creditors not listed on her petition: Tucker Motors, Liborious Agwana, Alabama Power, and a student loan lender.

On October 22, 1997, the Debtor made a motion to dismiss her Chapter 7 proceeding, and the Trustee objected to the dismissal. The Trustee had become aware that the Debtor possessed two automobiles and a bank account, causing him to pursue an investigation into the location of one of the Debtor's vehicles, a 1994 Cadillac, which she had not listed on her petition. The Trustee also initiated two adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy court to obtain possession of the 1994 Cadillac and to obtain deposit account monies. The bankruptcy court issued a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to order the Debtor to turn over the Cadillac, monies, and accounts to the Trustee.

On October 29, 1997, the Debtor amended her motion to dismiss claiming her only creditor (Pake) had been relieved from the stay. The motion to dismiss was denied on November 5, 1997.

The Trustee attempted to depose the Debtor on February 5, 1998, to obtain information that would lead to the location of the 1994 Cadillac, which supposedly was in the possession of the Debtor's husband Abdul Rashid. The Debtor did not show up for the deposition. The Debtor was brought before the bankruptcy court on February 9, 1998, by the U.S. Marshal, but she refused to answer any questions, claiming she had a privilege against self-incrimination. The next day the Debtor again asserted her privilege and refused to be deposed.4

On February 10, 1998, the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court issued notice under F.R. Bankr.P. 3002(c)(5)5 requesting that all parties file their claims because assets had been located. According to the Trustee, creditors filed six proofs of claims totaling $22,653.58.6

The Debtor continuously denied any knowledge of the whereabouts of the Cadillac or her husband who supposedly was in possession of the car. The Trustee found evidence of at least 80 phone calls that the Debtor made to the Debtor's husband, as well as letters she addressed to him. The Bankruptcy Court submitted a report and recommendation that the Debtor be held in contempt of court until she divulged information regarding the location of her remaining assets. The report and recommendation of the bankruptcy court was forwarded to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on February 12, 1998.

The Trustee located and took possession of the 1994 Cadillac on February 17, 1998. Currently the Debtor's vehicles are being stored in a warehouse under the Trustee's control.

The bankruptcy court's recommendation and report was assigned to Judge U.W. Clemon on February 19, 1998. That same day, without a hearing and without giving notice to the trustee, Judge Clemon withdrew the reference of the case to the bankruptcy court and dismissed the entire bankruptcy case. The district court also refused to hold the debtor in contempt of court.

II.Discussion

This Court reviews the determination of law, whether from the bankruptcy court or the district court, de novo. See General Trading Inc. v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1494 (11th Cir.1997), and reviews the bankruptcy court's factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. See id.

A.Withdrawal of Reference

A district court may, for cause, withdraw the reference of a case or proceeding in bankruptcy under 28 U.S.C. 157(d) which provides:

The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organization or activities affecting interstate commerce.

28 U.S.C. 157(d) (1994) (emphasis added). The law of this circuit states that: "Once a bankruptcy court has assumed jurisdiction ... a district court may withdraw reference only 'for cause shown.' " In re Parklane/Atlanta Joint Venture, 927 F.2d 532, 536 (11th Cir.1991). Although cause is not defined in the statute, this court has found that it is not an empty requirement. See id. (requiring cause must be shown for the district court to withdraw the reference under 28 U.S.C. 157(d)).

As this court noted in Parklane:

Although this Court has not yet articulated criteria for determining the existence of cause for withdrawal, other courts have. In Holland America Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.1985), the Fifth Circuit noted in dicta that in determining whether cause existed a district court should consider such goals as advancing uniformity in bankruptcy administration, decreasing forum shopping and confusion, promoting the economical use of the parties' resources, and facilitating the bankruptcy process. Id. at 998

Parklane, 927 F.2d at 536 n. 5 (citations omitted). It can be inferred from the district court's memorandum order that the district court assumed there were no claims against the bankruptcy estate, and that the case was being handled inappropriately by the bankruptcy court. This assumption might be due to the fact that the district court never viewed the record before withdrawing the reference and dismissing the case. At the time the district court order was written, creditors still had 90 days to respond to the 3002(c)(5) notice, and file a claim. As shown earlier, at least six proofs of claim were filed in response to the 3002(c)(5) notice.7

None of the goals suggested in Holland America Ins. Co. were advanced by the district court's withdrawal. Dating back to 1988, this debtor had a history of grossly abusing the bankruptcy process. By withdrawing the reference, the district court did not facilitate the bankruptcy process. Instead, the district court decision hindered the process, and its actions threatened to allow the Debtor to once again evade her creditors, hardly promoting the most economical use of the parties' resources. The district court should have taken into consideration the possibility that claims might be filed against the bankruptcy estate before it withdrew the reference of the case.

We conclude that the case was not being handled inappropriately by the bankruptcy court, and the district court was mistaken in believing that it was. The bankruptcy court's actions were not cause for withdrawing the reference to the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. 157(d).

B.Contempt charges

The bankruptcy judge recommended that the Debtor be found in both civil and criminal contempt. The bankruptcy judge also recommended that the debtor be incarcerated to force her to turn over the 1994 Cadillac, the deposit monies, and her husband's location. The Cadillac, deposit monies, and her husband's location were all acquired by the Trustee soon after this recommendation was filed. The district court refused the recommendation for sanctions noting there was "no credible evidence that [the Debtor could] comply with the court order requiring her to disclose [the Cadillac's] location to ...

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