People v. Betson

• Decision Date: 14 February 1936
• Docket Number: No. 23208.,23208.
• Citation: 200 N.E. 594,362 Ill. 502
• Parties: PEOPLE v. BETSON.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

362 Ill. 502

200 N.E. 594

PEOPLE

v.BETSON.

No. 23208.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 14, 1936.

Error to Circuit Court, Peoria County; Henry Ingram, Judge.

James W. Betson was convicted of kidnapping and holding for ransom, and he brings error.

Affirmed.George W. Sprenger, of Peoria, for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., E. V. Champion, State's Atty., of Peoria, and A. B. Dennis, of Danvill (Henry E. Pratt, Roy P. Hull, and Baird Helfrich, all of Peoria, of counsel), for the People.

ORR, Justice.

James W. Betson, charged with kidnapping Dr. James W. Parker and holding him for ransom in 1932, was found guilty by a jury in the circuit court of Peoria county and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 25 years. He seeks a reversal of the judgment by this writ of error.

The record shows that Dr. Parker was kidnapped from the drive of his home in Peoria about 7 o'clock in the evening of March 14, 1932. He was seized by Claude Evans (alias Red Evans) and Arlo Stoops and driven in his own car to a point in Peoria, where he was transferred to a Chevrolet car belonging to Stoops. In this car he was driven by another defendant, Cecil Minninger, who had followed the Parker car on a portion of its journey. On the transfer of Dr. Parker from one car to the other he was blindfolded, and in that condition he was taken to a farm near Manito. At this farm, which had been leased by Raymond Stoops, he was held and guarded alternately by Raymond and Arlo Stoops, Minninger, Evans, Homer Massey, and Dwight Bartlett until the evening of April 1, when he was released near East Peoria, without any ransom being paid. While the doctor was held prisoner he was compelled by his captors to write letters to members of his family and friends seeking to raise the $50,000 demanded by the kidnappers.

About 11 o'clock p. m. on March 14, the wife of Dr. Parker received a telephone call at their home from a person identifying himself as ‘Double X.’ She was then informed her husband would not be home that night, was told where his car could be found, and that she would hear from him the following morning. At the same time Edward W. Ohl, a house officer at the Pere Marquette Hotel in Peoria, saw the defendant Betson and Arlo Stoops together in the bottom lobby of the hotel. He saw Betson enter a telephone booth and use the telephone while Stoops waited for him in the immediate vicinity. On the morning of March 15, Betson called in person at an automobile service station located directly across the street from his home and claimed and drove away the Chevrolet automobile of Arlo Stoops which had been used in the kidnapping, after paying the service attendant the sum of $1 for washing the automobile. On the afternoon of March 31, Betson was taken into custody by police officers without any protest on his part and taken to a residence located in Peoria. There he was placed in a room with Joseph Pursifull, a Peoria attorney, who was likewise in custody for the kidnapping. The two were presumably alone in the room while Pursifull talked to Betson, during which he made many accusations implicating the latter in the kidnapping. All of the accusations were undenied by Betson at the time of their utterance. As a matter of fact, during this meeting the two were under the surveillance of police officers looking through a peephole and what was said was listened to by them through a dictaphone. While the two men were in the room, Henry E. Pratt, state's attorney of Peoria county, entered the room and accused Pursifull and Betson of connection with the kidnapping. This accusation was not denied by either man.

On the morning of April 1, while he remained in custody, Betson was taken to his home by a police officer. While the two were there, Nellie Minninger, the wife of Cecil Minninger, arrived about 7:30 and Betson, upon two occasions, told her to ‘go to 120 Fifth street (the home of Arlo Stoops) and tell the boys to dump it tonight—early.’ Mrs. Minninger then went to this place and failing to find Arlo Stoops, met Homer Massey in downtown Peoria, on the same day, and delivered Betson's message to him. Minninger, the two Stoops, Evans, Bartlett, Massey, Betson, and Pursifull were all found guilty of the kidnapping, while three other defendants were found not guilty. All of the defendants were tried together and a number of confessions, which will be treated later, were introduced in evidence. The defendants' motions for a severance, new trial, and in arrest of judgment were all denied.

The indictment consisted of five counts. The first was nolle prossed by the people. The second count is objected to because it does not use the word ‘feloniously’; the third count is defective, according to the defendant, because it does use the word ‘feloniously,’ but charges in effect that Dr. Parker kidnapped himself; the fourth count is attacked because it does not charge a crime in the words of the statute, there being a failure to use the words ‘seize,’ ‘unlawfully,’ and also the word ‘feloniously’; and the fifth count is allegedly bad because words of the statute, i. e., ‘seize,’ ‘unlawfully,’ and ‘feloniously’ were not used. Thus, according to defendant, there were no good counts in the indictment, and the trial court erred in overruling his motion to quash.

It is first argued by defendant that kidnapping for ransom was a felony under the common law, and that therefore it is necessary to charge that the kidnapping was done ‘feloniously.’ This contention is untenable for there is no such crime as a common-law felony in Illinois. All felonies in this state are defined by, and required to be prosecuted under, our Criminal Code (Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 38, § 1 et seq.). Therefore, every indictment for a felony must be construed in accordance therewith. People v. Connors, 301 Ill. 112, 133 N.E. 639;People v. Corder, 306 Ill. 264, 137 N.E. 845. The second, fourth, and fifth counts laid the charge in the exact words of the statute creating the crime. Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 38, §§ 386, 716. The statute creating the crime for kidnapping for ransom is divisible into two parts. The fourth and fifth counts of the indictment were in the exact words of the second part, while the second count was laid in the exact words of the first part. The use of the word ‘feloniously’ is not necessary in charging a felony under the Criminal Code. People v. Connors, supra.

The third count charged the crime of kidnapping for ransom under the first part of the statute, using the exact words thereof with the exception that the word ‘feloniously’ preceded the words ‘wilfully’ and ‘unlawfully.’ The allegation of defendant that this count charges Dr. Parker with kidnapping himself is puerile. An examination of the count will show this is not the case if it is read with such proper punctuation as was included therein. After naming the defendants, the count charges that they on ‘the 14th day of March, in the year of our Lord, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-two, at and within the county aforesaid, one James Parker, feloniously, wilfully, unlawfully and forcibly seized and secretly confined,’ etc. The questioned counts of the indictment were legally sufficient and plainly conveyed to defendant notice of the nature of the offense, the persons charged therewith, and the person kidnapped. This is all the law requires. People v. Wood, 318 Ill. 388, 149 N.E. 273.

The defendant assigns 27 errors, but we shall direct our attention only to those briefed and argued in this court. In considering the allegations that the trial court erred in not granting the motion for a severance, in order that defendant could have a separate trial, we find that the motion and affidavit did not disclose that his defense was to be antagonistic to that of his codefendants. It did not show any substantial reason why a severance should be granted, other than his desire not to be tried with his codefendants. He believed such coprosecution to be prejudicial to him, but gave no grounds therefor, except by intimating that statements or confessions of other codefendants might be used prejudicially against him. The record is conclusive that there was no antagonistic defense for the reason that no affirmative defense was offered by any of the other defendants. Betson concedes it would be the general rule of law that all defendants who are jointly indicted should be tried jointly, and that the matter of granting a separate trial to a codefendant rests within the sound discretion of the court and may not be assigned as error, in the absence of abuse of such discretion. A trial court will pass upon a motion for a separate trial only upon the grounds advanced in its support at the time the motion is made. This court, unless the facts were not then known, will not reverse a judgment and order a separate trial unless all the reasons therefor were presented to the consideration of the trial court. People v. Nusbaum, 326 Ill. 518, 158 N.E. 142. The right to a severance must rest upon the ground that the defense to be offered by one defendant is so antagonistic to the defense to be offered by the remainder of the defendants that severance is necessary to insure a fair trial. People v. Lawson, 331 Ill. 380, 163 N.E. 149;People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 216, 172 N.E. 743;People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539. The motion and affidavit presented to the trial court were insufficient in law, and there was no abuse of discretion in refusing the severance.

After the motion for a separate trial had been overruled, the trial court had to consider the use of certain confessions and statements by the people. A hearing was held upon the matter out of the presence of the jury. The state's attorney tole the court that any reference in the confessions or statements they might offer, which mentioned another defendant's name, would be eliminated. This offer was not restricted, but it encompassed evidence of any kind to be offered by ...