State of Missouri v. State of Illinois
| Decision Date | 19 February 1906 |
| Docket Number | No. 4,O,4 |
| Citation | 26 S.Ct. 268,200 U.S. 496,50 L.Ed. 572 |
| Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI, Complainant, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS and The Sanitary District of Chicago, Defts. riginal |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Sam B. Jeffries, Charles W. Bates, Herbert S. Hadley, N. T. Gentry, and W. F. Woerner for complainant.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 497-510 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. H. J. Hamlin and W. H. Stead for the state of Illinois.
Messrs. James Todd and John G. Drennan for sanitary district of Chicago.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 510-517 intentionally omitted]
This is a suit brought by the state of Missouri to restrain the discharge of the sewage of Chicago through an artificial channel into the Desplaines river, in the state of Illinois. That river empties into the Illinois river, and the latter empties into the Mississippi at a point about 43 miles above the city of St. Louis. It was alleged in the bill that the result of the threatened discharge would be to send 1,500 tons of poisonous filth daily into the Mississippi, to deposit great quantities of the same upon the part of the bed of the lastnamed river belonging to the plaintiff, and so to poison the water of that river, upon which various of the plaintiff's cities, towns, and inhabitants depended, as to make it unfit for drinking, agricultural, or manufacturing purposes. It was alleged that the defendant sanitary district was acting in pursuance of a statute of the state of Illinois, and as an agency of that state. The case is stated at length in 180 U. S. 208, 45 L. ed. 497, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 331, where a demurrer to the bill was overruled. A supplemental bill alleges that since the filing of the original bill the drainage canal has been opened and put into operation, and has produced and is producing all the evils which were apprehended when the injunction first was asked. The answers deny the plaintiff's case, allege that the new plan sends the water of the Illinois river into the Mississippi much purer than it was before, that many towns and cities of the plaintiff along the Missouri and Mississippi discharge their sewage into those rivers, and that if there is any trouble the plaintiff must look nearer home for the cause.
The decision upon the demurrer discussed mainly the jurisdiction of the court, and, as leave to answer was given when the demurrer was overruled, naturally there was no very precise consideration of the principles of law to be applied if the plaintiff should prove its case. That was left to the future,
with the general intimation that the nuisance must be made out upon determinate and satisfactory evidence, that it must not be doubtful, and that the danger must be shown to be real and immediate. The nuisance set forth in the bill was one which would be of international importance,—a visible change of a great river from a pure stream into a polluted and poisoned ditch. The only question presented was whether, as between the states of of the Union, this court was competent to deal with a situation which, if it arose between independent sovereignties, might lead to war. Whatever differences of opinion there might be upon matters of detail, the jurisdiction and authority of this court to deal with such a case as that is not open to doubt. But the evidence now is in, the actual facts have required for their establishment the most ingenious experiments, and for their interpretation the most subtle speculations, of modern science, and therefore it becomes necessary at the present stage to consider somewhat more nicely than heretofore how the evidence in it is to be approached.
The first question to be answered was put in the well known case of the Wheeling bridge. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. 13 How. 518, 14 L. ed. 249. In that case, also, there was a bill brought by a state to restrain a public nuisance,—the erection of a bridge alleged to obstruct navigation,—and a supplemental bill to abate it after it was erected. The question was put most explicitly by the dissenting judges, but it was accepted by all as fundamental. The Chief Justice observed that if the bridge was a nuisance, it was an offense against the sovereignty whose laws had been violated, and he asked what sovereignty that was. 13 How. 561, 14 L. ed. 267; Daniel, J., 13 How. 599, 14 L. ed. 283. See also Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 46 L. ed. 838, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552. It could not be Virginia, because that state had purported to authorize it by statute. The Chief Justice found no prohibition by the United States. 13 How. 508, 14 L. ed. 275. No third source of law was suggested by anyone. The majority accepted the Chief Justice's postulate, and found an answer in what Congress had done.
It hardly was disputed that Congress could deal with the
matter under its power to regulate commerce. The majority observed that although Congress had not declared in terms that a state should not obstruct the navigation of the Ohio by bridges, yet it had regulated navigation upon that river in various ways, and had sanctioned the compact between Virginia and Kentucky when Kentucky was let into the Union. By that compact the use and navigation of the Ohio, so far as the territory of either state lay thereon, was to be free and common to the citizens of the United States. The compact, by the sanction of Congress, had become a law of the Union. A state law which violated it was unconstitutional. Obstructing the navigation of the river was said to violate it, and it was added that more was not necessary to give a civil remedy for an injury done by the obstruction. 13 How. 565, 566, 14 L. ed. 268, 269. At a later stage of the case, after Congress had authorized the bridge, it was stated again in so many words that the ground of the former decision was that 18 How. 421, 429, 15 L. ed. 435, 436.
In the case at bar, whether Congress could act or not, there is no suggestion that it has forbidden the action of Illinois. The only ground on which that state's conduct can be called in question is one which must be implied from the words of the Constitution. The Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to controversies between two or more states, and between a state and citizens of another state, and gives this court original jurisdiction in cases in which a state shall be a party. Therefore, if one state raises a controversy with another, this court must determine whether there is any principle of law, and, if any, what, on which the plaintiff can recover. But the fact that this court must decide does not mean, of course, that it takes the place of a legislature. Some principles it must have power to declare. For instance, when a dispute arises about boundaries, this court must determine the line; and, in doing so, must be governed by rules explicitly
or implicitly recognized. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 737, 9 L. ed. 1233, 1265. It must follow and apply those rules, even if legislation of one or both of the states seems to stand in the way. But the words of the Constitution would be a narrow ground upon which to construct and apply to the relations between states the same system of municipal law in all its details which would be applied between individuals. If we suppose a case which did not fall within the power of Congress to regulate, the result of a declaration of rights by this court would be the establishment of a rule which would be irrevocable by any power except that of this court to reverse its own decision, an amendment of the Constitution, or possibly an agreement between the States, sanctioned by the legislature of the United States.
The difficulties in the way of establishing such a system of law might not be insuperable, but they would be great and new. Take the question of prescription in a case like the present. The reasons on which prescription for a public nuisance is denied or may be granted to an individual as against the sovereign power to which he is subject have no application to an independent state. See 1 Oppenheim, International Law. 293, §§ 242, 243. It would be contradicting a fundamental principle of human nature to allow no effect to the lapse of time, however long (Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451, 457, 48 L. ed. 1067, 1071, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692), yet the fixing of a definite time usually belongs to the legislature rather than the courts. The courts did fix a time in the rule against perpetuities, but the usual course, as in the instances of statutes of limitation, the duration of patents, the age of majority, etc., is to depend upon the lawmaking power.
It is decided that a case such as is made by the bill may be a ground for relief. The purpose of the foregoing observations is not to lay a foundation for departing from that decision, but simply to illustrate the great and serious caution with which it is necessary to approach the question whether a case is proved. It may be imagined that a nuisance might be created by a state upon a navigable river like the Danube, which would
amount to a casus belli for a state lower down, unless removed. If such a nuisance were created by a state upon the Mississippi, the controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means of a suit in this court. But it does not follow that every matter which would warrant a resort to equity by one citizen against another in the same jurisdiction equally would warrant an interference by this court with the action of a state. It hardly can be that we should be justified in declaring statutes ordaining such action void in every instance where the circuit court might intervene in a private suit, upon no other ground than analogy to some selected...
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