Williams v. Kelso

• Decision Date: 19 November 1999
• Docket Number: BOOK-IN
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2000) JAMES HOWARD WILLIAMS, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JULIAN VAUGHN WILLIAMS, APPELLEE, v. KENTON KELSO, LIEUTENANT, CHIEF JAIL ADMINISTRATOR; JOHN KOPP,OFFICER; MENTAL HEALTH RISK RETENTION GROUP; COUNSELING ASSOCIATES; ANDREA BECKER, M.S.; PETER EDWARDS, M.D. APPELLANTS. NOS. 99-1272EA, 99-2529EA Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1060

201 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2000)

JAMES HOWARD WILLIAMS, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JULIAN VAUGHN WILLIAMS, APPELLEE, v. KENTON KELSO, LIEUTENANT, CHIEF JAIL ADMINISTRATOR; JOHN KOPP, BOOK-IN OFFICER; MENTAL HEALTH RISK RETENTION GROUP; COUNSELING ASSOCIATES; ANDREA BECKER, M.S.; PETER EDWARDS, M.D. APPELLANTS.

NOS. 99-1272EA, 99-2529EA

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: November 19, 1999

Filed: January 27, 2000

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied March 23, 2000

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Richard S. Arnold, WELLFORD¹, and Beam, Circuit Judges.

Harry W. Wellford, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff's decedent, Julian Vaughn Williams, was arrested in Faulkner County, Arkansas, on misdemeanor charges, essentially a drunken assault upon his wife, and was booked into defendant Faulkner County Detention Facility ("FCDF") on July 22, 1994. Upon arriving, Williams appeared to be "disoriented," "confused," and somewhat separated from reality, although he had short spells of coherency. Williams was placed in a cell with other misdemeanor inmates. On July 26, 1994, early in the morning after continued periods of erratic and unusual conduct, an apparent altercation broke out between Williams and another inmate after Williams experienced hallucinations and heard "voices" during the night. Williams received cuts, abrasions, bruises and related head injuries, either from a fight or from throwing himself against the cell bars.² Jail personnel transported him to the emergency room at the Conway Regional Medical Center ("Medical Center") where he was treated and released with instructions for further treatment at defendant Counseling Associates, Inc. ("CA").

Defendant Andrea Becker, a CA psychologist, performed a screening and mental health evaluation of Williams around 8:00 a.m. on July 26. Thereafter, defendant Peter Edwards, M.D., a psychiatrist, consulted with Becker, who deemed Williams to be suffering from intermittent psychosis, and she devised a provisional treatment plan, including separation at jail and placement in a detoxification program. It should be noted that there is disagreement between Becker and Edwards regarding the latter's recommendation; Edwards claims he advised hospitalization, monitoring, and checking vital signs every four to six hours. For purposes of summary judgment the district court assumed that Becker gave instructions at approximately 11:00 a.m. on the 26th for the jail to isolate Williams, have a nurse check his vital signs, and return him to the emergency room if his blood pressure increased. Williams was isolated but his vital signs were never checked in the nearly seven hours between Becker's instructions and Williams' death. According to the district judge, "plaintiff does not allege that the FCDF ever received instructions to watch Williams at all times." Nonetheless, FCDF personnel observed Williams throughout the day on the 26th, including around 5:40 p.m. when FCDF Chief Administrator Lieutenant Kenton Kelso spoke with Williams. At approximately 5:45 p.m. Kelso returned to Williams' cell to transport him to the detoxification facility that had informed Becker, around 5:00 p.m., of an availability for Williams; however, Kelso found Williams unconscious and immediately had medics alerted and began performing C.P.R. Williams was pronounced dead on the evening of the 26th, and his death, caused by asphyxiation on toilet paper he lodged in his throat, was classified as suicide.

The two separate appeals considered herein were consolidated for argument and submission. Defendants appeal, in case number 99-1272, the district court's denial of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim of "deliberate indifference to Williams' safety based on his initial placement with other inmates" which was asserted against Kelso, Kopp, certain named and unnamed FCDF inmates and employees, and certain unnamed CA employees. Plaintiff claimed violations of the Eighth Amendment from Kelso's alleged failure to train and Kopp's alleged failure to protect based on his not segregating Williams upon book-in. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).

In case number 99-2529 plaintiff cross-appeals from the district court's summary judgment granted to defendants on the § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs based on failure to check Williams' vital signs. Any actions alleged, or failure to act, on the part of the county officials with respect to their failure to check Williams' vital signs, including the alleged "failure to implement sufficient policy," the district court deemed to be negligence, or a "mere negligent failure," and not a constitutional violation. See Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 937 (8th Cir. 1999). This cross-appeal also challenges the district court's dismissal without prejudice of the state law claims, which plaintiff asserts form the same case or controversy as the Eighth Amendment claims, and this claim added defendants Mental Health Risk Retention Group, CA, Becker, Edwards, and certain named and unnamed insurance companies. Plaintiff's attempt to proceed with an interlocutory appeal was denied by this court in Williams v. Blankenship, No. 98-8110 EACR (8th Cir. July 20, 1998). We have jurisdiction over this cross-appeal, because it is pendent to defendants' interlocutory appeal; its issues are "inextricably intertwined" with the issues of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, § 1983, and qualified immunity. See Murphy v. State, 127 F.3d 750, 753 (8th Cir. 1997).

I. NO. 2529

We first discuss the appeal by plaintiff on the summary judgment granted defendants on the cruel and inhuman treatment claim, regarding failure to give medical treatment in case of a known serious risk. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125, 1126 (8th Cir. 1998). We examine the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Essentially, we must determine whether there is a material fact or question of law that would preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff concedes that the burden rests upon him to show such material fact or question of law when qualified immunity is claimed, as in this case, by defendants. See Webb v. Lawrence County, 144 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Plaintiff's burden, then, on his federal claim of constitutional deliberate indifference under § 1983 is to "demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered objectively serious medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs." Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)).

Plaintiff contends "that there are inconsistent facts regarding the only issue in this case--Julian Vaughn Williams' medically prescribed treatment." There is a factual dispute as to whether Becker gave jail officials, specifically Kopp, instructions to check his vital signs.³ The district court properly, however, presumed in plaintiff's favor that Becker did give such instructions, and about seven hours passed without Williams' vital signs being checked before his suicide. Dr. Edwards maintained that he recommended to Becker that vital signs be checked every four to six hours. The failure to follow this instruction over a period of about seven hours, we agree with the district court, was a matter of negligence at most; there was not a showing of deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff, in his brief, "contends that the jailors' state of mind is a factual issue for the jury to decide." However, the law requires that plaintiff make a showing of subjective awareness by the prison officials of a "substantial risk" of "serious harm" to a prisoner in order to establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference cause of action, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828 (emphasis added), and we determine liability under the standard enumerated in light of defendant prison officials' demonstrated "attitudes and conduct" after the July 26 injury suffered by Williams. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). In this case, plaintiff has demonstrated no state of mind of Kelso or Kopp that is "more blameworthy than negligence." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Under Kelso's supervision, prison officials gave Williams his medication (Dilantin); placed him in the misdemeanor section of the jail; regularly observed him; when he was injured, had him examined by a hospital, a psychologist, and a psychiatrist; and were in the process of transferring him to a treatment center when the suicide occurred. Plaintiff did not show any "reckless disregard" of a known substantial risk on Kelso's or Kopp's part. Id. at 836.

The only contention of deliberate indifference is that vital signs were not checked for a period of over six hours. It is true that plaintiff points to expert medical testimony that it is very important to follow medical instructions in this regard; such directions are "essential." We assume that this is the case, but it was not error to determine this oversight (contested factually) to be negligence and short of deliberate indifference as a matter of law. At best, plaintiff's proof in this appeal amounts to negligent conduct, not deliberate or willful conduct on Kopp's or Kelso's part. Plaintiff did not demonstrate in this record "that prison officers actually knew of [serious medical needs] but deliberately disregarded those needs." Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). Williams gave no overt indication that he was a suicide risk from our examination of the record. As...