201 F.3d 428 (1st Cir. 1999), 99-1056, Platt v. State of Maine
|Citation:||201 F.3d 428|
|Party Name:||Thomas PLATT, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. The STATE of Maine, Defendant, Appellee.|
|Case Date:||November 04, 1999|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the First Circuit|
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA1 Rule 36 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maine, Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge.
John A. Ciraldo, with whom Jennifer L. Sanders and Perkins, Thompson, Hinckley & Keddy were on brief for appellant.
Charles K. Leadbetter, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, CYR, Senior Circuit Judge, and HILL, [*] Senior Circuit Judge.
Thomas Platt appeals from a district court order which dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
In the early morning hours of July 17, 1994, two persons wearing camouflage net masks entered the office of the Econo-Lodge in Bangor, Maine, accosted the desk clerk with a knife, and made off with $1000 in cash. In due course, Platt and his friends, Robert King and Dale Braley, were arrested and charged with Class A robbery under Maine law. After entering into plea agreements with state and federal prosecutors, King and Braley were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
At Platt's state court trial, King invoked the Fifth Amendment on the ground that he could be placed in jeopardy of future federal prosecution. The trial judge accordingly declared King an unavailable witness and the State introduced the transcript of a January 1995 police interview in which King described how he and Platt had robbed the Econo-Lodge while Braley waited in the car.
In order to safeguard Platt's rights under the Confrontation Clause, see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (admission of nontestifying codefendant's statements incriminating the defendant violates Confrontation Clause), the King statement was redacted to replace references to "Platt" with two asterisks (* *). When the King statement was read to the jury the two asterisks were referred to as "some person." Dale Braley testified that Platt and King had entered the motel while Braley waited in his car.
After Platt was convicted and sentenced to twelve years in prison, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected his Bruton-based appeal in State v. Platt, 704 A.2d 370 (Me.1997). Three days before the SJC decision became final, however, the United States Supreme Court had issued its decision in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998), which held that the use of incriminating statements obtained from nontestifying codefendants violates the defendant's right of confrontation even though the prosecution redacts their statements by replacing the defendant's name with a neutral symbol. Id. at 1157.
Thereafter, Platt petitioned for habeas corpus relief in federal district court, contending that Gray required reversal of his state-court conviction. Although the district court denied the petition, it issued a certificate of appealability.
The Federal Habeas Corpus Standard
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 narrowed the conditions in which state-court convictions may be reviewed in federal habeas corpus proceedings, by providing that the writ not be granted unless the state court's "adjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). See O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.1998).
The parties agree that the admission of King's redacted statement into evidence violated Platt's rights under the Confrontation Clause if the Gray decision itself then constituted a "clearly established" Supreme Court precedent. But the parties disagree as to whether section 2254 requires that the pertinent Supreme Court precedent need have been decided by the time the state court rendered its confrontation-clause ruling, or thereafter but before the state-court conviction became "final."
Although Platt was tried prior to the Gray decision, the state-court judgment did not become final until March 12, 1998, three days after Gray was decided. On an earlier occasion we deferred a ruling on this issue of first impression. See id. at 20 n. 3. We now do so once again, as the admission of the King statement into evidence amounted at most to harmless error.
Harmless Error 1
Platt argues that admission of the King statement was not harmless error, since the remaining evidence of his complicity in the Econo-Lodge robbery was not trustworthy. The burden rests with the State to establish that the putativeBruton-Gray error had no " 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict,' " or that it "was [not] of such magnitude that it actually casts doubt on the integrity of the verdict." Sinnott v. Duval, 139 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1998) (citation omitted). Normally, we focus our analysis on three criteria: "(1) the extent to which the error permeated the proceeding, (2) the centrality of the issue affected by the error to the case as actually tried and (3) the relative strength of the properly admitted evidence of guilt." Levasseur v. Pepe, 70 F.3d 187, 193 (1st Cir.1995).
1. The Robert King Statement
At a post-arrest interview in January 1995, Robert King provided the following version of the Econo-Lodge robbery: On the evening of July 16, 1994, King and his friends, Dale Braley and Timothy Boudreau, were driving...
To continue readingFREE SIGN UP