Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Laboratories

Decision Date05 January 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-2215,99-2215
Citation201 F.3d 883
Parties(7th Cir. 2000) Mead Johnson & Company, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Abbott Laboratories, Defendant-Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division. No. EV 98-131-C H/H--David F. Hamilton, Judge.

Before Bauer, Easterbrook, and Kanne, Circuit Judges.

Easterbrook, Circuit Judge.

"1st Choice of Doctors", in a blue ribbon on a product's packaging, conveys the message that more physicians prefer this product than any of its rivals. Does (must?) this phrase mean something more--for example, that a majority of all physicians prefer the product, or that the preference is strong or based on particular grounds? The phrase appears on the packaging of Similac, an infant formula made by the Ross Pediatrics division of Abbott Laboratories. More than a score of surveys show that pediatricians prefer Similac over Enfamil, the second-place formula (made by Mead Johnson), with all other competitors far behind. Many of these surveys show that Similac attracts majority support; most show that two physicians prefer Similac for every one who chooses Enfamil. But the district court nonetheless held that "1st Choice of Doctors" violates sec.43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. sec.1125(a)(1), because it implies to consumers that a majority of physicians strongly prefer the product for strictly professional reasons. 41 F. Supp. 2d 879 (S.D. Ind. 1999). All of the surveys that show majority support are inadequate, the judge concluded, because they were designed to elicit either weak preferences or those based on grounds other than medical judgment about quality. Other surveys, designed to eliminate slight or non-medical preferences, show that Similac enjoys only plurality support among physicians. A regular 2-to-1 margin is not enough to permit Abbott to make the "1st Choice" claim, the court held, and issued a preliminary injunction. In politics this would be a landslide: Bill Clinton was the "1st Choice of Voters" at the 1992 and 1996 Presidential elections even though he received less than half of the popular vote (43% in 1992, 49% in 1996). But in marketing, according to the district court, a product must have majority support to be "first."

In English, "first" is ordinal. It denotes rank in a series. A runner who crosses the finish line ahead of all others is "first" even if the race is slow and ends in a photo finish. A TV series ranks first in its time slot if it has a larger audience than any other series, even though there are so many networks, independent stations, and cable channels that no sitcom or drama attracts an absolute majority of viewers. A political candidate who receives more votes than the next- most-popular candidate finishes first, and for most offices a first-place finish is enough for election. Similac therefore is the "1st Choice of Doctors" according to ordinary usage. Perhaps a truthful claim of this kind could be misleading, and therefore actionable under sec.43(a)(1), if both absolute and relative levels of preference were small. Suppose 1.1% of pediatricians preferred Similac, 1% preferred Enfamil, 0.9% preferred some other formula, and 97% thought that all of the infant formulas were functionally identical. But absolute and relative preferences for Similac are substantial. Even if, like the district court, we throw out the surveys finding that a majority of medical professionals recommend Similac, the remaining surveys find that between 25% and 48% of those questioned rank Similac first, while Enfamil is the preference of between 10% and 40% of the respondents and never beats Similac. Surveys designed to elicit weaker preferences show that Similac receives between 51% and 64% support and Enfamil from 29% to 37%, so the roughly two-to-one ratio is not sensitive to methodology. Pediatricians may believe (as Abbott contends) that Similac is better tolerated by infants (i.e., less likely to induce unpleasant side effects such as gas, fussiness, and loose stools) and therefore is better in practice, even though clinical tests do not find nutritional differences and experts agree that both products are of high quality. No matter. When the absolute level of preference for the leading product is high, and the difference in support from the medical profession substantial, it is all but impossible to call the claim of "first choice" misleading.

Unless the meaning of language is itself a question of fact, to be determined by survey evidence. And this is what the district court concluded after a three-day hearing on the request for interlocutory relief. Mead Johnson commissioned a survey, which was administered at malls in 16 cities across the United States to women who either had recently purchased infant formula or contemplated doing so during the next year. The district court's opinion describes this survey in detail, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 887-92, so we summarize. Interviewers asked two sequences of questions. The first was open-ended. After identifying "1st Choice of Doctors" as the subject, interviewers asked consumers "what you understand this part of the label to communicate to you." Most of the answers were treated as variations on "higher quality," if not medical superiority. The second sequence opened with the query: "in order for [the "1st Choice"] statement to be true, what percent of those doctors would have had to say that this product was their first choice?" More than 80% of the participants replied that at least a majority would have to prefer the product. The district court concluded from this survey that the claim "1st Choice of Doctors" conveyed to consumers the message that at least a majority of physicians prefer Similac on grounds of qualitative superiority. Then the judge scrutinized the surveys of physicians to see whether Abbott's claim, thus understood, had been substantiated. The judge found not, because surveys finding that a majority of surveyed physicians prefer Similac were not designed to ensure that the preference was based on Similac's superiority, while surveys that limited the grounds of preference did not show majority support for Similac.

Abbott insists that because it has been applying the phrase "1st Choice of Doctors" (or a variant) to Similac for a decade, Mead Johnson's suit is barred by laches. Yet because a product's promotion must be true and non- misleading at the time of sale, the packaging's history cannot preclude a challenge. Suppose that when Abbott adopted the phrase physicians preferred Similac, but by the time suit was filed a decade later Enfamil had gained the lead in surveys of the medical profession. Similac then could not be labeled as physicians' first choice. Laches would supply a defense if nothing had changed over time (and if the other elements of that defense, such as prejudice, obtained). Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 191-94 (2d Cir. 1996). Moreover, long use of a phrase justifies placing on the challenger a burden to establish that something has changed, so that what was once true is now false (or at least misleading). The district court did not find that critical numbers have changed in the last decade, so perhaps Abbott has a sound laches defense, but we need not say given the weakness of Mead Johnson's position on the record assembled so far. If on remand Mead Johnson decides to press forward with more evidence in pursuit of permanent relief, then the district judge will have to decide whether it has demonstrated a change in the truthfulness of Abbott's promotion.

Everything in the district court's analysis depends on the survey of consumers about their understanding of the phrase "1st Choice of Doctors." It is a problematic exercise, for the survey assumes that "first" is a cardinal number- -that is, a count such as "246" or "55" or a ratio of two such numbers, rather than a place in a series. Only if "first" is a ratio of cardinal numbers does it make sense to ask whether its meaning is 90% or 51% or a plurality. Respondents in survey research are suggestible; the form of a question implies an answer, or at least the range of proper answers, and this survey ensured that the answers would be numbers rather than places in a series. Having told the respondents to treat "first" as cardinal, the survey was bound to produce a misleading if not meaningless answer. "First" does not mean 51%, or 90%, or any other ratio, so it is not surprising that the responses were all over the lot. The survey's opening set of questions...

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