Hunter v. Town of Mocksville

• Citation: 201 F.Supp.3d 750
• Decision Date: 12 August 2016
• Docket Number: 12cv333
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: Kenneth L. HUNTER, Rick A. Donathan, and Jerry D. Medlin, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF MOCKSVILLE, North Carolina, et al., Defendants.

201 F.Supp.3d 750

Kenneth L. HUNTER, Rick A. Donathan, and Jerry D. Medlin, Plaintiffs,

v.TOWN OF MOCKSVILLE, North Carolina, et al., Defendants.

12cv333

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

Signed August 12, 2016

Robert M. Elliot, Alison L. Maddux, Helen L. Parsonage, Reynolds M. Elliot, Elliot Morgan Parsonage, P.A., Winston-Salem, NC, for Plaintiffs.

Patrick Houghton Flanagan, Cranfill Sumner and Hartzog, L.L.P., Philip Marshall Van Hoy, Stephen J. Dunn, Van Hoy Reutlinger Adams & Dunn, Charlotte, NC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge

In December 2011, Defendants Town of Mocksville ("Town"), Robert W. Cook, its administrative police chief at the time, and Christine W. Bralley, its town manager, terminated Plaintiffs Kenneth L. Hunter, Rick A. Donathan, and Jerry D. Medlin from their positions as officers with the Mocksville Police Department ("MPD"). Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for wrongful discharge in violation of their First Amendment rights and State-law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Following an eight-day trial, a jury found in favor of Plaintiffs on all claims. Before the court now is Bralley's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, on which the court reserved ruling at trial, and Plaintiffs' motion for equitable relief, in the form of either reinstatement or front pay (Doc. 169). The motions are fully briefed and are ready for resolution.

I. BACKGROUND

The evidence at trial demonstrated that on December 14, 2011, Plaintiffs called the office of North Carolina Governor Beverly Purdue and reported corruption and other malfeasance (including alleged misuse of authority and of alcohol by Chief Cook, financial improprieties, and racial bias) within the MPD. Approximately two weeks later, on December 29, 2011, Plaintiffs were summarily terminated on the same afternoon. Donathan had been promoted to lieutenant just one month prior, and it was the first time that then-Chief Cook had ever terminated an officer. Rather, the chief had always allowed officers to voluntarily resign, including one officer who had been involved in a hit–and-run while intoxicated and on duty. The central question at trial was why the Plaintiffs were terminated. Plaintiffs claimed they were terminated for exercising their First Amendment rights, whereas Defendants claimed the officers were terminated for poor performance. The jury believed the Plaintiffs, making separate determinations of liability against the Town, Chief Cook, and Bralley. (Doc. 167.)

Based on its finding of liability, the jury awarded Hunter $805,706, Medlin $288,293, and Donathan $310,830 in compensatory (including back pay¹ ) damages. (Id. at 2, 4, 6.) The jury awarded each Plaintiff $10,000 in punitive damages separately against Chief Cook and Bralley. (Id. ) Based on the court's submission of the issue of front pay to the jury on an advisory basis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c), the jury also recommended an advisory front pay award of $388,125 for Hunter, $857,403 for Medlin, and $1,353,585 for Donathan. (Id. )

At the close of evidence, Defendants renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. The court found that there was sufficient evidence against the Town and Chief Cook to send the issue to the jury but reserved ruling on whether Bralley was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Defendants now ask this court to find that there was insufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury as to her. (Doc. 170 at 1-4.) Plaintiffs oppose this request and move for equitable relief of either reinstatement or adoption of the jury's advisory verdict on front pay. (Docs. 171, 173.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Bralley's Rule 50 Motion

Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where a plaintiff has been fully heard on an issue but has failed to produce sufficient evidence for a jury to find for the party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) ; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 149, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The standard for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) mirrors the standard for granting summary judgment "such that ‘the inquiry under each is the same.’ " Reeves , 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 250–51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). The court is to "review the record as a whole" but "must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, and the court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097.

At the summary judgment stage, this court rejected Defendants' claim that there was insufficient direct evidence of retaliation. (Doc. 95 at 7-8.) The court explained that evidence is not insufficient merely because it is circumstantial. (Id. ) "The law gives no greater weight to direct evidence over circumstantial evidence, and circumstantial evidence is frequently relied on in employment retaliation or discrimination cases because often only the defendants know the true motivation for their conduct." (Id. (citing Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co. , 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 & n. 12 (7th Cir.1994) ).) In light of the sequence of events and the forecast of evidence presented by Plaintiffs, this court found that "plaintiffs ha[d] offered sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the Town fired them for reporting to the Governor's office that the Mocksville Police Department was experiencing corruption and other issues." (Id. at 8.)

Here, Defendants renew substantially the same argument rejected at summary judgment. They contend that there was insufficient direct evidence that Bralley was aware of Plaintiffs' call to the governor's office. (Doc. 170 at 2 ("Plaintiffs did not even attempt to present any direct evidence that Bralley was aware that they called the Governor's office, or anyone else, to report the alleged criminal misconduct.").) Plaintiffs' evidence at trial, however, mirrored the forecast of evidence at summary judgment and was sufficient to sustain a verdict by a reasonable jury against Bralley. Critically, in addition to establishing close proximity between the call and their terminations, Plaintiffs presented evidence from which a reasonably jury could infer that Bralley was aware of Plaintiffs' involvement in the call.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the evidence at trial showed the following: Hunter, Medlin, and Donathan had been officers with the MPD for twenty-seven years, five years, and thirteen years, respectively. Their written service records were essentially unblemished, and they had received several awards and commendations. In December 2011, Plaintiffs set out to expose what they viewed as corruption and other malfeasance in the MPD. In an effort to keep their efforts anonymous, Hunter had his daughter purchase a disposable, prepaid "TracFone" cellphone. On December 14, 2011, Plaintiffs used the TracFone to call the governor's office and report the alleged corruption. The governor's office in turn noted Plaintiffs' complaint and communicated the TracFone number to the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation ("SBI") for follow-up.

Between December 19 and 22, Medlin observed SBI Agent D.J. Smith enter the MPD holding a small slip of paper. Agent Smith asked to speak with Chief Cook, but instead spoke with Cook's second-in-command, Daniel Matthews. Medlin heard Matthews call to the secretary to get Chief Cook on the phone. After Chief Cook was reached by phone, Medlin observed Agent Smith and Matthews rush out of the MPD together. This activity led Medlin to believe that Plaintiffs' involvement in the call to the governor's office had been exposed.

Davie County Sheriff Deputy Chris Shuskey established a second link between the TracFone number and the MPD. In the week before Christmas 2011, Agent Smith gave the TracFone number to Deputy Shuskey and explained that the cellphone had been used to allege misconduct against Chief Cook and the MPD. Agent Smith asked Shuskey to determine the owner of the phone. Shuskey ran the number through various databases and determined that the subscriber was an Hispanic female. He then contacted MPD Detective Nelson Turrentine and relayed what Agent Smith had communicated to him. Detective Turrentine did not recognize the number but he did recognize the name of the Hispanic female, who had recently been in a traffic stop with Hunter's nephew. Shuskey later communicated to Agent Smith that his investigation suggested a connection to the nephew. In addition, Detective Turrentine testified at trial that if he knew he had a phone number connected to allegations of corruption at the MPD, he would be expected to provide it to Chief Cook.

Despite purchasing the TracFone to assure anonymity, Medlin and Donathan inadvertently made calls to the TracFone from their MPD-issued cell phones. (Pl. Ex. 14.) Consequently, the Town's cellphone records logged these calls and tied Medlin and Donathan to the TracFone. (Id. ) The evidence showed that Bralley played a key role in obtaining these phone records just before the terminations.

Bralley was Chief Cook's immediate supervisor, and in that capacity she had the ultimate authority to approve or stop Plaintiffs' termination. On December 27, two days before Plaintiffs' terminations, Bralley made at least six calls to Sprint, the cellphone service provider, in an effort to obtain the Town's telephone billing statement for the November to December 2011 ("December statement") billing period. Absent her calls to Sprint, Bralley would not ordinarily expect to receive the December statement until it would arrive by mail a couple of days later. (Pl. Ex. 14.) Further, while talking with the...