Henning v. State
| Decision Date | 03 May 1947 |
| Parties | HENNING v. STATE. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
H. T. Etheridge Jr., of Jackson, for plaintiff in error.
Allison B. Humphreys Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
At the January term, 1947, of the Criminal Court of Madison County, the plaintiff in error (hereinafter called the defendant) was brought to trial upon a presentment charging "the violation of the liquor laws". He was represented by counsel and announced ready for trial; whereupon the trial judge apprised the defendant and his counsel that a plea of guilty had been entered at the September term, 1946, and by reason thereof the defendant had asked and secured a deferment of final judgment on said plea until the January term, 1947.
While there was no minute entry showing the plea of guilty, it does appear from the docket of the trial judge and by stipulation that the defendant pleaded guilty at the September term, 1946, as above stated. Counsel for the defendant was permitted to file the following written motion:
There was no affidavit filed or other evidence heard in support of this motion. The trial judge overruled it and upon the defendant's plea of guilty a jury was impaneled who assessed a fine of $100. The trial judge later added a workhouse sentence of six months, his action being based upon the testimony of the sheriff that defendant was a known "bootlegger" and had been arrested for violating the liquor laws since the indictment was returned.
Thereafter, and on the 11th day of January, 1947, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict and sentence and grant him leave to withdraw his plea of guilty. When the motion came on to be heard by the trial judge, J. Emmett Ballard appeared and was offered as a witness by the State. The record shows that Mr. Ballard represented the defendant when the plea of guilty was entered in September, 1946.
The present counsel for the defendant, as shown by the bill of exceptions, admitted in open court that defendant was present when the said plea of guilty was entered for him by Attorney Ballard and that he understood it and that judgment was to be deferred until the following term of court. At least, it was stipulated that Ballard would thus testify and the truth of his statement cannot be doubted.
The defendant, in support of his motion, filed an affidavit stating "he was not guilty and wanted to plead not guilty in court." His attorney, Mr. Etheridge, also filed an affidavit stating that "the defendant has good and sufficient defense to the charges set forth in the indictment against him." The record fails to disclose the nature of the defense, if any he had. The only question made on this appeal is, "Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in refusing to grant the defendant leave to withdraw his plea of guilty?"
In some jurisdictions the right of a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty is absolute if a motion is made within the proper time. But the weight of authority is that such right rests within the discretion of the trial court and "is not subject to reversal by an appellate court unless it clearly appears that there was an abuse of discretion." (Italics ours.) 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, sec. 286, p. 961. Many cases are cited in support of the foregoing text.
Ordinarily an accused should be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty where it was entered through a misunderstanding as to its effect, or through fear and fraud, or where it was not made voluntarily. "On the other hand, if a defendant, with full knowledge of the charge against him and of his rights and the consequences of a plea of guilty, enters such a plea understandingly and without fear or persuasion, the court may, without abusing its discretion, refuse to permit him to withdraw it." 14 Am.Jur., sec. 287, p. 962. See also annotations in 20 A.L.R. 1450 et seq., and 66 A.L.R. 632 et seq.
In our own case of Swang v. State, 42 Tenn. 212, 88 Am.Dec. 593, it was held that where a plea of guilty and submission was made through fear or fraud or through official misrepresentation and the accused acted "under a total misapprehension of his rights", the plea should be set aside. The cases are...
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State v. Turner
... ... 49 Swang v. State, 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.) 212, 213-14 (1865) ... 50 Swang, 42 Tenn. at 214-15 ... 51 Davis, 823 S.W.2d at 220 ... 52 Ray v. State, 224 Tenn. 164, 170, 451 S.W.2d 854, 856 (1970) ... 53 Capri Adult Cinema, 537 S.W.2d at 898 ... 54 See Henning v. State, 184 Tenn. 508, 511-13, 201 S.W.2d 669, 670-71 (1947) ... 55 United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277, 281 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 850, 86 S.Ct. 96, 15 L.Ed.2d 89 (1965) ... 56 State v. Anderson, 645 S.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982); 8A Moore's Federal Practice § ... ...
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State v. Crowe
... ... Anderson, 645 S.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982). Whether a defendant should be permitted to withdraw a plea is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, regardless of when the motion is filed. Mellon, 118 S.W.3d at 345; Henning v. State, 184 Tenn. 508, 201 S.W.2d 669, 671 (1947); Turner, 919 S.W.2d at 355; see generally 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law, § 755 (May 2004). The trial judge "should always exercise his discretion with caution in refusing to set aside a plea of guilty, to the end that one accused of crime may ... ...
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State v. Mellon
... ... See State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 355 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) (citing State v. Anderson, 645 S.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982)). Whether the defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea is a question that is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Henning v. State, 184 Tenn. 508, 201 S.W.2d 669, 671 (1947); State v. Turner, ... 118 S.W.3d 346 ... 919 S.W.2d at 355. However, when a constitutional violation is shown, the trial court's discretion is "strictly curtailed." State v. Davis, 823 S.W.2d at 220 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991) (citing United States v ... ...
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State v Maxwell
... ... See Ray v. State, 224 Tenn. 164, 170, 451 S.W.2d 854, 856 (1970). The trial court's decision not to allow a guilty plea to be withdrawn will be upheld on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Davis, 823 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Henning v. State, 184 Tenn. 508, 201 S.W.2d 669, 671 (1947)). Abuse of discretion in this context means there must be no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trial judge. See Goosby v. State, 917 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing State v. Williams, 851 S.W.2d 828, 830-31 ... ...