Reynolds v. Roberts, 97-6349

• Decision Date: 02 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 97-6349,97-6349
• Citation: 202 F.3d 1303
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2000) Johnny REYNOLDS, individually on behalf of himself and as representative of a class of black employees of the Highway Department, State of Alabama, similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, Cecil Parker, et al., Intervenors-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. G.M. ROBERTS, in his official capacity as Director for the Alabama Department of Transportation, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1303

202 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2000)

Johnny REYNOLDS, individually on behalf of himself and as representative of a class of black employees of the Highway Department, State of Alabama, similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, Cecil Parker, et al., Intervenors-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. G.M. ROBERTS, in his official capacity as Director for the Alabama Department of Transportation, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 97-6349.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Feb. 2, 2000.

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.(No. 85-00665-CV-T-N), Myron H. Thompson, Judge.

Before TJOFLAT and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and STORY^*, District Judge.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises out of a long-standing racial discrimination class action brought by job applicants and two groups of employees and former employees against the Alabama Department of Transportation. After the parties entered into a race-neutral consent decree providing for prospective relief relating to job qualifications and promotion criteria, the district court, sua sponte, entered a judgment awarding the members of one of the employee groups (of current and former employees) back pay in the sum of $17,450,077, plus interest in the sum of $17,282,410. Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 996 F.Supp. 1156 (M.D.Ala.1998). The Department of Transportation appeals. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The named plaintiffs brought this suit against the Department of Transportation (the "Department") in May 1985 on behalf of all black "merit" and "non-merit" employees and former employees of the Department and all unsuccessful black applicants for positions within the Department.¹ Alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive relief under those statutes and under 42 U.S.C. 1983. According to the plaintiffs, the Department was discriminating against all black employees and job applicants on account of their race, and had been doing so since an unspecified point in time prior to May 21, 1979. The discrimination consisted of (1) using non-job related criteria that had the effect of precluding blacks from being hired or promoted, (2) prohibiting black employees from gaining the job experience necessary for promotion, and (3) granting promotions and pay increases to white employees who were less qualified than their black counterparts. The Department, in its answer, denied the plaintiffs' allegations.²

In October 1986, the court certified three plaintiff classes. The first class consisted of any black person who unsuccessfully applied for a merit position in the Department at any time after May 21, 1979. The second class included all blacks employed by the Department at any time after May 21, 1979 who were permanent employees under the Department's merit system (the "merit" employees) and therefore eligible for promotion. The third class consisted of a portion of the blacks employed by the Department at any time after May 21, 1979 as temporary employees (the "non-merit" employees). During their employment in the Department, these employees had applied for merit positions, but the Department allegedly had rejected their applications on account of their race. Each class sought injunctive relief in the form of an order directing the Department to discontinue its current hiring and promotion policies and practices and requiring it to implement an affirmative action program. In addition, each class member sought injunctive and compensatory relief. The members of the first class sought the positions they would have received but for the Department's discriminatory hiring policies, together with the pay they would have earned. Each member of the second class contended that he or she had been denied promotion(s) on account of race, and therefore sought an order granting the promotion(s) and/or back pay. Each member of the third class contended that, while employed in the Department, he or she had applied for, but had been denied, merit-employee status on account of race, and therefore sought instatement in such status and/or back pay.

After the parties joined issue, and engaged in discovery, they entered into settlement negotiations. In 1988, and again in 1991, they presented a proposed consent decree to the district court for approval. On each occasion, some members of the plaintiff classes objected to the entry of the decree; the district court sustained their objections and refused to enter the decree.

In June 1992, the case proceeded to trial before the court. Near the end of the plaintiffs' case, the parties asked the court to recess the proceeding indefinitely so that they could engage in further settlement negotiations. The court granted their request. In November 1993, they reached a partial settlement, in the form of a proposed consent decree. The proposed decree provided a range of prospective class-wide injunctive relief. Among other things, it set hiring and promotion quotas for blacks-33% of the positions in each job classification in the Department would be set aside for blacks. To ensure an adequate pool for this set-aside program, the decree directed the Department to mount an aggressive recruiting campaign at historically black colleges and universities. Finally, the decree required the Department to establish a grievance procedure for its employees.

The parties presented the proposed decree to the district court, which, in turn, scheduled a hearing for January 19, 1994 to entertain any objections members of the plaintiff classes, or others likely to be affected (like white employees of the Department), might have to the terms of the proposed decree. On January 13, a group of white Department employees (the "Adams Intervenors") moved the court for leave to intervene on behalf of the Department's non-black employees in order to challenge the race-conscious provisions of the proposed decree-specifically, the 33% quota requirement for all job classifications in the Department. The court granted the motion, Reynolds v. Roberts, 846 F.Supp. 948, 953-54 (M.D.Ala.1994), and subsequently certified an additional class, consisting of the Department's non-black employees.

The January 19 hearing was held as scheduled. Over 200 people attended the hearing, including many non-black employees of the Department. The objections to the race-conscious aspects of the proposed consent decree were such that the parties withdrew it and, with leave of court, went back to the drawing board. By late February 1994, the plaintiffs and the Department decided to divide the previously proposed decree into three parts, called Consent Decrees I, II, and III. Consent Decree I contained the provisions that all sides agreed provided only race-neutral prospective relief. Consent Decrees II and III contained provisions that were acceptable to the plaintiffs and the Department, but opposed as race-conscious by the Adams Intervenors.

The parties submitted Consent Decree I to the district court for approval, and, on March 7, the court held a hearing on the fairness of the proposal. No one other than the parties' attorneys appeared at the hearing, and no one objected to the entry of the decree. The court approved the decree and, by order entered March 16, 1994, adopted it in full.³

Consent Decree I is composed of a series of "Articles" which revamped the process by which the Department hires, promotes, classifies, and pays its employees. The decree abolished the system of "employment registers" from which positions were filled and promotions were granted, and created new qualifications and procedures for hiring and promotion. It also created new procedures for, among other things, rotation of job duties, recruitment, and training.

The provisions of the decree at issue in this appeal are portions of the Preamble, Article 19 and Article 20.⁴ They address the race-discrimination claims of the individual members of the three plaintiff classes-the merit employees, the non-merit employees, and the unsuccessful job applicants-and provide for the trial of those claims before the court in the event they are not settled.⁵

The Preamble to the Consent Decree states:

The following terms and provisions of this Consent Decree are accordingly agreed to in final and complete resolution of all class issues which have been asserted in the case, subject to the provisions of this Decree providing for further proceedings, including but not limited to Article[ ] 20....

Similar language is repeated in Article 19, titled "General":

Subject to the provisions of this Decree permitting or requiring further proceedings, including but not limited to, Article[ ] 20 ..., this Decree constitutes full and complete relief on all claims, causes of action, and allegations which have been asserted in this action.

Article 20 explains how the members of the three plaintiff classes and the Department are to proceed with the individual claims of race discrimination. Because this article is at the heart of the dispute in this case, we reprint the article in its entirety:

ARTICLE 20

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS REGARDING CLASS MEMBERS

1. Further negotiations and proceedings are required to resolve the claims for monetary and non-monetary remedies for individual members of the class[es] (including the named plaintiffs and intervenors), provided however, that this Decree does not in and of itself entitled [sic] any such class member to such remedies. Such claims shall be resolved first by settlement negotiations and then, to the extent not resolved by settlement negotiations, by the Court.

2. The parties will make all reasonable efforts to resolve all such claims of the members of the class ...