Com. v. New York Cent. & H.R.r. Co.
| Citation | 88 N.E. 764,202 Mass. 394 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO. (two cases). |
| Decision Date | 25 May 1909 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
John J. Higgins, Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
Geo. L Mayberry, for defendant.
By St 1906, c. 463, pt. 2, § chapter 111, § 196, of the Revised Laws is incorporated without change, and by section 159 of part 3, the provisions being the same as those of existing statutes, section 155 is to be construed as a continuation of section 196, and not as a new enactment. Accordingly these complaints may be properly described as brought under section 196, which so far as material provides that 'no railroad corporation * * * or its * * * servants or agents, shall willfully or negligently obstruct, or unnecessarily or unreasonably use or occupy a highway, town way or street, nor in any case obstruct, use or occupy it with cars or engines for more than five minutes at one time,' without incurring a prescribed penalty for each violation. It was undisputed that on two separate days the defendant's cars obstructed, or occupied for more than the time permitted, a street which presumably was a public way although not so described. The defendant does not question that under the decision in Com. v. N. Y., N.H. & H. R. R. Co., 112 Mass. 412, where an earlier act, of which the present statute is substantially a re-enactment, was considered, it would be no excuse if the obstruction was accidental, or could not have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable diligence. But the valves to the air brakes having been maliciously opened by strangers without the knowledge of the defendant, or its servants, the train could not be operated within the period owing to the delay required not only to find and close the valves, but to furnish a fresh supply of air, it contends their interference constitutes a full defense. See St. 1906, pt. 2, c. 463, § 239; Rev. Laws, c. 111, § 255. Or as defined in Com. v. Elwell, 2 Metc. 190, 192, 35 Am. Dec. 398, 'if a man does an act which would be otherwise criminal, through mistake or accident, or by force, or the compulsion of others, in which his own will and mind do not instigate him to the act, or concur in it, it is a matter of defense. * * *' If, at common law, crime when committed by the individual consists of acts done with an evil intent, in statutory offenses created in the exercise of the police power, unless a wrongful intent, or guilty knowledge, commonly designated by the use of the words 'willfully' or 'maliciously,' is made an essential element of the prohibited act, the violator may be convicted, and punished, even if he has no design to disobey the law. Com. v. Bradford, 9 Metc. 268; Com. v. Wentworth, 118 Mass. 441; Com. v. Connelly, 163 Mass. 539, 40 N.E. 862; Com. v. Lavery, 188 Mass. 13, 16, 73 N.E. 884. It is because of this familiar doctrine inherent in the construction of statutes which prohibit, under a penalty, acts and conduct which otherwise are not generally deemed immoral, or criminal, that convictions for the sale of liquor, where the seller had no just ground to believe it was intoxicating, or of imitation butter by the defendant's agent without a descriptive wrapper, which, though furnished, he failed from mere carelessness to use, or an inadvertent sale by the defendant's servant of milk not of standard quality, and the admission of a minor to a pool room, where the defendant neither knew, nor had amy reason to believe, he was under age, have been sustained. Com. v. Savery, 145 Mass. 212, 13 N.E. 611; Com. v. Daly, 148 Mass. 428, 19 N.E. 209; Com. v. Warren, 160 Mass. 533, 36 N.E. 308; Com. v. Gray, 150 Mass. 327, 329, 23 N.E. 47; Com. v. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6. In other jurisdictions, in the construction of similar statutes, proof of moral turpitude, or a guilty mind, has never been deemed necessary to sustain a conviction. Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398; State v. Smith, 10 R.I. 252; People v. West, 106 N.Y. 293, 12 N.E. 610, 60 Am. Rep. 452; Com. v. Zelt, 138 Pa. 615, 21 A. 7, 11 L. R. A. 602; Farmer v. People, 77 Ill. 322; Humpeter v. People, 92 Ill. 400; Jamison v. Burton, 43 Iowa, 282; State v. Hertfiel, 24 Wis. 60; Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. & W. 404; Regina v. Paine, 10 Cex, 402.
If we turn to the language of the statute, the acts for which the defendant has been convicted are positively forbidden. It was within legislative authority to have extended the qualifying words of 'willfully' or 'negligently,' which describe the offense defined in the first clause of the sentence in section 196, to the unlawful acts with which the defendant is charged. The history of this legislation from its origin to the latest revision, however, indicates clearly a public policy which, in the language employed to define the offense, recognizes no extenuating circumstances of the nature relied on by the defendant. St. 1854, p. 280, c. 378; Gen. St. 1860, c. 63, § 68; St. 1871, p. 485, c. 83, § 1; St 1874, p. 389, c. 372, § 129; St. 1895, p. 178, c. 173; Rev....
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