Dudley v. Northampton St. Ry. Co.

Citation89 N.E. 25,202 Mass. 443
PartiesDUDLEY v. NORTHAMPTON ST. RY. CO.
Decision Date22 June 1909
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
COUNSEL

Wm. G Bassett and John B. O'Donnell, for plaintiff.

J. C Hammond and T. J. Hammond, for defendant.

OPINION

SHELDON J.

It was provided by the statutes in force at the time of this accident that no person should operate an automobile or motor cycle upon any public highway or private way laid out under authority of statute unless he had been licensed to do so and unless his automobile or motor cycle had been registered as prescribed. St. 1903, p. 507, c. 473; St. 1905, p. 227, c 311. But it was also provided by section 2 of the act last cited that 'any automobile or motor cycle owned by a nonresident of this state who has complied with the laws relative to motor vehicles and the operation thereof of the state in which he resides may be operated by such owner on the roads and highways of this state for a period not exceeding fifteen days without the license,' etc., required in other cases. The first question presented in this case is whether the plaintiff in operating his machine in this state on the day of the accident was acting in violation of law.

He was a resident of Connecticut. He had complied with all the laws of that state, and had a right to operate his machine on the highways of this state for a period not exceeding 15 days. He came into this state in his automobile on Wednesday, September 13th, and remained here until the day of the accident, September 29th, except that on September 14th he drove to West Suffield, Conn., returning to Massachusetts the same evening, and that he went to Brattleboro, Vt., on one day to attend a fair, staying there that day, but not overnight. Each of these absences was merely a temporary visit to the other state, made with no intention of a permanent stay, and followed by a speedy return; and on each of these days he did actually operate his machine in this state. After his return from Vermont and before the accident, his machine needed repairs, and was kept in a repair garage a day and a half for that purpose.

It is not necessary to determine whether the statute before us should be interpreted as giving to nonresident owners of motor cars who have complied with the laws of their own state merely one period of 15 days after once coming into the state before being forbidden to operate their machines on the roads of this state without a license under its authority, and allowing only one total period of grace during the whole of the license year, or whether it should be construed more liberally by allowing nonresident owners to operate their cars without a license for a period of not more than 15 days upon any and every occasion when they shall come into this commonwealth. In either event, this plaintiff had exceeded his privilege. He made one visit here; and the running of his 15 days was not interrupted by his temporary calls into other states. Nor can the period be extended by not counting the days on which his machine was laid up for repairs or on which for any other reason he did not actually operate it. He had driven it into this commonwealth; within the meaning of the statute he was operating it during the whole of his stay. By no process of computation can it be claimed that his stay had lasted for less than 16 days. It follows that he was acting unlawfully, in violation of the statutes referred to, at the time of the collision between his machine and the defendant's trolley car; and it must be determined whether his violation of law is necessarily fatal to his right of action.

The general rule was stated in Newcomb v. Boston Protective Department, 146 Mass. 596, 16 N.E. 555, 4 Am. St. Rep. 354, that the plaintiff's unlawful act will prevent his recovery if it directly contributed to his injury. But there is a distinction between an unlawful act which is at least a contributing cause of the accident and one which is merely an attendant circumstance or a condition, though perhaps a necessary condition, of that accident. McCarthy v. Morse, 197 Ass. 332, 83 N.E. 1109; Black v. N. Y., N.H. & H. R. R., 193 Mass. 448, 452, 79 N.E. 797, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 148, and cases there cited; Biggio v. Boston, 179 Mass. 356, 60 N.E. 938. And if we had before us simply the case of a plaintiff who was driving his vehicle on a public way in a manner forbidden by law or without appliances required by law, but who, while himself using all due care had been injured by an accident due solely to the negligence of a third person, his own violation of law not being a contributory cause of the accident but merely one of the conditions existing at the time, it could not be said that such a plaintiff was barred of recovery by the mere fact of his violation of the law. But that is not the case which is now presented. We are dealing here with a peculiar kind of vehicle which has only recently come into use, which requires unusual care in its management, and the presence of which upon the highways has been found to involve more than ordinary risks to other travelers. As was said by the Chief Justice, speaking for the full court in Com. v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 544, 85 N.E. 848: 'Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power, whose appearance is frightful to most horses that are unaccustomed to them. The use of them introduces a new element of danger to ordinary travelers on the highways, as well as to those riding in the automobiles. In order to protect the public great care should be exercised in the use of them. Statutory regulation of their speed while running on the highways is reasonable and proper for the promotion of the safety of the public. It is the duty of the Legislature, in the exercise of the police power, to consider the risks that arise from the use of new inventions applying the forces of nature in previously unknown ways. The general principle is too familiar to need discussion. It has been applied to automobiles in different states with the approval of the courts. Com. v. Boyd, 188 Mass. 79, 74 N.E. 255, 108 Am. St. Rep. 464; Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N.E. 1035, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 215, 108 Am. St. Rep. 196; People v. Schneider, 139 Mich. 673, 103 N.W. 172, 69 L. R. A. 345; People v. MacWilliams, 91 A.D. 176, 86 N.Y.S. 357.'

Accordingly the Legislature has dealt with this subject. The rights of these parties are governed by St. 1903, p. 507, c. 473, as amended by St. 1905, p. 227, c. 311, which was then in force and to which we have already referred. But we must now look more closely at the provisions of this statute. We find that, as expressed in the title, it provides comprehensively for 'the registration of automobiles and motor cycles and for licensing operators thereof.' Section 1 requires that 'all automobiles * * * shall be registered,' and provides with must detail for the registration by the highway commissioners both of the machines with identifying numbers or marks and of the names of the owners. Section 2 allows a general registration to be made by manufacturers of such machines and by dealers therein. Section 4 provides for the licensing of operators or drivers; and by section 5 all unlicensed persons are forbidden to operate such machines. Sections 7, 8, 10, and 11, and St. 1905, p. 289, c. 366, contain limitations upon the speed allowed and requirements of brakes and other appliances, manifestly intended as precautions to be observed for the safety of other persons upon the highways. Section 9 fixes penalties for any violation of the act. Thus far, the provisions of the act in question substantially resemble those of the Lord's Day act formerly in force, which made traveling on that day illegal simply by imposing a penalty upon any one who did so. But section 3 of the act...

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  • Dudley v. Northampton St. Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • June 22, 1909
    ...202 Mass. 44389 N.E. 25DUDLEYv.NORTHAMPTON ST. RY. CO.Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampshire.June 22, Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampshire County; John F. Brown, Judge. Action by E. I. Dudley against the Northampton Street Railway Company. Verdict directed for defendant, an......

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