People v. Coffey
Decision Date | 26 September 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 1,Docket No. 10735,1 |
Citation | 202 N.W.2d 456,42 Mich.App. 683 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Henry COFFEY, Defendant-Appellant |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
George E. Lee, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Div., Luvenia D. Dockett, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before LEVIN, P.J., and BRONSON and VanVALKENBURG, * JJ.
Defendant was found guilty by a jury of manslaughter, M.C.L.A. § 750.321; M.S.A. § 28.553. He was sentenced to a term in prison of from 8 to 15 years.
The pertinent facts are simply stated. Defendant was found late one night with two small children who were wearing bloodstained clothes. Because of the lateness of the hour, the state of the children's clothes, and confused behavior of defendant, defendant and the children were taken into custody and transported to the Highland Park police station. Because of defendant's confused behavior, he was handcuffed, but he was not formally arrested. At the police station defendant was asked if the police could contact the mother of the children, whereupon the defendant blurted out that he had just killed the children's mother. Defendant was immediately advised to say nothing more.
The officers learned of the mother's address from the children, and a scout-car crew was dispatched to the given address. The body of the deceased was discovered by the police, death being from multiple stab wounds.
After being fully advised of his rights, the defendant gave a statement detailing the events of the crime. Briefly stated, defendant indicated that he had quarreled with the deceased, his girlfriend, and had slashed her with a knife from the kitchen table.
Somewhat thereafter defendant was certified by the Center for Forensic Psychiatry as being a 'schizophrenic, paranoid type' and incompetent to stand trial. Defendant was referred to the Mental Health Department for treatment. Over a year later defendant was certified competent to stand trial.
A motion to suppress the oral and signed statements made by defendant to the police was made. Pursuant to that motion a Walker 1 hearing was held. The thrust of the motion to suppress was directed to the premise that because of defendant's mental state, including narcotic intoxication, he was unable to understand the gravity of his statements, even though informed of his Miranda rights by the police. Defendant argues that he comes within the rule enunciated in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960).
After an extensive hearing, the trial court determined that the initial statement was a spontaneous utterance by the defendant, and that the defendant was fully apprised of his rights, understood those rights and was aware of the consequence of his statements at the time of the second statement. The court summarized its findings as follows:
The trial court's determination was based upon three factors. First, the defendant appeared to be calm and rational at the time the statements were made. The record clearly shows that while defendant was extremely agitated when first taken into custody, by the time he was questioned at the station he had calmed down and was lucid and coherent.
The second factor was that the psychiatrist who examined defendant slightly more than a week after the incident concluded at that time that:
'At this time he (defendant) continues to be psychotic but in my opinion he is able to stand trial since he understands the charges placed against him and is able to cooperate with his counsel.'
At the Walker hearing, the psychiatrist further indicated that the fact that a person was psychotic did not necessarily make such a person unable to manage his own affairs.
The third factor was the testimony of defendant himself. Defendant was able to recall with considerable accuracy all of the details and circumstances surrounding the confession. Defendant admitted that no coercion or duress of any kind was employed by the police officers. During cross-examination of defendant, the following colloquy took place:
'Q. (By the assistant prosecutor): And for some reason or another you didn't know what you were doing when you told the officer in charge that you had stabbed Mrs. Franz, is that correct?
'A. That isn't what I said that I didn't know what I was doing. I said that I wasn't in, you know, complete control of myself. I wasn't in my right mind.
'The Court: You are speaking now of what time, at the time that you made the statement to the officer.
'The Witness: Yes.'
The standard of review of a Walker hearing determination is set forth in People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 551, 557, 194 N.W.2d 709, 710 (1972):
'The determination of voluntariness is a matter of fact--the ruling of law on the authority of the cases cited is that voluntary statements Etc. are admissible and involuntary statements Etc. are not.
'In any event the sole purpose of the Walker hearing is to determine the fact of voluntariness and a reviewing court is concerned only with the correctness of that determination. The role of reviewing court is accurately stated in People v. Summers, 15 Mich.App. 346, 348, 166 N.W.2d 672 (1968):
"On this appeal we are...
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People v. Brown
...93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854). The defendant's mental state is but one such circumstance, albeit a central one. (People v. Coffey, 42 Mich.App. 683, 202 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. of App., 1972); Commonwealth v. Eisen, 358 Mass. 740, 267 N.E.2d 229 (1971), rev'd sub nom. Eisen v. Picard, 452 F.2d 860......
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...voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the nonspecific or general-intent crime of involuntary manslaughter. People v. Coffey, 42 Mich.App. 683, 202 N.W.2d [184 MICHAPP 448] 456 (1972), and People v. Duffield, 20 Mich.App. 473, 174 N.W.2d 137 (1969), aff'd 387 Mich. 300, 197 N.W.2d 25 (1......