Snyder v. Blake

• Decision Date: 11 January 1949
• Docket Number: 7434
• Citation: 202 P.2d 394,69 Idaho 14
• Parties: SNYDER v. BLAKE et ux
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

202 P.2d 394

69 Idaho 14

SNYDER v. BLAKE et ux

No. 7434

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 11, 1949

Rehearing Denied Feb. 14, 1949.

Rehearing Denied February 14, 1949.

Appeal from District Court, Second Judicial District, Clearwater County; A. L. Morgan, Judge.

Judgment affirmed.

J. H Felton and William J. Jones, both of Lewiston, for appellants.

An action for unlawful detainer under Section 9-303, I.C.A., is a summary proceeding and cannot be maintained unless the conventional relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, so that the defendant is estopped to deny the plaintiff's title. Coe v. Bennett, 39 Idaho 176, 226 P. 736; Richardson v. King, 51 Idaho 762, 10 P.2d 323.

Under statutes authorizing the maintenance of summary proceedings against tenants who wrongfully hold over, it is essential, to enable a person to maintain such proceedings, that the conventional relation of landlord and tenant exists. Willis v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 169 U.S. 295, 18 S.Ct. 347, 42 L.Ed. 752; Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982.

The relationship of landlord and tenant is always created by contract, either express or implied. It cannot exist without such contract. Van Pelt v. Russell, 134 Ark. 236, 203 S.W. 267; Beck v. Minnesota & Western Grain Co., 131 Iowa 62, 107 N.W. 1032, 7 L.R.A.,N.S., 930; Little v. Libby, 2 Me. 242, 11 Am.Dec. 68; Stockett v. Watkins, 2 Gill & J., Md., 326, 20 Am.Dec. 438.

It is said that to establish the relation of landlord and tenant so as to render summary proceedings available, the existence of a valid lease is necessary. Reich v. Cochran, 151 N.Y. 122, 45 N.E. 367, 37 L.R.A. 805, 56 Am.St.Rep. 607, 3 N.Y.Ann.Cas. 344; Robertson v. Birdie, Sup., 107 N.Y.S. 75; 36 C.J. Landlord and Tenant, sec. 1799, p. 620.

If it is necessary, in an unlawful detainer action, to determine which party has the paramount legal or equitable title in order to determine the right for possession, then the action cannot be maintained. Richardson v. King, 51 Idaho 762, 10 P.2d 323.

Frank F. Kimble, of Orofino, for respondent.

One who establishes legal title to land is presumed to have been possessed of the property and its occupancy by another is deemed to be in subrogation to the legal title. Bower v. Kollmeyer, 31 Idaho 712, 175 P. 964; Pleasant v. Henry, 36 Idaho 728, 213 P. 565; 5-206 I.C.A.; Moore v. Western Meat Co., 16 N.M. 107, 113 P. 827, 829.

In an action for unlawful detainer the sole question involved is the right of possession. Hunter v. Porter, 10 Idaho 72, 77 P. 434; Wolter v. Dixon, 29 Idaho 26, 157 P. 250; Swanson v. Olsen, 38 Idaho 24, 220 P. 407; Obermeyer v. Kendall, 38 Idaho 283, 220 P. 751; Richardson v. King, 51 Idaho 762, 10 P.2d 323.

All that is necessary for the plaintiff to show is her right of possession at the commencement of the action and the withholding by the defendant. Froman v. Madden, 13 Idaho 138, 88 P. 894; McMasters v. Torsen, 5 Idaho 536, 51 P. 100.

Givens, Justice. Holden, C. J., and Featherstone, Taylor and Sutphen, District Judges, concur.

OPINION

Givens, Justice.

Respondent's complaint in unlawful detainer was filed first in the probate court and alleged her ownership in fee and right of possession in the property involved; occupancy by defendants as tenants; their failure and refusal to pay rent; service of proper notice to pay or vacate the premises, and prayer for appropriate relief.

A demurrer challenging the complaint as not stating a cause of action; that the action was barred by Sections 5-203, 5-204, 5-209, 5-218 and 9-314, I.C.A.; that the probate court was without jurisdiction because defendants claimed title; and that unlawful detainer was the improper type of action, was overruled.

The ensuing answer denied respondent's ownership or right of possession; lack of jurisdiction of the court in this action to try title; that the action was barred by Section 9-314, I.C.A.; that the defendants own the property, and asserting adverse possession. Upon the filing of the answer, the probate court transferred the cause to the District Court. At the inception of the trial therein, the District Judge made this statement:

"I want to call the attention of counsel on both sides that, in my opinion and I have that opinion very firmly fixed in my mind, the only questions are whether there is a lease and whether the terms of the lease have been violated." and during the progress of the trial, reiterated substantially the same thought:

"I think this, that when a showing of title is made, I am not going to determine this question of title.

"* * *. I am not passing on whether it is a good title or a bad one.

"Mr. Felton: It is my understanding we are not taking up the question of title. I waive identification of copies of the record, but I don't agree they are good deeds. That is my statement.

"The Court: It is agreed by counsel that I am not to pass on title."

Respondent's claim to right of possession was based substantially upon the following showing as to her title: that her predecessor in interest, Mrs. Jessie M. Blake, mother of appellant George B. Blake, acquired title to this property along with other property as a member of the community with her husband, and under his will and by relinquishment deeds from her sons, other heirs under the will; that appellants entered the premises then owned and in the possession of Mrs. Jessie M. Blake as tenants and so continued over under respondent's ownership by deed from Mrs. Blake without further or any written or specific oral leasing.

The court found:

"That on the 14th day of February 1946 the plaintiff was the owner of and entitled to the possession of Lot Four (4) in Block (7) Seven of Blakes Addition to the city of Orofino, Idaho and the said plaintiff is now the owner of and entitled to the possession of said premises."

"That prior to the 14 -- day of February 1946 by the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff, the defendants were let into the occupancy of the North apartment of said premises as tenants of plaintiffs predecessors in interest.

"That the occupancy of said premises by the defendants was as tenants at sufferance under Jesse M. Blake the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff."

That another action involving title to this property was pending did not appear upon the face of the complaint, nor did the demurrer present such issue and neither did the answer -- hence appellants' assignment of error in that regard may not be considered. Colorado Nat. Bank v. Meadow Creek L. Co., 36 Idaho 509, at page 512, 211 P. 1076.

The other assignments are: claimed erroneous entry of the decree for the reason --

"* * * that the defendants' defense was that they (plaintiff and defendants) were tenants in common and were occupying the premises as owners, and when the Court ruled they could not present such defense the Court should have also ruled that this was not a proper form of action and refused to try the case."

Also, that:

"The Court erred in first preventing the defendants from presenting their evidence of title in this matter and then finding that the plaintiff was the owner of the said property, * * *."

and the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff and the refusal to give judgment in favor of defendants.

Appellants' only offer was on cross examination of Mrs. Blake, the plaintiff's predecessor in interest, in connection with whether the payment of certain taxes by appellants were on this property and/or other property owned by Mrs. Blake or the Blake estate, as follows:

"Mr. Felton: It is my purpose and I offer to prove at this time, for the purpose of the record, that some time before George Blake moved into this duplex (property in dispute) there was a certain common property, being the old Blake residence, which was occupied from that time until this by Mrs. Blake upstairs and by George Blake downstairs and they had an accounting between them for taxes on their common property and all these payments testified to were common taxes on common property and not as rent."

The court sustained the objection to the offer as follows:

"The Court: The tender will be denied. He made a tender of proof and it is denied. The theory is this: In the first place, if this testimony is competent at all, you should identify these checks and the rest would come as a defense." (Emphasis added.)

The ruling that it was a matter of defense was proper, yet no offer of proof was made when appellants were presenting their case, and no questions were asked and adversely ruled upon.

While appellants' second assignment of error focuses attention on this matter thus:

"The Court erred in first preventing the defendants from presenting their evidence of title in this matter and then finding that the plaintiff was the owner of the said property, for the reason that the defendants had pleaded they were owners and entitled to possession of the property as owners."

the difficulty is the appellants presented no evidence, made no offer of proof nor was the court specifically asked to rule thereon.

Coe v. Bennett, 39 Idaho 176, 226 P. 736, held that in unlawful detainer a defendant is entitled to an opportunity of showing his equities and presenting his defenses and only where the conventional relationship of landlord and tenant exists is the tenant estopped to deny the landlord's title and quoted with approval Francis v. West Virginia Oil Co., 174 Cal. 168, 162 P. 394, 395, wherein the Supreme Court of California held that:

"While the validity of titles may not be tried in proceedings of this character, (unlawful detainer) evidences of title are admissible to show the character or extent of the possession claimed."

Again as pointed out in Jones v. Seawell, 13...