203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000), 97-1330, Blomkest Fert. v Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan

Docket Nº:97-1330
Citation:203 F.3d 1028
Party Name:Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc.; Cobden Grain & Feed, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs, Hahnaman Albrecht, Inc.; John Peterson, doing business as Almelund Feed & Grain; Laing-Gro Fertilizers, Inc.; Plaintiffs-Appellants, Clearbrook Ag Service, Inc., on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated; Reamford Liqui
Case Date:February 17, 2000
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

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203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000)

Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc.; Cobden Grain & Feed, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs,

Hahnaman Albrecht, Inc.; John Peterson, doing business as Almelund Feed & Grain; Laing-Gro Fertilizers, Inc.; Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Clearbrook Ag Service, Inc., on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated; Reamford Liquid Fertilizer, Inc., on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated; Tolley's Inc., on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs,

James River Farm Service, Inc., on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Angela Coleman, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs, Ag Network, Inc.; Plaintiffs-Appellants,

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Marcelline Farm Supply, Inc., on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated; Plaintiffs,


Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, Inc.; Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Sales, Inc.; Potash Company of America, Inc.; IMC Fertilizer Group, Inc.; Kalium Chemicals, Ltd.; Kalium Canada, Ltd.; Noranda Minerals, Inc.; Central Canada Potash Co.; Noranda Sales Corporation, Ltd.; Cominco, Ltd.; Cominco American, Inc.; Eddy Potash, Inc.; New Mexico Potash Corporation; Defendants-Appellees,

Rio Algom, Ltd.; Defendants,

PPG Canada, Limited; PPG Industries, Inc.; IMC Global; Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-1330

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

February 17, 2000

Submitted: September 13, 1999

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

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BEAM, Circuit Judge.

A certified class of potash consumers appeals the district court's1 grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants (collectively "the producers") in this action for conspiracy in restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act. We affirm.


This case involves the production and sale of potash, a mineral essential to plant growth and therefore used in fertilizer. The certified class includes all of those persons who directly purchased potash from one of the producers between April 1987 and July 1994. The class named six Canadian potash companies and two American companies.2

Both parties agree that the North American potash industry is an oligopoly.3 Prices in an oligopolistic market tend to be higher than those in purely competitive markets, and will fluctuate independently of supply and demand. See Enrico Adriano Raffaelli, Oligopolies and Antitrust Law, 19 Fordham Int'l. L. J. 915, 916 (1996). Furthermore, "price uniformity is normal in a market with few sellers and homogeneous products." E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984). This is because all producers in an oligopoly must charge roughly the same price or risk losing market share.

The Canadian province of Saskatchewan is the source of most potash consumed in the United States. The province founded defendant Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan (PCS), which holds thirty-eight percent of the North American potash production capacity. As a governmental company, PCS had no mandate to maximize profits and was not accountable to private owners. Instead, the company was primarily concerned with maintaining employment and generating money for the local economy. Not surprisingly, PCS suffered huge losses as it mined potash in quantities that far outstripped global demand. These policies impacted the entire potash industry: during the 1980's, the price of potash fell to an historic low. In 1986, Saskatchewan voters elected a provincial government which had promised to privatize PCS. New management was appointed to PCS after the elections. Thereafter, PCS significantly reduced its output and raised its prices.

Also in 1986, New Mexico Potash Corporation (NMPC) and another American potash producer (who is not a named defendant) filed a complaint with the United States Department of Commerce. Frustrated with low potash prices, the petitioners alleged that Canadian producers had been dumping their product in the United States at prices below fair market value. In 1987, the Department issued a preliminary determination that the Canadian producers were dumping potash and ordered the companies to post bonds on all exports to the United States. These bonds were set according to each firm's calculated "dumping margin."4 Eventually, the Department

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negotiated a Suspension Agreement with each of the Canadian producers. The agreement raised the price of Canadian potash in the United States by setting a minimum price at which each Canadian producer could sell in the United States.5 That agreement remains in effect today. When the Canadian producers entered into the Suspension Agreement, PCS announced that it was raising its prices by eighteen dollars per ton. Other producers quickly followed suit. The price of potash has remained markedly higher after the Suspension Agreement, although prices have slowly but steadily declined for the most part since the agreement was signed by the producers on January 8, 1988.

The class alleges that between April 1987 and July 1994 the producers colluded to increase the price of potash. The producers, in turn, maintain that the price increase was the product of the interdependent nature of the industry and its reaction to the privatization of PCS and the Suspension Agreement. The district court granted the producers's motions for summary judgment and the class appeals.


The class asserts that if we affirm the district court, we will "stand alone in holding that circumstantial evidence, even if overwhelming, cannot be used to defeat a summary judgment motion in anti-trust cases." We make no such legal history here, however, because the class's proffered evidence, far from overwhelming, fails to establish the elements of a prima facie case.

Section 1 prohibits concerted action by two or more parties in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1. The Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 & 768 (1984) and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986), provided the standard used to determine whether the plaintiffs's evidence of a section 1 violation survives a summary judgment motion. In order to state a section 1 case, plaintiffs must present evidence that "tends to exclude the possibility of independent action" by the defendants. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768. This means that conduct that is "as consistent with permissible [activity] as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588. We are among the majority of circuits to apply Monsanto and Matsushita, broadly, and in both horizontal and vertical price fixing cases. See The Corner Pocket of Sioux Falls, Inc. v. Video Lottery Tech., Inc., 123 F.3d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1054 (1998). Applied in this case, the standard requires that if it is as reasonable to infer from the evidence a price-fixing conspiracy as it is to infer permissible activity, then the plaintiffs's claim, without more, fails on summary judgment.

The class's price-fixing claim is based on a theory of conscious parallelism. Conscious parallelism is the process "not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests." Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). The class points out that the producers's prices were roughly equivalent during the alleged conspiracy, despite differing production costs. It further points out that price changes by one producer were quickly met by the others. This establishes only that the producers consciously paralleled each other's prices.

Evidence that a business consciously met the pricing of its competitors does not prove a violation of the antitrust

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laws. See Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954). Particularly when the product in question is fungible, as potash is, courts have noted that parallel pricing lacks probative significance. See Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 160 (7th Cir. 1972). An agreement is properly inferred from conscious parallelism only when certain "plus factors" exist. See In re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 884 (8th Cir. 1978) (requiring evidence that defendant acted contrary to self-interest in addition to evidence of conscious parallelism to establish antitrust violation). A plus factor refers to "'the additional facts or factors required to be proved as a prerequisite to finding that parallel [price] action amounts to a conspiracy.'" In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (quoting 6 Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law § 1433(e) (1986)).

A plaintiff has the burden to present evidence of consciously paralleled pricing supplemented with one or more plus factors. See Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 n.30 (11th Cir. 1991). However, even if a plaintiff carries its initial burden, a court must still find, based upon all the evidence before it, that the plaintiff's evidence tends to exclude the possibility of independent action. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 & 768; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588; see also In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122. As noted, the class identified parallel pricing. The class also...

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