State v. Sykes
Decision Date | 10 April 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 56,56 |
Citation | 285 N.C. 202,203 S.E.2d 849 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Jack Edward SYKES. |
Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen., Claude W. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State of North Carolina.
Douglas P. Connor, Mount Olive, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant assigns as error the trial court's action in admitting over objection the following testimony of Officer Wood:
Defendant contends his incriminating statement was elicited by custodial interrogation before he had been advised of his constitutional rights as mandated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He therefore argues that his incriminating statement should have been excluded.
Miranda warnings and waiver of counsel are required when, and only when, the defendant is being subjected to custodial interrogation. State v. Blackmon, 284 N.C. 1, 199 S.E.2d 431 (1973). 'By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
At the time Officer Wood asked defendant if he had been drinking, defendant was not in custody, under arrest, or 'deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' While there is no absolute test to ascertain exactly when an arrest occurs, the time and place of an arrest is determined in the context of the circumstances surrounding it. State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973).
Officer Wood's initial detention of defendant to investigate defendant's erratic driving did not amount to an arrest. 'The brief detention of a citizen based upon an officer's reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot is permissible for the purpose of limited inquiry in the course of a routine investigation, and any incriminating evidence which comes to the officer's attention during this period of detention may become a reasonable basis for effecting a valid arrest.' United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1970).
Furthermore, the decision in Miranda was not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
In relation to routine police investigations of traffic violations, one federal court had this to say:
Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969).
In the factual context of this case defendant was not in custody and Officer Wood was merely in the process of conducting a general on-the-scene investigation when defendant responded that he had been drinking. It was only after that admission, and after observing defendant's inability to walk normally or retain his balance that he was placed under arrest. In light of these facts, Miranda warnings were not required.
We observe in passing that State v. Beasley, 10 N.C.App. 663, 179 S.E.2d 820 (1971), and State v. Tyndall, 18 N.C.App. 669, 197 S.E.2d 598 (1973), should not be interpreted to hold that the rules of Miranda are inapplicable to All motor vehile violations. We said in State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547, 178 S.E.2d 462 (1971): 'One who is detained by police officers under a charge of driving under the influence of an intoxicant has the same Constitutional and statutory rights as any other accused.' (Emphasis added) We adhere to that view. Even so, it was no violation of this defendant's constitutional rights for the officer to observe and converse with him during the on-the-scene investigation and then testify with respect to defendant's state of insobriety. For a general discussion on the applicability of Miranda to traffic offenses, see Annotation, Police Interrogation[285 N.C. 207] --trafFic offeNse, 25 a.l.R.3D 1076 (1969). Defendant's first assignment of error is overruled.
After advising defendant he was under arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicants, Officer Wood asked him if he would take a breathalyzer test and defendant said that he would. Officer Wood then requested Trooper Flynn to come to the jail to perform the breathalyzer test. Prior to giving defendant the test Trooper Flynn advised him of his statutory rights to an attorney or a witness to observe the test so long as it did not delay the test over thirty minutes. Defendant said he did not want an attorney or witness and the test was administered with his consent at 12:25 a.m. on 15 June 1972. Over defendant's...
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