Territory of New Mexico Ex Rel Lean Company v. Denver Rio Grande Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 15 October 1906
• Docket Number: No. 18,18
• Citation: 203 U.S. 38,51 L.Ed. 78,27 S.Ct. 1
• Parties: TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO EX REL. E. J. McLEAN & COMPANY, Appt. v. DENVER & RIO GRANDE RAILROAD COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

203 U.S. 38

27 S.Ct. 1

51 L.Ed. 78

TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO EX REL. E. J. McLEAN & COMPANY, Appt.

v DENVER & RIO GRANDE RAILROAD COMPANY.

No. 18.

Argued March 14, 15, 1906.

Decided October 15, 1906.

Messrs. William B. Childers and T. B. Catron for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 39-43 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Charles A. Spiess, A. C. Campbell, and D. J. Leahey for appellee.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 43-46 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the supreme court of New Mexico, affirming the judgment of the district court of Santa Fe county, sustaining a motion to quash an alternative writ of mandamus issued on the relation of E. J. McLean & Company against the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company.

From the allegations of the writ it appears that the relators, the appellants here, had delivered to the railroad company at Santa Fe, New Mexico, a bale of hides consigned to Denver, Colorado, a point on the line of the defendant's railroad. The railroad company refused to receive and ship the hides for the reason that they did not bear the evidence of inspection required by the act of the legislature of New Mexico, approved March 19, 1901, which act, to be more fully noticed hereafter, made it an offense for any railroad company to receive hides for shipment beyond the limits of the territory which had not been inspected within the requirements of the law.

An objection is made to the jurisdiction of this court upon the ground that the case is not appealable under the act of Congress of March 3, 1885. 23 Stat. at L. 443, chap. 355 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 572).

Section 1 of the act provides, in substance, that no appeal or writ of error shall be allowed from any judgment or decree of the supreme court of a territory unless the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum of $5,000. Section 2 of the act makes exception to the application of § 1 as to the sum in dispute, in cases wherein is involved the validity of a treaty or statute of or authority exercised under the United States, and in all such cases an appeal or writ of error will lie without regard to the sum or value in dispute.

Confessedly, $5,000 is not involved; and in order to be appealable to this court the case must involve the validity of an authority exercised under the United States, and also be a controversy in which some sum or value is involved. This court, in the case of United States v. Lynch, 137 U. S. 280-285, 34 L. ed. 700-702, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114—116, laid down the test of the right to appeal under the statute in the following terms:

'The validity of a statute, or the validity of an authority, is drawn in question when the existence or constitutionality or legality of such statute or authority is denied, and the denial forms the subject of direct inquiry.'

The right to legislate in the territories is conferred, under constitutional authority, by the Congress of the United States, and the passage of a territorial law is the exertion of an authority exercised under the United States. While this act was passed in pursuance of the authority given by the United States to the territorial legislature, it is contended by the relators below, appellants here, that it violates the Constitution of the United States, and is therefore invalid, although it is an attempted exercise of power conferred by Congress upon the territory. The objection of the relator to the law raises a controversy as to the right of the legislature to pass it under the broad power of legislation conferred by Congress upon the territory. In other words, the validity of an authority exercised under the United States in the passage and enforcement of this law is directly challenged, and the case does involve the validity of an authority exercised under the power derived from the United States. It is not a case merely involving the construction of a legislative act of the territory, as was the fact in Snow v. United States, 118 U. S. 346, 30 L. ed. 207, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1059. The power to pass the act at all, in view of the requirements of the Constitution of the United States, is the subject-matter of controversy, and brings the case in this aspect within the 2d section of the act.

Is there any sum or value in dispute in this case? While the act does not prescribe the amount, some sum or value must be in dispute. Albright v. New Mexico, 200 U. S. 9, 50 L. ed. 346, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 210. The matter in dispute is the right to have the goods which were tendered for shipment transported to their destination. As a common carrier, the railroad was bound to receive and transport the goods. Its refusal so to do was based upon the statute in question because of the noninspection of the goods tendered. The relators claimed the right to have their goods transported because the statute was null and void, being an unconstitutional enactment. The controversy, therefore, relates to the right of the appellants to have their goods transported by the railroad company to the place of destination. We think this was a valuable right, measurable in money. At common law, a cause of action arose from the refusal of a common carrier to transport goods duly tendered for carriage. Ordinarily, the measure of damages in such case is the difference between the value of the goods at the point of tender and their value at their proposed destination, less the cost of carriage. We are of the opinion that this controversy involves a money value within the meaning of the statute, and the motion to dismiss the appeal will be overruled.

Passing to the merits of the controversy, Congress has conferred legislative power upon the territory to an extent not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1851. It is contended that the act under consideration contravenes that part of article 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the United States, which reads: 'No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.' And also that part of the 8th section of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, which gives to Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the states, and with the Indian tribes.

As to the objection predicated on § 10 of article 1, that section can have no application to the present case, as that provision directly applies only to articles imported or exported to foreign countries. Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345-350, 43 L. ed. 191-193, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862, and cases cited. Moreover, that paragraph of the Constitution expressly reserves the right of the states to pass inspection laws, and if this law is of that character it does not run counter to this requirement of the Constitution.

The question principally argued is as to the effect of this law upon interstate commerce, and it is urged that it is in violation of the Constitution, because it undertakes to regulate interstate commerce, and lays upon it a tax not within the power of the local legislature to exact. It has been too frequently decided by this court to require the restatement of the decisions, that the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce is vested by the Constitution in Congress, and that other laws which undertake to regulate such commerce or impose burdens upon it are invalid. This doctrine has been reaffirmed and announced in cases decided as recently as the last term of this court. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321, 50 L. ed. 772, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 491; McNeill v. Southern R. Co. 202 U. S. 543, 50 L. ed. 1142, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722. While this is true, it is equally well settled that a state or a territory, for the same reasons, in the exercise of the police power, may make rules and regulations not conflicting with the legislation of Congress upon the same subject, and not amounting to regulations of interstate commerce. It will only be necessary to refer to a few of the many cases decided in this court holding valid enactments of legislatures having for their object the protection, welfare, and safety of the people, although such laws may have an effect upon interstate commerce. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613-635, 42 L. ed. 878-885, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 42 L. ed. 688, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 48 L. ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132. The principle decided in these cases is that a state or territory has the right to legislate for the safety and welfare of its people, and that this right is not taken from it because of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, except in cases where the attempted exercise of authority by the legislature is in conflict with an act of Congress, or is an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. In Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture, supra, it was directly recognized that the state might pass inspection laws for the protection of its people against fraudulent practices and for the suppression of frauds, although such legislation had an effect upon interstate commerce. The same principle was recognized in Neilson v. Garza, 2 Woods, 287, Fed. Cas. No. 10,091,—a case decided by Mr. Justice Bradley on the circuit and quoted from...